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Abstract
Hypnosis is associated with profound changes in conscious thought, experience and 
behaviour and has a long clinical and experimental history. Data on the nature and role of 
hypnotic induction procedures is still somewhat lacking however, and probably the only 
thing one can say about them with any conviction is that they enhance suggestibility in 
some cases. Nevertheless, a review and re-analyses of previous work reveals that the effect of 
the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility may be substantial, comparable to psychological 
treatments in general. The work reported here makes a clear distinction between the 
hypothetical ‘hypnotic state’ and the phenomena produced by suggestion and aimed to 
investigate the necessity for the former in producing suggestibility changes and the 
mechanisms by which both exert their influence. As it had important implications for how 
non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility were measured in the thesis, Study 1 (n=312) 
examined the relationship between lateral asymmetry and bodily response to suggestion. 
Study 2 (n=102) and Study 3 (n=105) explored the notion that absorption and reduced 
critical thought are instrumental in how inductions effect responses to test-suggestions and 
suggestions for pain modulation respectively. Study 4 (n=105) investigated the effect on 
suggestibility of a hypnotic induction and the extent to which the magnitude of this effect is 
altered by labelling the procedure ‘hypnosis’. Study 5 (n=105) examined the influence of 
compliance to requests on suggestibility and addressed the role of strategy selection in 
response to suggestions. The findings are important for both clinical and experimental 
applications and indicate that important determinants of subsequent responses to 
suggestion are: (i) the definition of the situation as hypnotic which in turn enhances the 
expectation of benefits; (ii) the focussing of attention and the reduction of critical thought; 
and (iii) the facilitation of engaging in goal-directed behaviours through compliance to 
requests.
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Chapter 1
Suggestion and Suggestibility 
Overview of chapters 1-3
It has been hypothesised, in the context of ‘hypnosis’, that if a suggestion is effectively at 
work, then a state of hypnosis must be present (e.g. Hilgard, 1965; Orne, 1959, Shor, 1959). 
However, more recently there has been a tendency amongst researchers not to differentiate 
between the effects caused by suggestion and those possibly dependent on a hypnotic state. 
Both are often placed in the category ‘hypnosis’. Until the cognitive and neuropsychological 
mechanisms of both of these potential components have been definitively established, 
hypnosis and suggestion should be treated separately. The thesis makes a clear distinction 
between the hypothetical ‘hypnotic state’ and the phenomena produced by suggestion 
(Heap & Aravind, 2002). The main focus of this first chapter is suggestion, in particular 
suggestions that are typically included within the ‘domain of hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1991). 
Hypnosis and the hypothetical ‘hypnotic state’ will be the main topic of Chapter 2; and in 
Chapter 3 the effects of hypnosis on responses to suggestion will be reviewed and critically 
examined.
1.1. The nature o f suggestion and suggestibility
Suggestion and suggestibility were once central topics in psychology, with eminent 
psychologists such as Binet (1900), Bernheim (1911), Freud, (1921), Eysenck (1947), Hull 
(1933), James (1890), Janet (1889) and Sidis (1898) contributing to our understanding of 
them. However, in the last 60 years or so there has been a comparative lack of interest in 
investigating the phenomenon of human suggestibility and as Gheorghiu (1989a) has 
pointed out, suggestibility has become the ‘stepchild’ of psychological research.
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So what is suggestion and suggestibility? Unfortunately, the task of devising central 
definitions of these terms has eluded psychology. Gheorghiu (2000) notes that in modern 
suggestion research -  as in the famous articles of Eysenck (1947) and Stukat (1958) -  no 
definitions are actually presented. Bernheim (1884) defined suggestion as a process by 
which a communication is immediately transformed into the corresponding act, 
emphasising the involuntary and unconscious nature of responding to suggestions. 
MacDougall (1908) identified suggestion as a process involving the acceptance of an idea in 
the absence of critical thought. Some theorists specifically included hypnosis when defining 
suggestibility, viewing hypnosis as an extreme case of suggestibility (e.g. Bernheim, 1884; 
Eysenck, 1991; Hull, 1933; Sidis, 1898). Others argue that the terms ‘suggestion’ and 
‘suggestibility’ are global ones, and hence carry many meanings, which contributes to the 
confusion surrounding these terms (e.g. Schumaker, 1991b; Gheorghiu, 1989a, 2000). 
Marcuse (1959) concluded that ‘the definitions which are proffered are varied, confusing 
and incomplete’ (p. 85). The generality of suggestion and suggestibility can be illustrated by 
how these terms are intimately related to a variety of important psychological concepts 
(Gheorghiu & Kruse, 1991; Eysenck, 1991), such as conformity, compliance, the placebo 
response, hypnotic phenomena, influence, expectancy and imitation. It is clear that 
suggestibility is a complex phenomenon, and is unlikely to represent a monolithic construct 
(Schumaker, 1991b), however, the fundamental aspects of suggestion and suggestibility 
remain to be elucidated. The lack of standardised psychological tests available for measuring 
individual levels of suggestibility independently of hypnosis has resulted in the mainstay of 
the literature being primarily in connection with hypnosis. Nevertheless, as indicated by this 
brief overview, suggestibility clearly has meaning independent of hypnosis, and it is with the 
non-hypnotic context that this chapter will initially be concerned with.
1.2. Suggestibility independent of hypnosis
Experimental work on suggestibility independent of the hypnotic context dates back to the 
nineteenth century (e.g. Binet, 1900; Gilbert, 1894; Seashore, 1895; Sidis, 1898). Although
15
the manifestation and nature of ‘suggestion’ in psychological literature has primarily been in 
connection with hypnosis, the focus of this section will be non-hypnotic suggestibility, 
sometimes referred to as ‘waking’1 suggestibility (e.g. Bernheim, 1884; Hull, 1933)
Research on suggestion independent of hypnosis carried out by pioneers such as Binet, 
Seashore and Sidis, was primarily concerned with whether ‘normal suggestibility’ in the 
‘normal’ population actually existed and whether it could be empirically tested (Gheorghiu, 
1989a). This led to the development of suggestibility tests outside the hypnotic context, 
where participants were tested indirectly, without any awareness that their perceptions and 
judgements were being influenced. Binet’s (1900) progressive lines and weights tests are the 
most well known examples of these indirect tests of suggestibility. The progressive lines test 
involves participants being briefly shown a line of a particular length, which is then removed 
and replaced by a series of other lines. The first few lines are longer than the preceding one, 
but subsequent lines are of equal length.
Participants are required to judge whether the line is ‘longer’, ‘shorter’ or ‘equal’. The 
progressive weights test is similar in nature, involving the judgement of weights rather than 
line length (Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Hull (1933) classified these tasks as tests of impersonal 
suggestion. In contrast Hull identified more explicit tests of suggestibility involving 
communications that suggested effects were occurring, as tests of personal suggestion. One of 
the oldest and best known examples of an ‘explicit’ test of suggestibility is the postural sway 
test, which involves participants standing with their eyes closed and being told repeatedly 
that they will experience a backward movement, then a tendency to sway backward and then 
a tendency to fall. Another classic example is the Chevreul pendulum test, which involves 
suspending a pendulum above the ground whilst the person holding it up is given the 
suggestion that the pendulum is beginning to sway. This classification of personal and 
impersonal tests of suggestibility, are also designated as direct and indirect procedures or
1 The term ‘waking’ when used to distinguish suggestibility from hypnotic suggestibility is a misnomer as 
hypnosis is unrelated to sleep (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999)
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prestige and non-prestige measures by many researchers (e.g. Aveling & Hargreaves, 1921; 
Binet, 1900; Bird, 1940; Lurie, 1938)
A few years later Eysenck and Furneaux (1945) in their influential study, made distinctions 
similar to these earlier conceptions (Gwynn & Spanos, 1996). Eysenck and Furneaux (1945) 
administered 12 tests of suggestibility to sixty neurotic male army patients of average 
intelligence. Using factorial analysis they identified two types of suggestibility: ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’. Primary suggestibility involved participants’ behavioural and experiential 
involuntary responses to direct verbal suggestions. Eysenck and Furneaux (1945) found the 
various measures of primary suggestibility, which include the postural sway and Chevreul 
pendulum tests, to correlate highly with hypnotizability and phenomena associated with 
hypnosis. Secondary suggestibility is rather a vague category and was said to involve 
suggestibility of the indirect kind, as measured by Binet’s (1900) progressive lines and 
weights tests. Eysenck and Furneaux indicated that secondary suggestibility might be closely 
associated to various tendencies otherwise known as ‘gullibility’. In contrast to primary 
suggestibility, secondary suggestibility did not correlate with hypnotizability.
Subsequent studies have attempted to verify Eysenck-Furneaux’s important classification of 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ suggestibility, and in the main the findings appear mixed and 
inconclusive. In one of the earliest studies, Grimes (1948) administered 16 tests judged to be 
‘valid measures of suggestibility’ to 233 orphan boys, between 8 to 15 years of age. Grimes 
found that the correlations between the tests of suggestibility were for the most part very 
low, some being positive and others negative, although there was some evidence for a 
primary suggestibility factor (Gheorghiu 1989a, Gwynn 8c Spanos, 1996). Benton and 
Bandura (1953) aimed to corroborate the findings of Eysenck and Furneaux using a 
‘normal’ (rather than ‘abnormal’) population of 50 undergraduate students. However, their 
results appeared to indicate that the Eysenck-Furneaux conclusions did not apply to a group 
of normal young adults, with mostly non-significant correlations between tests of 
suggestibility.
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Stukat (1958) carried out a comprehensive factorial and experimental analysis of 
suggestibility with samples of Swedish children and adults and found factors consistent with 
Eysenck-Furneaux’s classification of primary suggestibility. Stukat (1958) also found factors 
consistent with secondary suggestibility, and claimed that secondary suggestibility involved 
the effect of subjective factors, such as conformity and expectation, on cognitive functions, 
such as perception and memory (Gheorghiu 1989a, Gwynn 8c Spanos, 1996). This 
interpretation reflected the earlier developments of Binet (1900) who posited that there was 
a relationship between responsiveness to suggestion and: (a) obedience to mental influence 
emanating from another person; (b) imitation; (c) susceptibility to preconceived ideas, 
inhibiting the faculty of criticism; and (d) expectative attention (Gheorghiu 1989a, Gwynn 
8c Spanos, 1996). Stukat’s conformity factor corresponds closely to (a) and (b), whilst 
Stukat’s expectation factor corresponds to (c) and (d) (Gwynn 8c Spanos, 1996). Primary 
suggestibility was found to be uncorrelated with age, whereas secondary suggestibility was 
found to be negatively correlated with increasing age. In addition, neurotics, tended to be 
more suggestible participants on tests of secondary suggestibility only.
Duke (1964) carried out a review of the intercorrelational status of suggestibility tests up to 
the early 1960’s. He found the correlations between primary suggestibility tests from all 
research he reviewed to be moderately high (r = 0.46) providing support for a factor of 
primary suggestibility. Primary suggestibility tests were also found to provide an adequate 
measure of hypnotizability (correlation with hypnosis: r=  0.60). Secondary suggestibility 
measures were found to have low intercorrelations (r = 0.14). Duke (1964) further classified 
secondary suggestibility into 4 sub-categories: (i) ‘task set’ which were associated with 
Binet’s (1900) progressive weights and lines tests; (ii) ‘sensory’ which were related to tests of 
heat and odour illusions; (iii) ‘conformity’; and (iv) standard geometric illusion tests. Of the 
4 sub-categories of secondary suggestibility tests, there was a very low correlations between 
sensory and conformity classes and primary tests (approximately r = 0.10). Task set tests 
failed to correlate with primary tests, but did exhibit a very low correlation with sensory and 
conformity tests (approximately r = 0.10). Standard illusion tests failed to correlate among
18
themselves or with other categories of suggestibility test. Overall Duke’s results indicate a 
lack of empirical support for the concept of secondary suggestibility.
Evans (1967) evaluated the earlier evidence and attempted to classify and account more 
precisely for suggestibility observed in ‘normal’ participants. In particular, Evans claimed 
that factor analytic studies (e.g. Duke, 1964; Hammer, Evans & Bartlett, 1963; Stukat, 1958) 
do not confirm the classification of primary and secondary suggestibility as identified by 
Eysenck and Furneaux (1945). He posited that these studies identify at least 3 types of 
suggestibility: primary, challenge and imagery/sensory suggestibility. Evans’ primary 
suggestibility factor was synonymous with that described by Eysenck and Furneaux (1945), 
as measured by body sway and Chevreul pendulum tests. Challenge suggestibility was 
characterised by suggestions for example for arm rigidity and immobility, which suggest 
that individuals cannot carry out a certain action (e.g. move their arm), and then 
challenging them to overcome the induced phenomenon. Imagery or sensory suggestibility 
was closely associated with heat and odour illusion tests and involved an uncritical 
acceptance of suggested situations (Evans, 1967; Gwynn & Spanos, 1996).
In summary, the findings concerning non-hypnotic suggestibility (suggestibility 
independent of hypnosis) are at best inconclusive and beset with equivocal results and 
conceptual difficulties. The only clear conclusion that emerges from the literature is that 
suggestibility is not a unitary dimension (e.g. Evans, 1967; Eysenck, 1947; Gheorghiu, 1989a; 
Stukat, 1958; Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Gheorghiu (1989a) points out that classification of 
suggestibility has been so firmly entrenched with procedures, at the expense of any 
additional explanation at all. In others words research has been pre-occupied with ‘how’ a 
suggestion procedure is implemented, rather than ‘what’ is suggested. For example, Eysenck 
and Furneaux’s original and influential categorisations associated primary suggestibility 
with “m otor” activities and a ‘direct’ suggestion mode (e.g. body-sway test; Chevreul 
pendulum). Whilst in contrast, secondary suggestibility was connected with ‘sensory’ 
activities and an ‘indirect’ suggestion mode (e.g. heat illusion test). Consequently, direct and
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indirect tests often differed on ‘how’ something was suggested as well as ‘what’ was 
suggested (Gheorghiu, Polczyk & Kappeller 2003). However, motor and sensory processes 
can be influenced by both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ suggestions, emphasising the importance of 
the way in which the influence of suggestion actually exerts its effect as opposed to the 
procedural method (e.g. Hammer et al., 1963 Stukat, 1958). Similarly indirect suggestions 
are often cited as being a ‘permissive’ mode, with direct suggestion being an ‘authoritative’ 
mode. However, direct suggestive influence can be achieved in a permissive, non- 
authoritative way (Gheorghiu, 1989a). Gheorghiu (1989a) claims one-sided connections, 
such as those made by Eysenck and Furneaux (i.e. direct suggestion mode with motor 
processes and indirect suggestion mode with sensory processes) have resulted in 
classifications that are far too sweeping, based on differences that may not all be equally 
meaningful.
Another key shortcoming of research on suggestibility is the lack of standardisation of tests 
for the measurement of suggestibility. Even with the best-known tests such as the body-sway 
and Chevreul pendulum tests, which were first used in the nineteenth century, there are no 
established or general methods for implementing them. Consequently the same tests may 
differ in relation to: the condition and context the tests are administered in; the instructions 
and explanations given to participants; the time available to complete the tests; the sequence 
the test items are received; and the method used to score test items (Gheorghiu et al., 2003). 
The contradictory and ambiguous results evident in the literature may be due in part to the 
lack of standardised tests and deficiencies in the procedures used to implement them 
(Gheorghiu, 1989a).
Investigations in this area are rare, and research on suggestion and suggestibility after 
reaching a peak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with Binet, Eysenck and 
Hull to name but a few, almost disappeared from psychology completely. In the last 30 years 
there has been a resurgence of interest in suggestion. The terms ‘suggestion’ and 
‘suggestibility’ have gained the attention of many researchers, however this has almost been
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exclusively in the context of the areas of: hypnosis, social influence, placebos, and memory 
distortions induced by means of suggestive techniques2 (Gheorghiu, et al., 2003). Entire 
books and a multitude of articles have been devoted to the role of suggestion in these areas 
and therefore would be too large to comprehensively examine here (for excellent reviews of 
contemporary suggestion and suggestibility research and theory, see the edited books by De 
Pascalis, Gheorghiu, Sheehan & Kirsch, 2000; Gheorghiu, Netter, Eysenck & Rosenthal, 
1989; Schumaker, 1991a). In light of this, the focus of the thesis, and the paucity of research 
on the fundamental aspects of suggestibility independent of hypnosis, the discussion will 
now turn to the literature on suggestion and suggestibility within the ‘domain of hypnosis’ 
and the relationship between hypnotic responsiveness and (i) social influence; (ii) placebo 
effects; and (iii) interrogative suggestibility.
1.3. Suggestion and suggestibility within the domain o f hypnosis
In 1973 Hilgard characterised the ‘domain of hypnosis’ by the kinds of behaviours and 
experiences reported in hypnosis. Hypnotic phenomena such as analgesia, motor 
inhibitions, amnesia, and hallucinations were seen as central to a definition of hypnosis. 
Hilgard (1973, 1991) claimed that certain forms of suggestibility are associated with 
hypnosis and others lie outside the domain of hypnosis. He characterised suggestion as a 
‘form of communication that produces a compliant response that differs in its subjective 
aspects from a deliberate response to a request’ (1991, p. 38). Specifically, Hilgard argued 
that ‘primary suggestibility’ is closely related to hypnosis; whilst ‘secondary suggestibility’ 
characterised by forms of social suggestibility, such as gullibility, conformity, and 
compliance are unrelated to hypnotic behaviour. In the main, the ‘domain of hypnosis’ is
2 The suggestion associated with social influence, placebos, and memory distortions induced by means of 
suggestive techniques, could be classified as types of non-hypnotic suggestibility. This chapter distinguishes 
these possible forms of non-hypnotic suggestibility from the literature on suggestibility independent of 
hypnosis, which is reviewed in section 1.2, and is based on classical tests for measuring suggestibility (e.g. 
body-sway and Chevreul pendulum tests).
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largely defined by the standardised scales that are used to measure hypnotizability3, such as 
the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard,
1962) and the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos, 
Radtke, Hodgins, Stam & Bertand, 1983). These scales, which typically comprise of a 
hypnotic induction ritual and a series of test suggestions, are central to the thrust of the 
thesis and will be examined thoroughly later on in the chapter (section 1.7). But now the 
relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and other forms of suggestibility will be 
considered.
1.4. Hypnotic suggestibility and social influence
As discussed earlier, Eysenck and Furneaux (1945) found hypnotizability correlated with 
primary suggestibility, involving direct tests, but not with secondary suggestibility, which 
involved more indirect tests. Similarly, Hull (1933) and Evans (1967) found a positive 
correlation between responses to direct non-hypnotic suggestions (i.e. primary 
suggestibility) and hypnotizability. In a widely cited study by Moore (1964), the 
relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and social suggestibility was investigated in 80 
male participants. Social influence was measured using a persuasibility test (Hovland &
Janis, 1959); an influencibility test (Schachter, 1959) and an autokinetic test (Sherif, 1935). 
Hypnotic suggestibility was measured by the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form A 
(SHSS:A; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959). Factor analysis appeared to show that the 
hypnotic scale and sub-scales represented one factor (primary suggestibility), which was 
orthogonal to a bipolar factor represented largely by scores on the tests of social influence. 
The correlations revealed that hypnotic suggestibility was marginally negatively related to 
persuasibility (r = -0.17, p < 0.10), moderately positively correlated with influencibility (r =
3 The term ‘hypnotizability’ will sometimes be used for convenience. Strictly speaking hypnotizability is 
the change in responsiveness to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions produced by the induction of hypnosis (Kirsch,
1997). However, hypnotizability in the context o f this chapter refers to the measurement of responsiveness 
to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions following the administration of a hypnotic induction -  i.e. hypnotic 
suggestibility (see section 1.8)
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0.21, p < 0.05) and uncorrelated with the autokinetic test. Moore suggested that the 
moderate relationship between influencibility and hypnotic suggestibility might be 
accounted, in part, by the inclusion of the postural sway suggestion in the total hypnotic 
suggestibility score. Moore (1964) came to a similar conclusion to that of Hilgard, and 
proposed that hypnotizability tapped into ‘primary’ suggestibility, whilst tests of social 
suggestibility were related to conceptions of ‘secondary’ suggestibility, and that both were 
independent of one another.
In contrast, Shames (1981) reported a strong relationship (r = 0.55, p < 0.05) between 
hypnotic suggestibility, as measured by the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP: Spiegel & 
Spiegel, 1978) and conformity, determined by means of the classic Asch paradigm (1952, 
1956). Shames hypothesised that suggestibility was the construct mediating the correlation 
between these two phenomena. However, this strong relationship was based on only 10 
participants, and it is still yet to be determined whether this relationship would remain if 
investigated’ using a more substantial sample. Another weakness undermining these results 
is the use of the Hypnotic Induction Profile as measure of hypnotic suggestibility. A number 
of studies have failed to support a relationship between the HIP and conventional 
suggestion-based tests of hypnotic responsiveness such as the Stanford scales (e.g. Sheehan, 
Latta, Regina & Smith, 1979; Orne, Hilgard, Spiegel, Spiegel, Crawford, Evans, Orne, & 
Frischholz, 1979).
Several studies have found that higher levels of hypnotic suggestibility may be associated 
with greater responsiveness to social influence. Miller (1980) examined the relationship 
between the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A; Shor and 
Orne, 1962) and the Suggested Syllables test, which was deemed to be a behavioural 
measure of non-hypnotic suggestibility. The Suggested Syllables test requires participants to 
determine the identity of tachistoscopically presented ‘nonsense’ syllables when, unknown 
to them, no syllables were present. Miller found that low hypnotically suggestible 
participants perceived the suggested syllables significantly less frequently than both high and
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medium hypnotically suggestible participants. Council and Loge (1988) similarly found a 
significant difference between high and low hypnotically suggestible participants who 
received instructions implying that they would perceive increases in odour or heaviness. 
Greater hypnotic suggestibility was found to be associated with more perceived changes in 
odour and heaviness and greater confidence in reports. However, Council and Loge found 
no differences between hypnotic and non-hypnotic contexts, and concluded that their 
results supported a ‘general factor underlying suggestibility in hypnotic and non-hypnotic 
situations’ (p. 95).
Malott, Bourg and Crawford (1989) assessed the impact of a hypnotic induction and 
hypnotic suggestibility on the responses of 48 undergraduates to a persuasive 
communication advocating mandatory pregraduation comprehensive examinations.
Malott et al., (1989) found that participants in the hypnotic context (following a hypnotic 
induction) generated significantly fewer counter-arguments to the presentation, than 
participants in the non-hypnotic context (absence of hypnotic induction). No differences 
with respect to counter-arguing were found between high and low hypnotically suggestible 
participants. However, high hypnotically suggestible participants, in both contexts, were 
significantly more likely than low hypnotically suggestible participants, to agree and be in 
favour of the arguments presented in the communication. Malott et al., (1989) concluded 
that ‘both context (induction) and trait (hypnotic suggestibility level) played a role in the 
occurrence of hypnotic behaviour’ (p. 31). Graham and Greene (1981) also found a similar 
relationship between response to persuasive communication and hypnotic responsiveness.
In short, the findings with respect to the relationship between hypnotic responsiveness and 
social influence are highly inconsistent. Some studies indicate that higher levels of hypnotic 
responsiveness may be associated with greater responsiveness to social influence (e.g. 
Shames, 1981; Malott et al., 1989); whilst others have found them to be independent of one 
another (e.g. Eysenck & Furneaux, 1945; Moore, 1964). The relationship between the two is 
further complicated by the findings that measures of susceptibility to social influence,
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including, Hovland and Janis’ (1959) persuasibility test, Schachter’s (1959) influencibility 
test, and Sherifs (1935) autokinetic test, do not correlate with each other (see Moore, 1964). 
It is not clear at all whether responses to social influence are distinct from hypnotizability.
1.5. Hypnotic suggestibility and the placebo response
The literature regarding the relationship between hypnotic and placebo responsiveness is 
also less than definitive, partly due to a lack of research and lack of conceptual clarity in this 
area. It is generally agreed that placebo effects are due to a variety of psychological processes, 
including patient’s belief in the efficacy of the treatment, response expectancies, and aspects 
of the patient-doctor relationship (e.g. Lundh, 1987, 2000; Wagstaff, 1981). Lundh (2000) 
defines placebo effects as ‘psychologically mediated effects that are due either to the patient’s 
belief in the efficacy of the treatment, or to other aspects of the therapeutic relationship’ (p. 
72). The deceptive nature of placebos makes phenomena in response to placebos similar to 
Eysenck and Furneaux’s category o f ‘secondary suggestibility’ (Kirsch, 2000b). The classic 
study of McGlashan, Evans and Orne (1969) is frequently cited as providing evidence that 
suggestions involved in placebos are not the same as hypnotic responsiveness (see also 
Evans, 1981, 1989; Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983; Orne, 1974; Shapiro, 1971). The study 
compared hypnosis to placebo medication (a placebo packed in Darvon capsules) in the 
relief of ischemic muscle pain. They reported that high hypnotically suggestible participants 
showed substantial pain reduction in response to hypnotic analgesia and only a slight pain 
decrease in the placebo condition. In contrast, low hypnotically suggestible participants 
showed a mild pain reduction in both the hypnotic analgesia and placebo conditions. 
Placebo response did not differ significantly between high and low hypnotically suggestible 
participants. They concluded that the mechanisms underlying hypnotic responses are 
distinguishable from those involved in responses to placebos. Spanos, Perlini and Robertson 
(1989) similarly found that high hypnotically suggestible participants showed significantly 
greater pain reduction in hypnosis as compared to both baseline and placebo conditions,
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despite using a different pain stimulus (a strain gauge on a finger) and a different placebo 
(‘topical anaesthetic’) to that used in the McGlashan et al., (1969) study.
The evidence appears to indicate that hypnotic responsiveness is independent of placebo 
responsiveness. However, there are several problems relating to these laboratory studies 
comparing placebo and hypnotic analgesia. Primarily, the parameters of experimental and 
clinical pain do not overlap in several areas (Melzack, 1973). Evans (1974) indicates that 
analgesic placebos are about twice as effective in clinical trials as in experimental trials. 
Kirsch (2000b) highlights another potential flaw in studies comparing hypnosis and placebo 
effects, noting that placebo controlled investigations require that the placebo match the 
treatment for which it is a control for, as different placebos potentially have different effects. 
Indeed, in a recent review of placebo effects Kirsch (2002) cites studies showing that: 
placebo injections are more effective than placebo pills (de Craen, Tijssen, de Gans,
Kleijnen, 2000); placebo morphine is more effective than placebo aspirin (Evans, 1974); red 
placebos are more effective than white, blue or green placebos (de Craen, Roos, de Vries, 
Kleijnen, 1996; Huskisson, 1974; Nagao, Komia, Kuroanagai, Minaba 8c Susa, 1968); 
placebos are more effective when associated with a well-known brand; and that the placebo 
response varies as a function o f ‘dose’ consumed (Branthwaite 8c Cooper, 1981)
Kirsch (2000b) argues that given the differing effects of different placebos it is possible that 
high hypnotically suggestible individuals who are able to experience phenomena such as 
hallucinations, analgesia and amnesia, would consequently expect greater pain relief from 
hypnosis than a placebo packed in Darvon capsules or described as a ‘topical anaesthetic’. In 
this context he refers to a study (Baker 8c Kirsch, 1993), which found that placebo and 
hypnosis were equally effective in reducing pain, when the placebo was presented as a drug 
that induced hypnosis. It is evident that that relationship between hypnotic and placebo 
responsiveness is not as conclusive as is commonly believed. Nevertheless, linking hypnotic 
responsiveness to the placebo response may have detrimental consequences for the use of 
hypnotic suggestions as an adjunct to psychological and medical treatments. As Kihlstrom
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(2001) points out, the current healthcare environment perceives placebos negatively, rather 
than as a psychological phenomenon that could be utilised for positive effect. Future 
research will need to carry out comprehensive analyses and multivariate studies to elucidate 
the relationship between hypnotic and placebo responsiveness.
1.6. Hypnotic suggestibility and interrogative suggestibility
Interrogative suggestibility is one of the few areas, independent of hypnosis, that has 
produced an extensive and productive line of research inextricably linked with the concept 
of suggestion. Schooler and Loftus (1986) identify two main theoretical approaches to 
interrogative suggestibility: 1) the ‘experimental’ approach as typified by the work of Loftus 
and colleagues on the misinformation effect of eyewitness memory (e.g. Loftus, 1975, 1979; 
Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978); and 2) the ‘individual differences’ approach as illustrated by 
the work of Gudjonsson on individual differences in susceptibility to leading questions and 
responses to negative feedback (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1983, 1984, 1992, 2003; Gudjonsson & 
Clark, 1986) . Although the two approaches are complementary to each other (Gudjonsson, 
1992), the measurement of suggestibility is central to the work of Gudjonsson, and 
consequently emphasis will be placed on the ‘individual differences’ approach.
Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) define interrogative suggestibility as ‘the extent to which, 
within a closed social interaction, people come to accept messages communicated during 
formal questioning, as a result of which their subsequent behavioural response is affected’ 
(p. 84). Gudjonsson (1987, 1991) argues that interrogative suggestibility differs from other 
types of suggestibility in three important ways. Firstly, interrogative suggestibility is 
concerned with memory and the recollection of past experiences and events. Secondly, 
interrogative suggestibility is associated with procedures that take place in a closed social 
interaction (e.g. police questioning). Finally, interrogative suggestibility involves stressful 
situations, which play upon individuals’ level of certainty.
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After laying the foundation of the theoretical work (see Gudjonsson & Clarke, 1986), 
Gudjonsson constructed and developed a scale to measure individual differences in 
interrogative suggestibility (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale: GSS; Gudjonsson, 1984, 1992). 
The GSS assesses the extent to which participants ‘yield’ to subtly ‘leading questions’ and the 
extent to which participants ‘shift’ their responses once personal pressure is applied. The 
GSS has been shown to demonstrate high levels of internal consistency, test-retest reliability 
and construct validity (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1984; 1992; 2003; Gudjonsson & Lister, 1984; Singh 
& Gudjonsson, 1984). The GSS is often considered a test of indirect suggestibility, sharing 
features with secondary suggestibility (Eysenck and Furneaux, 1945), conformity, gullibility 
and persuasibility. Indeed, the GSS has been found to correlate positively with compliance 
and acquiescence (e.g. Gudjonsson, 1989; 1990; Richardson & Kelly, 2004) and social 
desirability (Gudjonsson, 1983; Richardson & Kelly, 2004).
Gudjonsson (1987) argues that there are good theoretical and empirical reasons for 
construing interrogative suggestibility as a distinct type of suggestibility. Therefore, on 
conceptual grounds, no relationship would be expected between hypnotizability and 
interrogative suggestibility. In line with Gudjonsson’s hypothesis, in an unpublished 
undergraduate study, Hardarson (1985; cited in Gudjonsson, 1991) found a non-significant 
relationship between interrogative suggestibility and hypnotizability as measured by the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS:A; Shor &Orne, 1962). Similarly, 
both Young, Bentall, Slade and Dewey (1987) and David and Brown (2002) reported an 
absence of correlations between interrogative suggestibility and hypnotizability as measured 
by the Barber Suggestibility Scale (BSS: Barber, 1965) and the HGSHS:A.
In the first study to explore the relationship between hypnotizability and interrogative 
suggestibility in the hypnotic setting, Register and Kihlstrom (1988) attempted to induce 
memory errors by the GSS following a hypnotic induction. Forty participants listened to a 
short news story and subsequently were required to free recall the details of the story. Four 
days later, participants were given three free-recall tests: prior to hypnosis, following a
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hypnotic induction, and once hypnosis was terminated. During hypnosis participants were 
interrogated twice, with either ‘misleading’ or ‘objective’ questioning for story details. 
Register and Kihlstrom (1988) found that participants given misleading questions during 
interrogation gave fewer correct responses, had more factual errors, increased forgetting, 
and increased yielding to interrogative suggestibility, when compared to participants given 
objective questions. No significant differences in interrogative suggestibility were found 
between high and low hypnotically suggestible participants. The authors concluded that 
their results were in ‘support of Gudjonsson’s (1987) hypothesis that interrogative 
suggestibility is independent of suggestibility as measured in a hypnotic context’ (p. 556).
Nevertheless the relationship between hypnotic and interrogative suggestibility may not be 
as independent as Gudjonsson hypothesised. Indeed, although Register and Kihlstrom’s
(1988) study involved both the GSS and a measure of hypnotic responsiveness and despite it 
often being cited as evidence in support of the independence of hypnotic and interrogative 
suggestibility, modifications and selective reporting make the assessment of the relationship 
unclear. Gwynn and Spanos (1996) identified several problems including: (i) the inclusion 
o f ‘objective’ questioning for half the participants, which was a major digression from the 
original GSS; (ii) the utilisation of only high and low hypnotically suggestible participants, 
thus inhibiting any correlational analyses; (iii) the lack of any type of non-hypnotic control 
group; and 4) failure to report a total interrogative suggestibility score as measured by the 
GSS.
In contrast to Gudjonsson’s hypothesis, Linton and Sheehan (1994) found a significant 
relationship between interrogative suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility (as measured by 
the HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962) in a sample of 117 college students. They found that 
suggestibility scores on the GSS differed between high and low hypnotizable participants. 
They also found that the HGSHS was significantly correlated with yield scores on the 
interrogative suggestibility scale. A possible explanation for why Linton and Sheehan (1994) 
found a positive relationship between interrogative suggestibility and hypnotizability may
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have been due to a context effect, as both measures were taken during the same session (see 
Council, Kirsch & Grant, 1996). Supportive of this notion is an unpublished study by 
Gordon, Gwynn and Spanos (1993; cited in Gwynn & Spanos, 1996), which found that 
when interrogative and hypnotic suggestibility were measured in different contexts, both 
were found to be independent of one another. However, when hypnotic procedures were 
incorporated into GSS testing, a relationship emerged between the two. These findings 
emphasise the importance of contextually generated expectancies and also indicates that to 
truly delineate the relationship between interrogative and hypnotic suggestibility, future 
research will need to assess the levels of hypnotizability and interrogative suggestibility in 
different sessions, whilst maintaining naivety regarding any connection between the two.
1.7. Measuring ‘hypnotic’ suggestibility
The previous sections have shown that despite the theoretical and empirical reasons offered 
by Hilgard (1973, 1991), Eysenck and Furneaux (1945) and Evans (1967, 1989) for 
construing that hypnosis is only related to ‘primary suggestibility’, it is evident that evidence 
pertaining to the independence of hypnosis with respect to social influence, the placebo 
response and interrogative suggestibility is far from conclusive. Possible explanations for the 
ambiguity of results in the literature may lie in the lack of available standardised tests and 
with the varying expectations and beliefs of individuals about the variables on which they 
are assessed. Theoretical constructs of suggestibility and their inter-relatedness need precise 
definition and instruments of measurement. The systematic analyses of the dimensions of 
suggestibility remain on the agenda for future research.
Compared to other forms of suggestibility, there is a substantial literature on ‘hypnotic’ 
suggestibility and its measurement. The close association between suggestion and hypnosis 
led to a preponderance of tests that specifically measure hypnotizability. The measurement 
of hypnotizability stems back to the nineteenth century and Braid’s (1843) proposed three 
‘stages’ of hypnosis. Bernheim (1884) developed these degrees of responsiveness to
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hypnosis, and proposed nine categories of responsiveness to suggestion, which were defined 
in terms of behavioural responses and subjective experiences. Bernheim’s ‘scale’ of hypnotic 
responsiveness is probably the forerunner of modern hypnotic scales and bears a close 
resemblance to the current standardised measures of hypnotizability.
Scales used in the measurement of hypnotizability today are standardised to a certain extent, 
mainly as a consequence of the development of the Stanford scales in the late 1950s and 
1960s (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959, 1962). Tests of hypnotizability generally comprise of 
two parts: a hypnotic induction that defines the situation as ‘hypnosis’ and a series of test 
suggestions. A typical hypnotic induction consists of instructions for muscular and mental 
relaxation, focussed attention, and disattention to extraneous thoughts. The four main types 
of test suggestions that are used are (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001): motor productions 
(involuntary movements); motor inhibitions (paralyses); cognitive productions 
(hallucinations); cognitive inhibitions (sensory inhibition, amnesia). Despite this degree of 
standardisation, there exists a proliferation of measuring instruments. Indeed,
Weitzenhoffer (2000) identifies at least 25 instruments described as scales o f ‘hypnotic 
susceptibility’ and ‘hypnotizability’. Are all these scales measuring the same thing? Do they 
have equivalence? The aim of this section is to examine the uses and limitations of the major 
scales that have been devised to measure hypnotic behaviour. For a full listing and detailed 
description of hypnotic suggestibility scales, see Council (2002) and Weitzenhoffer (2000).
1.7.1. The Stanford Scales
Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard (1959) introduced the first of the widely accepted measures of 
hypnotizability into the field with the Stanford Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Forms A 
and B (SHSS:A; & SHSS:B), which extensively revised and expanded an earlier scale by 
Friedlander and Sarbin (1938). These scales begin with a preliminary ‘non-hypnotic’ 
suggestion of body sway followed by an induction procedure, which incorporates eye 
fixation and eye closure. The induction procedure is followed by 10 test suggestions,
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including 5 motor challenge items. A major criticism of the first Stanford scales is that 
although they demonstrated that the field was moving towards a uniform index, they had 
limited usefulness since the content predominantly consisted of motor items. This resulted 
in a lack of sensitivity regarding differences amongst the most responsive individuals 
(Hilgard, 1965). The Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C;
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) was subsequently developed, which consisted of a much 
wider range of suggestions, including age regression and negative hallucinations, to fully 
represent the cognitive aspects of hypnosis and the high end of responsiveness (Council, 
2002). The SHSS:C also differs from the SHSS:A & B in that items are arranged in ascending 
order of difficulty, which means that it is not necessary to administer the entire scale to low 
responders, as the test can be stopped after a number of consecutive item failures.
A number of extensions of the Stanford Scale have been developed for special purposes and 
populations. One of the first was the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form 
A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962), which was devised as a group version of the SHSS:A. The 
HGSHS:A replaces the ‘non-hypnotic’ suggestion for body sway used in the SHSS:A, by a 
‘non-hypnotic’ suggestion for a head fall. More recently, Bowers (1993, 1998) developed a 
group version of the SHSS:C, the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility, Form C (WSGC). The WSGC attempts to remove the shortcomings of the 
HGSHS:A, by including a wider ranger of items that tap cognitive as well as positive and 
negative hallucinations, thus avoiding the exclusive emphasis on motor items found in the 
HGSHS:A and the SHSS:A. Although group scales have almost identical items as their 
parent individually administered scales, there is a critical issue surrounding whether group 
measures can reliably replace individually administered scales. This is discussed in Chapter 
3.
In response to the need for a shorter scale for use in clinical work and one with a wider 
more therapeutically relevant range of items, clinical adaptations of the Stanford Scales for 
adults (SHCS: Adult; Morgan & Hilgard, 1978-1979a) and for children (SHCS: Child;
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Morgan & Hilgard, 1978-1979b) were developed. The clinical adaptations draw on items 
from A, B and C forms, including hands moving apart, a dream, age regression, post­
hypnotic suggestion and post-hypnotic amnesia. The Stanford scales and their derivatives 
are still seen as the ‘gold standard’ tools to measure hypnotizability, with the validity of 
other scales of hypnotizability often established on the basis of how well they correlate with 
the Stanford scales. The four other measures most commonly utilised in the current practice 
of both laboratory and clinical hypnosis are the Barber Suggestibility Scale (BSS: Barber, 
1965), the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS: Barber & Wilson, 1979), the Carleton University 
Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam & Bertrand, 
1983) and the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP: Spiegel 8c Spiegel, 1978).
1.7.2. The Barber Suggestibility Scale
The Barber Suggestibility Scale (BSS: Barber, 1965) was first reported in a study by Barber 
and Glass (1962), and was designed for a series of studies that aimed to delineate the 
important variables affecting responses to suggestions (e.g. Barber, 1969; Barber &
Calverley, 1964, 1965). The BSS contains 8 test suggestions, which can be: (i) defined as a 
test of imagination or hypnosis; (ii) administered with or without a hypnotic induction; and 
(iii) used with both adults and children. The BSS is relatively short and can be administered 
quick and easily. Probably the most significant improvement of the BSS over the Stanford 
scales is the inclusion of assessment of subjective experiences as well as objective 
experiences.
1.7.3. The Creative Imagination Scale
The Creative Imagination Scale (CIS: Barber 8c Wilson, 1979; Wilson 8c Barber, 1978) is a 
permissively worded scale and was developed as an alternative to the Stanford and BSS 
scales which adopted a more authoritarian approach. Like the BSS, the CIS is short and is 
easily administered and can be administered to an individual or to a group, with or without 
a hypnotic induction. The CIS contains 10 suggestions in which individuals are invited to
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control and generate experiences (rather than being told what to do), such as arm heaviness, 
music and relaxation, through creative thinking and imagining along with the suggestions. 
Scoring on the CIS is solely by means of self-report in which participants are asked to rate 
the reality of their imagined experiences, thus making it especially easy to use in group 
assessments. As the CIS uses a unique permissive approach, it may particularly useful with 
individuals who are apprehensive about hypnosis and the loss of control (Council, 2002).
1.7.4. The Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale
The Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos et al., 1983) is 
a group scale that stands in similar relation to the BSS, as the HGSHS:A does to the SHSS:A 
(Council, 2002). The scale consists of an induction followed by 7 test suggestions. A 
significandy useful aspect of this scale, is that suggestions are scored on three dimensions:
(i) objective, in which the participant assesses their own behavioural response; (ii) 
subjective, in which the participant rates how real the suggested experiences feel to them; 
and (iii) involuntariness, in which participants rate the extent to which their objective 
responses were involuntary. The CURSS has been shown to have strong psychometric 
characteristics (e.g. Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Bertrand, Stam & Dubreuil, 1983; Spanos, 
Radtke, Hodgins, Bertrand, Stam & Moretti, 1983) and was extensively used by Spanos and 
colleagues in countless studies (see Spanos, 1996 for an extensive listing of such 
publications).
1.7.5. The Hypnotic Induction Profile
The Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP; Spiegel 8c Spiegel, 1978) is unique among 
hypnotizability scales in that it was developed in a clinical setting for clinical applications. As 
a consequence of this it is very short (10 minutes) and fairly easy to administer. The HIP 
consists of two parts -  the eye roll test and the induction. The eye-roll test is probably the 
most controversial aspect of the HIP, and is measured by the amount of sclera visible 
between the bottom of the iris and lower eyelid when a person is asked to roll their eyes
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upward (Council, 2002). Spiegel and Spiegel (1978) posit that the eye-roll score (ERS) is an 
index of a person’s biological capacity to enter a trance state. The second part of the HIP is 
the induction, which is a combination of a hypnotic induction and the administration of an 
arm levitation suggestion. The induction score (INDS) corresponds to the more traditional 
scales, such as the Stanford (Council 2002). The main issue surrounding the HIP revolves 
around the debate on how good a substitute the HIP is for other more traditional measures 
of hypnotic suggestibility. A number of studies have reported the HIP to be an inadequate 
substitute for the more conventional hypnotic suggestibility scales (e.g. Frischolz, Spiegel, 
Tryon & Fisher, 1981; Orne et al., 1979; Sheehan et al., 1979). The eye-roll component of 
the HIP appears to have little to do with hypnotic suggestibility per se and although there is 
a slight tendency for IND scores to correlate with conventional hypnotic suggestibility 
measures, the correlations are very low and not sufficient enough to support the notion that 
it is an adequate measure of hypnotic suggestibility.
1.8. What are ‘hypnosis’ scales measuring: hypnotizability vs. 
suggestibility?
Generally, the scales reviewed in the previous section are regarded as hypnosis scales; that is 
they all claim to measure the extent to which the person is in a hypnotic state, or their 
capacity/potential to enter or develop a hypnotic state (hypnotizability). The most logical 
and obvious way to measure and assess hypnosis that has developed has been to sample the 
kinds of effect ‘hypnotized’ individuals can produce, i.e. their hypnotic responsiveness. 
Accordingly, the majority of constructed scales simply consist of sets of test suggestions. 
Weitzenhoffer (2002) and Kirsch and Braffman (2001) indicate that at best, they are only 
scales of suggestibility -  the capacity to respond to suggestion -  with the addition of a 
hypnotic induction. By this view, they have nothing directly to do with the hypnotic state 
per se (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the hypnotic state).
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It is interesting in this context to note that the current Stanford scale, the SHSS:C, was 
modified from initial versions (SHSS:A & SHSS:B) to include a number of easier items. The 
initial SHSS: A & B versions contained 14 hard items, which generated a fairly skewed 
distribution. Hilgard (1973) included easier items to fit in with his conception that 
hypnotizability and hypnotic responsiveness had a bimodal distribution, which generated a 
normally distributed set of response profiles. Consequently, the SHSS:C had an implicit 
assumption of a bimodal distribution indicative of two kinds of response: - what Hilgard 
would describe as ‘true hypnotic’ suggestion which few people pass; and more ‘normal 
suggestion’ which are passed by most individuals. Therefore, the SHSS:C and derivative 
scales have explicit assumption of different types of suggestion incorporated under the 
domain of hypnosis.
In contrast to the traditional hypnosis scales, there are a small number of other scales 
designed to measure the depth of hypnosis that do not make direct use of suggestibility 
(Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Both the Field Inventory (Field, 1965) and the Phenomenology of 
Consciousness Inventory (PCI: Pekala, 1991a, 1991b) are based on individuals’ experiences 
of being ‘hypnotized’, with participants retrospectively checking off or rating the degree to 
which each item on a list of experiences applies to them. However, like most of the other so- 
called hypnosis scales, the validity of these scales have been established on the basis on how 
well their measures are correlated with measures of suggestibility obtained from the ‘gold 
standard’ Stanford scales. Consequently, the acceptances of these scales that measure the 
depth of hypnosis have actually depended on their ability to provide a measure of 
suggestibility (Weitzenhoffer, 2002).
1.8.1. Hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestibility revisited
On the evidence so far it seems reasonable to conclude that traditional methods for 
assessing hypnotic responsiveness and hypnotizability generally do not assess the state of 
hypnosis or the capacity to develop it directly. They seem on the whole to be assessing some
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sort of suggestibility, and perhaps only suggestibility. The associations found between 
hypnotizability as traditionally measured and other variables may therefore simply indicate 
the extent to which suggestibility itself relates to those measures. In line with this argument, 
the high correlation, ranging from 0.66 to 0.99, between responsiveness to suggestion with 
hypnosis and without hypnosis has lead some authors to conclude that what the so-called 
hypnosis scales are measuring is Hypnotic Suggestibility -  a measure of suggestibility 
following the administration of hypnosis (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch & Braffman, 
2001). As discussed earlier, suggestibility is a complex phenomenon in its own right 
(Schumaker, 1991b). There are different types of suggestibility, which differ theoretically 
and conceptually from one another. Unfortunately as noted above, there are very few 
available tests of ‘non-hypnotic’ suggestibility as defined previously.
Kirsch (1997) identifies the type of suggestibility assessed by ‘hypnotizability’ scales as 
imaginative suggestibility and describes hypnotized participants as engaging in fantasies that 
‘lead to subjective experiences that are at variance with what they know to be objectively 
true’ (p. 58, Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). Imaginative suggestions are, in Kirsch’s view, 
requests to experience imaginary situations and states of affairs as if they were real. 
Imaginative suggestions can be given in and out of hypnosis. In fact, most suggestion 
contained in hypnotic suggestibility scales, explicitly instruct participants to imagine a 
situation or state of affairs (e.g. ‘imagine that your right arm is feeling heavier’ or ‘imagine 
that your hands are two pieces of steel welded together’). Specifically what Kirsch is 
proposing is that there is a general capacity for imaginative suggestibility which can be 
assessed without a hypnotic induction, when it might be designated as non-hypnotic 
suggestibility4; or following a hypnotic induction procedure, in which case it may be labelled 
hypnotic suggestibility. This line of thinking may provide a useful insight into what so- 
called hypnotizability scales are actually measuring and will hopefully lead researchers into
4 The term ‘non-hypnotic suggestibility* is potentially problematic as there are many types of non­
hypnotic suggestibility. Non-hypnotic suggestibility in this context is used to denote imaginative 
suggestibility assessed without a hypnotic induction.
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thinking critically about the scales they are using. However, the issue of the scales being 
doubtful instruments for the determination of the presence of hypnosis or of 
hypnotizability has received little explicit recognition.
1.8.2. More limitations
A further key limitation of existing scales, with the exception of one (CURSS, Spanos et al., 
1983) is the failure to measure whether responses to suggestions are experienced as 
involuntary (‘classic suggestion effect’ Weitzenhoffer, 1953) The experience of 
involuntariness is a defining and characteristic feature of a communication to be termed a 
suggestion (e.g. Lynn, Rhue 8c Weekes, 1990; Weitzenhoffer 1953; 2000). Consequently, 
most scales are open to false-positive scoring, as responses to suggestions may or may not 
have been experienced as involuntary. Nevertheless, as Weitzenhoffer (2002) points out, 
provisions for eliciting information regarding experienced involuntariness for each 
suggestion can be easily made.
Weitzenhoffer (2002) highlights another problem with hypnotic suggestibility scales, 
regarding the degree of equivalence between scales. The Stanford Scales of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility (Forms A. B, & C) have served as the ‘gold standards’ for most other scales of 
hypnotizability scales. The validity of hypnotizability scales have more often than not been 
based on how well their measures correlate with: (i) measures obtained from the Stanford 
scales, or (ii) measures obtained from scales that are seen as adequate substitutes for the 
Stanford scales. Existing scales are often deemed as equivalent and consequently 
interchangeable. Statistical correlation values (e.g. Pearson’s moment coefficient 
correlations) are used to provide support and establish the validity of measures of 
suggestibility in relation to other measures of suggestibility. Weitzenhoffer (2002) identifies 
that the reasoning for many scales has been that if scale 1 is correlated with scale 2 and if 
scale 2 correlates with 3, then scale 1 also correlates with 3, which of course is not necessarily 
so. Moreover, the correlations used to justify equivalence between scales, although
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significant, are often relatively small (with rvalues 0.60 and less). So in general we cannot 
necessarily assume that two scales measure one and the same thing equally well, and 
consequently many of the existing scales, which are used as substitutes for the Stanford 
scales may in-fact not be (Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Nevertheless, this does not necessary imply 
that these scales are not measuring the same thing or something relevant. All hypnotic 
suggestibility scales may be measuring some sort of suggestibility (or something relevant in 
some other way) and differences may lie with respect to other variables not common to all 
scales.
1.9. Conclusions
A central recurring theme in the literature on suggestion and suggestibility is the 
multidimensional nature of the concepts. Particularly as there is no generally accepted 
classification, most researchers are likely to agree with this conclusion. The multiple 
dimensions of suggestibility appear to have varying degrees of inter-relatedness and a 
number of investigators have attempted to elucidate the relationships between various 
measures and indices of suggestibility, in order to establish the meaningful categorisation of 
the various components. Unfortunately, results have been equivocal. Within the ‘domain of 
hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973), hypnotizability often correlates with ‘primary suggestibility’ and 
responses to direct suggestions; however, the evidence pertaining to this is not entirely 
consistent.
The relationship between hypnotizability and suggestibility is further complicated by the 
fact that methods assessing ‘hypnotizability’ generally do not assess the state of hypnosis or 
the capacity to develop it (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001; Weitzenhoffer, 2002). At best, they 
generally assess some form of suggestibility, perhaps imaginative suggestibility. 
Hypnotizability scales do not appear to reflect the true character of what the instrument is 
presumed to do, and consequently phenomenon and effects usually attributed to hypnosis 
and the hypnotic state may be more accurately described as ‘suggested’ effects.
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In what follows, the term suggestion will be restricted to what Kirsch has described as 
‘imaginative’ suggestion, and suggestibility will denote the capacity to produce an 
involuntary response (classical suggestion effect; Weitzenhoffer, 1953) to an ‘imaginative’ 
suggestion. Hypnotic suggestibility and non-hypnotic suggestibility will refer to 
‘imaginative’ suggestibility, assessed in and out of hypnosis, respectively.
An important question emerging from the above, that is taken up in Chapter 3, is what 
effect if any a hypnotic induction procedure, and hence ‘hypnosis’ has on imaginative 
suggestibility. Before that though, it is important to explore the nature of hypnosis and the 
hypnotic procedures that might mediate any such effects.
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Chapter 2 
The State o f ‘Hypnosis’
Chapter overview
As Chapter 1 tried to make clear, suggestion is separable from hypnosis, despite the 
common practice of making no distinction between the two. This chapter focuses on 
hypnosis and examines the concepts of the ‘hypnotic state’ and ‘altered states of 
consciousness’. The principle proposed characteristics of the hypnotic state, including 
absorption, relaxation and dissociation, and theories of hypnosis will be reviewed and 
evaluated. The chapter also considers the relationship between ‘trance’ and ‘suggestion’
2.1. Defining hypnosis
The word ‘hypnosis’ conjures up an endless array of images in people’s minds. Therefore, it 
is hardly surprising that there is little agreement concerning the nature and definition of the 
term hypnosis. The problem is not that there is a lack of definitions, rather that there is a 
profusion of theories and accounts of hypnosis that are commonly viewed as incompatible 
and competing with one another for conceptual dominance. These divergent views about 
hypnosis revolve around the central debate within the hypnosis community as to whether 
hypnosis should be characterised as a unique altered state of consciousness or as a 
consequence of normal social psychological processes. This lack of a coherent definition 
poses problems in interpreting and analysing hypnosis and ‘hypnotizability’ as well as its 
associations with concepts such as suggestion and suggestibility, which have been 
inextricably linked since the late nineteenth century and by the work of Bernheim and the 
Nancy School (Gheorghiu, 1989a, 1989b).
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2.1.1. Two principle theoretical perspectives
The contemporary question as to whether hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness is 
still one of the most hotly disputed issues in the area (Chaves, 1997; Kirsch, 1992; Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1995). Although at present there are many different theories about hypnosis in the 
literature, overlapping and differing in many ways, Kirsch (2004) suggests that it is possible 
to identify a ‘generic altered state’ conception of hypnosis and a ‘generic non-state’ view, 
thus allowing the grouping of these theories into two broad categories. The essence of the 
generic altered state conception (e.g. Bowers, 1976; Gruzelier, 1998, 2000; Hilgard, 1965, 
1977; Spiegel & Spiegel, 1978; Weitzenhoffer, 2000) is that hypnotic phenomena are due to 
the implementation of a special state of psychological functioning characterised by unique 
cognitive, behavioural, phenomenological and physiological processes (e.g. altered states of 
consciousness, ‘trance’, dissociation). In contrast the generic non-state view, as taken by 
socio-cognitive theorists (e.g. Barber, 1969; Kirsch, 1985, 1991; Sarbin & Coe, 1972; Spanos, 
1982, 1986; Wagstaff, 1981, 1986), rejects the need for an altered state explanation, believing 
such an approach to be inevitably misleading, as many so-called ‘hypnotic’ phenomena can 
be produced in response to suggestion by non-hypnotized individuals. Therefore, hypnotic 
phenomena can be explained by psychological factors, such as expectancy, motivation, 
voluntary goal-directed role enactments, which are present in non-hypnotic, ‘waking’ state 
(Kirsch, 1992).
Nevertheless there are a number of issues that virtually all theorists agree on (Kirsch 2000a). 
One of these issues is compliance and faking. It is agreed that most hypnotized subjects are 
not merely faking and complying with experimenter’s demands. In response to suggestion 
in a hypnotic context, people really do experience alterations in sensations and perceptions; 
they really do experience, motor inhibitions, amnesia, analgesia and hallucinations. These 
are perceived as subjectively real, in that the individual genuinely believes what has been 
suggested. What is also commonly described as unusual about hypnosis is that such 
suggested behaviours and experiences are characteristically accompanied by a feeling of
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involuntariness, a phenomenon which has been labelled the ‘classic suggestion effect’ 
(Weitzenhoffer, 1953). A notable example to illustrate the point that subjects are not merely 
complying with the demand characteristics of the experimenter was reported by Greene and 
Reyher (1972). They assigned highly hypnotizable subjects randomly to hypnosis and 
simulating groups, and instructed the simulators to remain out of hypnosis, whilst deceiving 
the experimenters into believing they were hypnotized and to react to a painful stimulus as 
if they were experiencing analgesia. Pain tolerance and pain intensity reports were obtained 
in response to increasing electric shock intensities. Despite the attempt to behave like 
hypnotized.subjects, the simulators were significantly less tolerant to the pain stimulus, with 
subjects in the hypnosis group and simulator group increasing their pain tolerance by 45% 
and 16% respectively. The shocks were more bearable for subjects in the hypnosis group 
than the equally ‘susceptible’ role enactors. However, theoretical differences are about how 
these ‘altered states’ and unusual phenomena are brought about, rather than whether they 
actually exist.
Another area of agreement, as identified by Kirsch (2000a), is that many hypnotized subjects 
experience and report themselves as being in a special state of consciousness, and it is often 
this ‘altered state’ that is used to signify the notion of trance. Kirsch (2000a) points out that 
the main point of contention between the generic altered state view and the generic non­
state conception is not whether these experiences are real, but over whether these 
experiences produced by suggestion (such as amnesia, hallucinations, analgesia) are entirely 
dependent on a unique hypnotic state or trance.
Both the generic altered state and generic non-state conceptions also agree on the point that 
hypnotic suggestions produce changes in physiology (Kirsch, 2000a). If most would accept 
that suggestion produces changes in experience, then most would accept that these changes 
in experience are also accompanied by changes in brain physiology and activation. This 
would necessarily be so, given that there are physiological markers or neural correlates for 
all conscious experiences (Chalmers 2000). Therefore, it is not surprising that with the
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arrival of neuroimaging, studies have shown accompanying changes in brain physiology for 
hypnotic suggestions modulating pain perception (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger & Oakley, 
2004; Faymonville, Laureys, Degueldre, DelFiore, Luxen, Frank, Lamy & Maquet, 2000; 
Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier & Bushnell, 1997); motor movement (Halligan, Athwal, 
Oakley & Frackowiak, 2000); visual perception (Kosslyn, Thompson, Costatini-Ferrando, 
Alpert & Spiegel, 2000); auditory perception (Szechtman, Woody, Bowers & Nahmias,
1998); attention (MacLeod & Sheehan, 2003; Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner, 2002); 
intentionality (Oakley, Ward, Halligan & Frackowiak, 2003; Ward, Oakley, Frackowiak & 
Halligan, 2003); and awareness of control (Blakemore, Oakley & Frith, 2003).
2.1.2. Trance and altered states vs. experiences produced by suggestion
As described earlier, most researchers agree that suggestions produce altered experiences. 
However, the issue that divides the generic altered state and generic non-state conceptions is 
whether there is a unique hypnotic state (i.e. ‘trance’; altered state); and whether the 
distinctive experiences produced in hypnosis (i.e. after a hypnotic induction) by suggestion, 
are dependent on this hypothetical ‘trance’ state. This highlights two main components of 
hypnosis -  ‘trance’ and ‘suggestion’ (Heap & Aravind, 2002).
Unfortunately, the issue regarding hypnosis, as an altered state of consciousness and its 
necessity, is somewhat further complicated by the lack of a common satisfactory definition 
of the term ‘altered states of consciousness’. According to Wagstaff (1998a, 1998b) a key 
reason for the failure to develop a meaningful definition of hypnosis is that there are 
semantic disagreements about the status of hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness. For 
example, both Hilgard (1978) and Kihlstrom (1985) identified and distinguished between 
two versions of the state concept, the so-called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ interpretations. The 
‘strong’ interpretation of the state is the traditional understanding of hypnosis, as a special 
or distinct state of consciousness characterised by cognitive, behavioural, 
phenomenological, and physiological processes that all hypnotized individuals enter. In
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contrast the ‘weak’ interpretation views the hypnotic state as a descriptive label representing 
a domain of characteristic phenomena, including suggested behaviours and self-reports of 
experience. The ‘weak’ interpretation construes the ‘state’ as a shorthand, with no causal 
properties or defining features associated with it (Hilgard, 1969; Kihlstrom, 1985).
Tart (1983) presents a clear definition of the terms ‘state of consciousness’ and ‘altered state 
of consciousness’, and in what follows, these terms will be restricted to Tart’s definition. 
According to Tart, these terms have been used too loosely to describe whatever is on one’s 
mind at the moment, and consequently Tart introduces the term discrete state of 
consciousness to accurately conceptualise a state of consciousness. Tart (1983) describes a 
discrete state of consciousness as ‘a unique, dynamic pattern or configuration of 
psychological structures, an active system of psychological subsystems. Although the 
component structures/subsystems show some variation within a discrete state of 
consciousness, the overall pattern, the overall system properties remain the same. I f ... you 
think, “I am dreaming” instead of “I am awake”, you have changed a small cognitive 
element in your consciousness but not affected at all the basic pattern ... a discrete altered 
state of consciousness refers to a discrete state of consciousness that is different from some 
baseline state of consciousness... a discrete altered state of consciousness is a new system 
with unique properties of its own, a restructuring of consciousness’ (p. 5).
Tart (1983) conceptualises a state of consciousness as a particular pattern of dynamically 
interacting psychological structures and subsystems (e.g. discrete state of consciousness), 
whilst an altered state of consciousness is when the particular pattern of interacting 
structures are restructuring forming a new pattern of psychological structures and 
subsystems with unique properties (e.g. discrete altered state of consciousness).
As of yet, there is no evidence of a ‘discrete state’ or ‘discrete states’ of hypnosis, involving 
unique patterns of psychological structures. The physiological and neurological evidence 
provided by neuroimaging studies (e.g. Egner et al., 2005; Kosslyn et a l, 2000; Rainville et 
al., 1997) have supported the view that highly suggestible hypnotized participants really do
experience what has been suggested to them, however highly suggestible people show nearly 
as much responsiveness to suggestions objectively and subjectively without hypnosis as they 
do with hypnosis (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). This is consistent with the body of research 
that reports that although hypnotic inductions enhance suggestibility, the effect is relatively 
small (e.g. Barber & Glass, 1962; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Hull, 1933; 
Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961). In fact, most ‘hypnotic’ phenomena can be produced by 
suggestion without the use of a formal hypnotic induction or explicit reference to hypnosis 
(e.g. Barber, 1965; Barber & Calverly, 1964). This indicates that the unusual ‘hypnotic’ 
phenomena usually associated with hypnosis (e.g. amnesia, hallucinations, analgesia) are 
more than likely to be products of suggestion and not trance.
Therefore, to demonstrate that changes in brain states are due to a discrete state/discrete 
states of hypnosis (i.e. trance), studies would need to show that these physiological changes 
do not occur in participants when they respond to the same suggestions without hypnosis 
(Kirsch 2000a). To date, no such evidence exists (Oakley & Halligan, 2005), with all the 
neuroimaging studies ‘indicating that the induction of hypnosis without specific suggestions 
for altered perception [has] little effect’ (Rainville, Hofbauer, Paus, Bushnell, Duncan, & 
Price, 1999, p. 112). Although modest attempts have been made (e.g. Derbyshire et al.,
2004; Gruzelier, 1998, 2004), neuroimaging and physiological data on the effects of 
suggestion without hypnosis is still somewhat lacking and remains an important avenue for 
future research.
So where does this leave the notion of trance and altered states? Wagstaff (1991) has pointed 
out that the term ‘state’ or ‘trance’ can be used within the domain of hypnosis, without 
necessarily implying unique properties outside normal psychological processing. For 
example, trance is often associated and described as absorption, focussed attention, and 
extreme concentration, which are all ‘states’ that occur in non-hypnotic contexts, a view 
almost synonymous with the ‘weak’ interpretation of the hypnotic state. The key issue here 
is that the terms ‘state’ or ‘trance’ may be used to indicate a particular state of mind in
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relation to a particular procedure or hypnotic induction/ritual, which may be facilitated by 
motivation, expectation, and a reduction in critical thought. Consequently, you may not 
expect to find a unique discrete state of hypnosis (i.e. trance state), as the brain-state of an 
individual in trance would be no different than the brain-state of the same individual in a 
non-hypnotic context engaging in an absorbing task.
2.2. I f ‘hypnosis’ is a state, what kind is it?
It appears imperative that hypnosis and suggestion are treated separately until the cognitive 
and neuropsychological mechanisms of both have been defined. A theory of suggested 
amnesia, analgesia or hallucinations is not that same as a theory of hypnosis itself, and as 
mentioned earlier (a key concept underlying this thesis), many make no distinction between 
hypnosis and suggestion. The result is that features of suggestion and hypnosis are 
confounded.
In this light, it may seem rather futile to examine the hypothesised characteristics and 
correlates of hypnosis and the hypnotic state. The following discussion does not intend to be 
an exhaustive critique of hypnosis theories as this is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
would be too large to review in any detail here (for a fuller account of a variety of theories 
see for example Fromm 8c Nash, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1985; Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Lynn 8c Rhue, 
1991, 1994; Spanos 8c Chaves, 1989); for this reason only the principle proposed 
characteristics of the hypnotic state, and where appropriate their accompanying theoretical 
framework, will be selectively reviewed and evaluated.
2.2.1. Hypnosis as a non-state
Viewing hypnosis as a non-state that involves normal behavioural and mental processes that 
derive from the special social-contextual situation, is a view held by socio-cognitive 
theorists. Consequently, research stemming from this tradition has focussed on the effects 
of the hypnotic context and its components, such as motivation, beliefs, expectancies, and
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cognitive strategies, on suggestibility and responsiveness to suggestion. The origins of 
modern socio-cognitive approaches to hypnosis can be traced to the landmark work of 
White (1941) who posited that hypnotic phenomena were the consequence of purposeful, 
goal-directed actions, shaped by individuals’ expectations of what the hypnotist wanted 
them to do. Nevertheless, White (1941) retained the belief that hypnosis was an altered 
state. A decade later Sarbin (1950) adopted White’s notion of hypnosis as a goal directed 
action, but unlike White he explicitly rejected the view of hypnosis as an altered state. 
According to Sarbin, the goal-directed action engaged by individuals in hypnosis, is an 
attempt by participants to meet the social role expectations governed by prior beliefs and 
cues salient in the hypnotic situation. In this view participants were believed to have been 
role-playing or role-enacting to look as i f  they had been hypnotized so as to comply with the 
demands of the hypnotic situation.
Sarbin’s original theory provided a framework for subsequent sociocognitve theorists (e.g. 
Barber, 1969; Coe & Sarbin, 1991; Kirsch 1985, 2000; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Spanos, 1982, 
1986; Wagstaff, 1981, 1986) who all provide similar accounts and have extended Sarbin’s 
original in significant ways. The main contemporary views of the socio-cognitive tradition 
have already been touched upon earlier, however, for convenience, the key extensions of 
Sarbin’s role-theory will be briefly examined. In contrast to Sarbin’s original theory, 
contemporary socio-cognitive theorists argue that hypnotic participants do not only look as 
if  they are hypnotized, but actually perceive and experience the phenomena as real and 
authentic. In other words, individuals genuinely believe that they perceive and experience 
hypnotic phenomena involuntarily. Involuntariness is experienced by individuals in the 
hypnotic situation due to a misattribution of the source of their behaviour. According to the 
socio-cognitive approach determinants of hypnotic responsiveness include: (a) participant’s 
expectancies that involuntariness is central to hypnotic phenomena; (b) the wording of 
suggestions and the interpretations of these communications; (c) engaging in strategies and 
goal-directed behaviour to facilitate hypnotic responding; (d) willingness of participants to 
adopt the hypnotic role; and (e) the way in which feedback from their own responding and
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the hypnotist influences their definition and perception as a hypnotic participant (Barber, 
1969; Spanos, 1982, 1986). These all contribute to individuals misattributing their 
behaviour and experiences as involuntary, although in reality they are engaging in an 
effortful and intentional process, which they are not aware of.
The major programme of work on responding to suggestion without a hypnotic induction, 
was undertaken by T.X. Barber and colleagues (e.g. Barber 1969; Barber 8c Calverley, 1964, 
1965; Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974) demonstrating that procedures such as task- 
motivational instructions are as effective as hypnotic inductions in enhancing responses to 
suggestion. Task motivation procedures typically involved participants receiving 
instructions to produce positive motivation, to cooperate by imagining vividly, and to 
perform maximally on a ‘test of imagination’. Barber (1969) showed that supposed hypnotic 
phenomena such analgesia, amnesia and visual and auditory hallucinations could be 
produced without a hypnotic induction, and moreover, following the presentation of task- 
motivating instructions, non-hypnotic participants showed increases in behavioural and 
subjective responses to suggestion as participants receiving a hypnotic induction. Research 
(e.g. Hilgard, 1965; Kirsch, 1997, 2000a; Spanos, 1982; Spanos 8c Coe, 1992; Spanos 8c 
McPeake, 1977) has repeatedly demonstrated that hypnotic phenomena, which were 
previously seen as unusual and transcendent in nature and attributed to a hypnotic state, 
can be elicited without any formal hypnotic induction with participants even reporting 
equivalent levels of involuntariness (when measured). However, there is some data 
indicating that task-motivational instructions may place a lot of pressure on participants, 
and may force some participants to fake hypnotic responses. Bowers (1967, cited in Kirsch 
8c Council, 1992) found that the increased responsiveness to suggestion associated with 
task-motivational instructions, might reverse for some participants if an explicit and strong 
request is made for honesty.
As well as motivational variables, the socio-cognitive approach argues that situational 
variables influence hypnotic responsiveness through their effect on individuals’
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expectancies. In the main, studies have manipulated expectancies by either: (i) influencing 
individual’s beliefs and perceptions about hypnotic procedures and the hypnotic context 
itself; or (ii) influencing individual’s beliefs and perceptions about themselves as being 
highly suggestible. The manipulation of relatively simple situational variables have been 
shown to influence participants expectancies. Barber and Calverley (1964) reported that 
participants are more responsive to suggestions when the experiment was described with 
positive connotations, such as a ‘test of imagination’, compared with negative connotations, 
such as being described as a ‘test of gullibility’. Barber and Calverley (1964, 1965) have also 
reported that participants are more responsive to suggestions, for example when: (i) 
responses to suggestions were described as easy rather than difficult; (ii) the experiment was 
defined as ‘hypnosis’; and (iii) inductions are described as highly effective rather than highly 
ineffective. Barber (1969) suggests that differences in responsiveness to suggestions are due 
to the suppression of responding by negative expectations, as positive expectancy 
instructions did not increase responsiveness to suggestion over and above that produced by 
a hypnotic induction alone.
Other studies have shown that modifying individuals’ expectancies through the use of 
experiential feedback can profoundly effect their responsiveness to suggestion. Two notable 
studies by Wilson (1967) and Wickless and Kirsch (1989) involved participants receiving 
suggestions for alterations in perceptual and cognitive experience, which were subsequently 
subtly and surreptitiously confirmed by the experimenters’ manipulation of the 
experimental situation. Wilson (1967) reinforced non-hypnotic suggestions with real 
experience, so for example, after presenting participants with the suggestion that the room 
was turning red, he covertly turned on a red light, which gave the room a slight red 
appearance. Manipulations such as these resulted in a substantial and significant increase in 
responses to suggestions due to the generation of expectations that participants would also 
experience phenomena described in subsequent test suggestions. Wilson’s (1967) study was 
replicated and extended by Wickless and Kirsch (1989), who used a verbal expectancy 
manipulation as well as the experiential manipulation used by Wilson. Wickless and Kirsch
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(1989) used bogus feedback from personality tests as their verbal expectancy manipulation, 
which informed participants that they were highly hypnotizable. This is an excellent 
example of how studies changed expectancies by influencing individual’s beliefs and 
perceptions about themselves. Wickless and Kirsch (1989) reported that participants 
receiving bogus feedback responded to more suggestions than those in the no-treatment 
control group. Moreover, the use of both the verbal and experiential expectancy 
manipulations in conjunction was the most effective in increasing response to suggestions, 
with approximately three-quarters of the sample scoring in the high range of suggestibility.
Numerous studies have investigated the impact of expectancies on responsiveness to specific 
hypnotic suggestions and experiences (e.g. Bartis &Zamansky, 1986; Gandolfo, 1971; Lynn, 
Snodgrass, Rhue & Hardaway, 1987; Orne, 1959; Silva 8c Kirsch, 1987; Spanos, Flynn 8c 
Gwynn, 1988; Young 8c Cooper, 1972 -  see also Council et al., 1996 for review). Particularly 
notable and striking examples come from studies that modified Hilgard’s (1977) hidden- 
observer paradigm and manipulated information about the observer (e.g. Spanos, Gwynn 8c 
Stam, 1983; Spanos 8c Hewit, 1980; Spanos, Radtke 8c Bertrand, 1984; Silva 8c Kirsch, 1987). 
For example, Spanos et al., (1984) informed eight highly suggestible participants, who had 
previously reported their responses to suggestions as involuntary and had repeatedly failed 
to breach amnesia, that hidden parts of their minds remained aware of things that they 
could not consciously remember. Participants were then informed that one part of their 
mind was aware of everything that occurred in the right hemisphere, whilst another part of 
their mind was aware of everything in the left hemisphere. Participants were required to 
learn a list of concrete and abstract words; with half the participants being told that concrete 
words were stored in the right hemisphere and abstract words stored in the left. The other 
half were given the opposite information about storage location. Following an amnesia 
suggestion to forget words, equivalent high levels of amnesia were reported on the initial 
recall trial for both groups. However, subsequently each of the participants’ ‘hidden parts’ 
were ‘contacted’ and asked to recall as many words as possible. Spanos et al., (1984) 
reported that participants behaved in accordance with the expectancy information that they
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had received. So when participants’ ‘right hidden parts’ were contacted, participants 
correctly recalled all of the words they believed to be stored in the right-hemisphere, and 
none of the words they believed to be stored in the left-hemisphere. Participants breached 
the suggested amnesia, demonstrating that amnesia was a function of which ‘hidden part’ 
was contacted and what words were supposedly ‘known’ to that hidden part.
Similarly, Silva and Kirsch (1987) also reported that highly suggestible participants could 
demonstrate high levels of breaching. In this study, participants were told that once 
hypnotized they were going to be taken ‘deeper’ into hypnosis. Half the participants were 
informed that ‘deep hypnosis’ would enhance their recall; with the other half informed that 
it would reduce their recall. Silva and Kirsch (1987) reported that 80% of participants in the 
enhanced-recall condition showed a complete breaching of amnesia, and 80% of 
participants in the reduced-recall condition exhibiting complete amnesia, demonstrating 
that participants behaved in line with the expectations conveyed to them.
Also studies altering expectancies by convincing participants that certain procedures can 
‘induce’ hypnosis, have reported increases in participants’ responsiveness to subsequent 
test-suggestions. Studies have used inert pills described as ‘hypnotic drugs’ (e.g. Glass & 
Barber, 1961; Baker 8c Kirsch, 1987); biofeedback (e.g. Council, Kirsch, Vickery 8c Carlson, 
1983); and stroboscopic lights (e.g. Kroger 8c Schneider, 1959) to “induce” hypnosis and 
produce equivalent levels of suggestibility to that of formal hypnotic inductions.
More recently, based on expectancy research, Kirsch’s (1985, 1991) response expectancy 
theory, which has subsequently been expanded into a broader theory of response sets 
(Kirsch, 2000a; Kirsch 8c Lynn, 1997), argues that all hypnotic behaviour is mediated by 
expectancy related cognitions derived from instructional cues and prior beliefs. Response 
expectancies are ‘anticipations of automatic reactions in response to particular stimuli’ 
(Kirsch 8c Lynn, 1997, p. 337). According to this theory, although individuals expect their 
behaviour to feel voluntary, volition is an attribution derived from individuals’ depictions of 
behavioural causation. The hypnotic context is associated with culturally mediated beliefs of
loss of volitional control and passivity, and consequently behaviour by individuals in the 
hypnotic context is subject to the control of response expectancies. According to Kirsch 
(1985) the most important feature of these expectancies is that they tend to be ‘self­
confirming, in that they generate the expected subjective response, along with its 
physiological substrate* (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997, p. 337). With regard to hypnosis, when a 
specific suggestion is given such as an arm levitation suggestion, the response expectancy 
produces the associated subjective experience of the arm feeling lighter, which in turn 
reinforces the expectancy and produces the behaviour of the arm rising, which is 
accompanied by a sense of involuntariness. Kirsch and Lynn (1997) also consider 
intentions and expectancies as response sets which prepare the individual to respond in a 
particular way to particular stimuli. Intentions define the individual as the source of 
behaviour, whilst expectancies define a source external to the self as the cause of the action, 
and consequently, intentions elicit a voluntary response, whist expectancies elicit an 
automatic response. In hypnotic situations, individuals attribute responses to suggestion to 
an external source and consequently experience hypnotic phenomena as involuntary.
Numerous studies by Kirsch and colleagues have demonstrated a strong association between 
response expectancy and responses to suggestion (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Council, Kirsch 
& Haffher, 1986; Council, Kirsch, Vickery & Carlson, 1983; Kirsch, Silva, Comey & Reed, 
1995; Vickery & Kirsch, 1991). For example, Council et al., (1983) found correlations 
ranging from 0.47 to 0.65 between response expectancy and variety of measures of hypnotic 
suggestibility. These studies have also identified that accuracy of predictions increases with, 
for example better knowledge of the hypnotic procedures as well as higher hypnotic 
suggestibility. Kirsch (2000a; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch and Braffman, 2001; Kirsch & 
Council, 1992) claims, that apart from non-hypnotic suggestibility (i.e. responses to 
suggestions prior to a hypnotic induction), response expectancy is the most powerful single 
predictor of hypnotic suggestibility.
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It is evident that there is considerable empirical support for the position concerning 
hypnosis as a non-state that involves normal behavioural and mental processes that derive 
from the special social-contextual situation. Studies, carried out by researchers of the 
sociocognitive tradition, have focussed on the extent individuals respond to suggestions and 
the nature of those responses, and how they vary as a function of psychosocial factors, such 
as motivation, expectancy and cognitive strategies. Although the socio-cognitive gives a 
comprehensive account of the factors that moderate responses to hypnotic suggestions, it 
remains unclear how factors such as expectancy and motivation, mediate such responses. In 
other words, the socio-cognitive tradition fails to account for how responses to hypnotic 
suggestions are brought about; as Gruzelier (2000) puts it ‘the process is missing’ (p. 53). 
Similarly, central to the socio-cognitive tradition is the notion that individuals are prone to 
misattribution and implicit contextual demands, whilst remaining unaware of this activity, 
but again ‘the process is missing’ and no explanation of how these processes actually operate 
is offered.
Although, the position held by socio-cognitive theorists is in its own way a framework of 
hypnosis as a state, it could be argued that the socio-cognitive literature says very little about 
the hypnotic state per se and more about the effects and nature of suggestion. This in itself is 
not a criticism of the socio-cognitive tradition. Studies indicate that most ‘hypnotic’ 
phenomena can be produced by suggestion without the use of a formal hypnotic induction 
or explicit reference to hypnosis; nevertheless this does not automatically imply the 
hypnotic state to be non-existent. Woody and Sadler (1998a) point out that although the 
socio-cognitive tradition often implies that ‘hypnosis is nothing but positive attitudes, 
motivations and expectations, or that hypnosis is nothing but the suggestion of a special 
condition called “hypnosis” ... to show ... that hypnosis is affected by expectancies falls far 
short of showing that hypnosis is nothing but expectancies’ (p. 180). Weitzenhoffer (2000) 
argues that though the hypnotic state may not account for anything, as hypnosis is 
measured now, this is not an argument that can be used against its existence or its 
unimportance (see also, Woody and Sadler, 1998a)
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2.2.2. Hypnosis as a state of relaxation
Relaxation is commonly assumed to be an essential component of hypnosis. Edmonston 
(1981, 1986, 1991) has presented a strongly argued case for interpreting hypnosis purely in 
terms of relaxation. Edmonston (1991) cites numerous studies that demonstrate that 
hypnotic responding of participants during hypnosis do not differ from those elicited 
during a condition of relaxation (e.g. Cogger 8c Edmonston, 1971; Plapp 8c Edmonston, 
1965; for a review see Edmonston, 1981 or Humphreys, 1984). Edmonston’s focuses upon 
what he terms ‘neutral hypnosis’, which is what happens to participants as a result of the 
induction procedure before suggestions are presented. Edmonston describes this state of 
neutral hypnosis as ‘anesis’.
The notion of hypnosis as a state of relaxation is extremely problematic. The primary 
argument against such a conceptualisation is that if an individual can be ‘hypnotized’ and 
produce hypnotic phenomena without being relaxed, can the hypnotic state merely be a 
state of relaxation? Although most traditional hypnotic inductions consist of suggestions for 
physical and mental relaxation, there is no evidence that relaxation is an essential 
component of the hypnotic state or necessary for the production of other hypnotically 
suggested phenomenon. Studies that have used hypnotic inductions based on increasing 
mental alertness and physical activity provide evidence to the contrary (e.g. Banyai 8c 
Hilgard, 1976; Cardena, Alarcon, Capafons, 8c Bayot, 1998; Fellows 8c Richardson, 1993) 
demonstrating levels of responsiveness to suggestion as great as those produced by 
traditional hypnotic relaxation inductions. Nevertheless, the role of relaxation in traditional 
hypnotic induction procedures may be to do with enhancing the face validity of ‘hypnotic’ 
inductions rather than being an essential component of the hypnotic state, as relaxation is 
often consistent with lay peoples’ beliefs of what hypnosis and hypnotic inductions are. 
Fellows (1986) concludes that any theory that posits hypnosis as state of relaxation deals 
with only a small part of the domain of hypnosis and perhaps not a particularly important 
part at that.
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2.2.3. Hypnosis as a state of absorption
Absorption is probably the most popular concept that is cited in reference to the hypnotic 
state. The notion of the hypnotic state being a state of absorption, and likened to 
phenomena of being absorbed in a book, television programme, music or whilst driving is 
an extremely popular one, especially in the therapeutic applications of hypnosis. Indeed, in 
a review of hypnosis, Spanos and Barber (1974) described the concept of absorption as 
being the most significant point of convergence between many different theories of 
hypnotic responding. The construct of absorption has been defined as ‘a characteristic of 
the individual that involves an openness to experience emotional and cognitive alterations 
across a range of situations’ (Roche & McConkey, 1990, p. 92).
Absorption has most commonly been researched as a personality trait as measured by the 
Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS: Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; Tellegen, 1982), which 
measures the frequency of episodes indicative of absorption. Since the original study by 
Tellegen and Atkinson (1974) found a significant correlation between absorption and 
hypnotic suggestibility (sample 1: r = 0.27; sample 2: r = 0.43), a plethora of subsequent 
studies have reported a similar pattern of results (see de Groh, 1989; Kirsch 8c Council, 1992 
for reviews). Although correlations between absorption (as measured by the TAS) and 
hypnotic suggestibility are generally significant, the actual correlations are low to modest. 
According to Kirsch and Council (1992), the correlations between the TAS and hypnotic 
suggestibility scales, account for approximately 10% or less of the variance in hypnotic 
suggestibility scores. By and large studies that have tended to use smaller samples and use a 
greater number of female participants5 have reported higher correlations (de Groh, 1989; 
Kirsch & Council, 1992). There is also evidence that indicates that absorption is related to 
the more so-called ‘difficult’ cognitive suggestions, such as hallucinations, amnesia and age
5 Numerous studies have found females to score significantly higher than males on absorption (e.g. 
Crawford, 1982; Spanos 8c McPeake, 1975). Although magnitude differences have usually been small, this 
may help explain the slightly higher correlations between absorption and hypnotic suggestibility in some 
studies.
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regression, whilst being unrelated to the so-called ‘easier’ ideomotor suggestions (e.g. 
Balthazard & Woody, 1992; Roche 8c McConkey, 1990). Studies using hypnotic 
suggestibility scales that consist of more of the ‘difficult’ cognitive suggestions (e.g. SHSS:C; 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) also appear to report higher correlations.
However, the picture is further complicated by findings that suggest that the relationship 
between absorption and hypnotic suggestibility is context dependent. Council, Kirsch and 
Haffner (1986) conducted the first study that examined whether there was still a 
relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and absorption, independent of any effects 
produced by context. In their study, participants were administered an absorption measure 
-  the TAS; and a hypnotic suggestibility measure -  a group modification of the SHSS:C in 
one of two different ways. Participants in the same-context group received the TAS, 
followed by the suggestibility scale. Participants in the different-context group were 
administered the TAS and the suggestibility scale in completely different settings, ensuring 
participants were unaware that the two constructs were being measured as part of the same 
study. Council et al., (1986) found that the TAS and hypnotic suggestibility correlation was 
only statistically significant when absorption was measured before hypnosis, with the 
significance disappearing when absorption and hypnotic suggestibility were both measured 
in separate contexts.
As far as the author is aware, eight other studies have also directly investigated the effects of 
context on the absorption and hypnotic suggestibility relationship (de Groot, Gwynn 8c 
Spanos, 1988; Drake, Cawood 8c Nash, 1990-1991; Milling, Kirsch 8c Burgess, 2000; Nadon, 
Hoyt, Register 8c Kihlstrom, 1991; Perlini, Lee 8c Spanos, 1992; Spanos, Arango 8c de Groot, 
1993; Oakman, Woody 8c Bowers, 1996; Zachariae, Jorgenson 8c Christensen, 2000). 
However, evidence for the context effect as identified by Council et al., (1986) is mixed. 
Although the majority of studies have replicated the context effect, reporting non­
significant correlations between the TAS and hypnotic suggestibility, three studies (Nadon 
et al., 1991; Perlini et al., 1992; Zachariae et al., 2000) have reported a significant small to
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moderate relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and absorption even when context is 
controlled. The picture gets even more complicated, with some studies (e.g. Drake at al., 
1990-1991; Nadon et al., 1991) reporting non-significant differences between the size of 
correlations between same-context and different-context conditions, indicated that context 
does not effect the relationship. Milling et al., (2000) identify methodological problems 
which may account for the anomalous results regarding the context effect. Milling et al., 
(2000) point out that participants were not randomly assigned to conditions in most of the 
studies (e.g. Council et al., 1986; Drake et al., 1990-1991; Nadon et al., 1991), with 
participants from the Oakman et al., (1996) study even being drawn from different 
populations altogether. Another factor that was not considered was the time between 
measurements. The interval between the absorption and hypnotic suggestibility assessments 
was greater in the different-context conditions compared to the same-context conditions for 
many studies (e.g. Council et al., 1986; de Groot et al., 1988; Nadon et al., 1991; Perlini et 
al., 1992); whilst for other studies, the interval between measurements is unclear (e.g.
Spanos et al., 1993; Oakman et al., 1996), thus confounding the different-context conditions 
with a temporal factor. Milling et al., (2000) addressed these confounds, and found that 
even when time between assessment sessions were constant and participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions, a significant context effect was still obtained. Taken together studies 
in this area indicate at best a low to moderate relationship between absorption and hypnotic 
suggestibility, and of the studies that have reported a significant relationship with context 
controlled, the variance shared with hypnotic suggestibility is very low, approximately 4% 
(Milling et al., 2000).
The constructs of ‘imaginative involvement’ and ‘fantasy proneness’ are conceptually very 
similar to absorption, and consequently will be briefly reviewed here. The concept of 
imaginative involvement was constructed by J. Hilgard (1974, 1979), following a series of 
extended interviews, when she noted that most high hypnotizable participants tended to 
describe the hypnotic situation as one in which they experienced ‘almost total immersion in 
the activity...’ accompanied with ‘...indifference to distracting stimuli in the environment’
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(1974, p. 5). Moreover, Hilgard’s research reports that most of the highly hypnotizable 
individuals studied were more inclined to engage and be involved in, activities that required 
similar ‘imaginative involvement’, such as sports that require absolute total concentration 
and acting. Subsequent studies have provided support for Hilgard’s observations that 
activities and roles that may entail greater ‘imaginative involvement’ correlate significantly 
with hypnotic suggestibility (reviewed in Council, Kirsch & Grant, 1996). As mentioned 
earlier, the concept of imaginative involvement is very closely related, if not practically 
synonymous (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995), with Tellegen and Atkinson’s (1974) concept of 
absorption. Indeed, according to Kirsch and Council (1992), research using the TAS has 
been used to support the construct validity of imaginative involvement and its relationship 
with hypnosis. However, similar to the studies investigating absorption, it appears when 
context effects are controlled, the validity of the significant relationship between imaginative 
involvement and hypnotic suggestibility is called into question (Drake et al., 1990-1991).
The ‘fantasy-prone personality’ (Wilson & Barber, 1983a) is an amalgamation of various 
conceptually similar concepts such as absorption and imaginative involvement. It is assessed 
using the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI, Wilson & Barber, 
1983b), which measures the frequency, intensity and involvement of fantasy and vivid 
daydreaming an individual engages in child or adulthood. On the basis of the original work 
by Wilson and Barber (1981, 1983b) and a series of studies by Barrett (1990, 1996) and by 
Lynn and Rhue (1986, 1988), a strong relationship between high levels of hypnotic 
suggestibility and fantasy proneness has been demonstrated. Crawford (1982) reports that 
fantasy-prone individuals are more inclined to be involved in disproportionate amounts of 
image-based daydreaming, to become intensely absorbed in imaginative activities such as 
reading and music, as well as show high levels of imagery vividness. These findings suggest 
that individuals who are highly prone to engage in fantasy-related activities involving a 
temporary inhibition of rational and reality-bound analytical thinking will consequently be 
susceptible to hypnosis (Lynn 8c Rhue, 1988, 1991). Moreover, unlike absorption and 
imaginative involvement, fantasy proneness appears to remain significantly correlated with
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hypnotic suggestibility, even with context controlled (e.g. Silva, 1990; cited in Kirsch & 
Council, 1992). However, as Rhue and Lynn (1989) point out, not at all fantasy-prone 
individuals are highly hypnotizable, and the studies subsequent to that of Wilson and 
Barber (1981, 1983b) have only found moderate correlations, indicating that there is more 
to hypnosis then simple proneness to fantasy. Indeed, Barber (1999) himself notes that 
although fantasy prone individuals have played a dramatic role in the history of hypnosis, 
most individuals classified as highly hypnotizable are not fantasy prone. In addition, 
considering that fantasy proneness as measured by the ICMI has a sizeable conceptual 
overlap, the components of the ICMI that correlate with hypnotic suggestibility 
independent of context remain unknown (Kirsch & Council, 1992).
2.2.4. Hypnosis as a state of dissociation
Since the turn of the last century and the work of Pierre Janet (1901), William James 
(1890/1981), and Morton Prince (1906), hypnosis has been inextricably linked with the 
concept of dissociation. Janet (1901) proposed hypnosis as a pathological dissociation of 
normally integrated personality processes, expressed through noticeable discontinuities in 
normal experience of the self and the world. In contrast, James and Prince contested the 
pathological and discontinuous characteristics of dissociation and proposed that 
dissociation was in fact present in the everyday non-pathological experiences of all 
individuals, to varying degrees.
Hilgard’s Neodissociation theory and his seminal publication, Divided Consciousness: 
Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action (1977), have often been credited with 
bringing dissociation and hypnosis out of their relative obscurities in pathology and 
bringing them into the fields of psychology and everyday non-pathological experiences. The 
essence of Neodissociation theory is that hypnosis is a state in which individuals become 
dissociated from conscious intentions and purposes, usually via the influence of hypnotic 
suggestions.
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According to the theory, the behaviour of an individual is a product of subordinate 
cognitive control systems, which consist of a number of functionally independent, yet 
interacting paths operating in a hierarchical order. At the top of the hierarchy is a central 
control structure -  the executive ego - which is responsible for planning, monitoring and 
managing the subordinate cognitive subsystems that are required for thoughts and actions. 
The executive ego itself is under conscious control of the individual and requires and 
consumes attentional resources. Once the executive selects the appropriate subordinate 
cognitive subsystems for a given task, they are active with a considerable degree of 
autonomy from it, and function largely outside conscious awareness. Hilgard (1992) points 
out that in this way, well-learned behaviours can be performed effortlessly and 
simultaneously, with conscious representation of complex behaviours being unnecessary.
He uses the example of a bilingual person deciding to talk in one of his or her languages, 
after which the appropriate language is used automatically and the other language is 
inhibited.
Although the cognitive control systems are subject to executive ego control and monitoring, 
the executive ego is constrained by dispositional and situational influences. Consequently, 
under particular circumstances, the activity of cognitive control systems can be ‘dissociated’ 
from that of the executive ego’s control. According to Hilgard, hypnosis is one particular 
circumstance, in which the hypnotic induction may influence the executive functions 
themselves, by inhibiting them and fractionalising them and subsequently changing the 
hierarchical arrangement. The fractionalising of the executive ego, results in part of it 
continuing to control and monitor in conscious awareness, with a second dissociated part 
exerting its influence outside awareness concealed by an amnesic barrier. The theory posits 
that hypnotic suggestions influence the dissociated part of the executive ego resulting in 
change in the hierarchical arrangement of the subsystems. The suggested actions, 
experiences and behaviours are experienced as involuntary, because the individual is 
unaware that part of the ongoing central executive ego structure has been dissociated from 
consciousness.
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The notion of fractionation of the central executive ego was inspired by the very well known 
unanticipated discovery of the ‘hidden observer’ by Hilgard during an undergraduate 
demonstration of hypnosis. During the session, an individual was given the suggestion that 
he was completely deaf, which was subsequently successfully implemented and evidenced by 
no responses to shots from a starter’s pistol, questions or taunts. One of the students raised 
the issue of whether there was some part of the individual that was aware of things 
happening around him, even though his overt behavioural responses indicated otherwise. 
Hilgard tested this by asking the participant whether or not there was a part of their mind 
that could hear and was processing information, and if so, to raise an index finger to sign 
that this was the case. Subsequently, the person’s finger rose as requested, indicating that 
although the individual was not aware of sensory auditory information, he was nevertheless 
registering and processing the sensory experience in some way. Hilgard (1973) termed this 
the ‘hidden observer’ phenomenon.
Since this discovery, the hidden observer phenomenon has been investigated by studies that 
aimed to elucidate its prevalence and parameters. The evidence suggests that the 
phenomenon of the hidden observer can only be found in a small proportion of the very 
highly responsive hypnotic subjects. In one of the earliest studies by Hilgard, Morgan & 
Macdonald (1975), it was demonstrated that as a group (20 high hypnotic suggestible 
participants) there were significantly greater reports of ‘hidden’ cold-pressor pain than pain 
reported in the usual way whilst hypnotized following an analgesia suggestion. However, as 
Hilgard et al., (1975) point out, the mean findings were heavily dependent on the responses 
of 8 of the participants. Numerous studies have found a similar pattern of results, indicating 
that only a relatively small fraction of highly suggestible participants, approximately 30-40% 
produce the phenomenon of the hidden observer (e.g. Crawford, Macdonald & Hilgard, 
1979; Hilgard, Hilgard, Macdonald, Morgan & Johnson, 1978; Knox, Morgan & Hilgard, 
1974; Laurence & Perry, 1981)
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A series of studies by Spanos and colleagues challenged Hilgard’s neodissociation theory 
suggesting that the hidden observer phenomenon was a result of demand characteristics and 
expectations inherent in the instructions used in hidden observer experiments (Spanos, 
Flynn & Gwynn, 1988; Spanos, Gwynn 8c Stam, 1983; Spanos 8c Hewitt, 1980). These studies 
indicated that the hidden observer phenomenon was shaped by the instructions given to 
participants. For example, Spanos et al., (1983) found that high hypnotic suggestibles rated 
‘hidden’ cold-pressor pain and pain reported in the usual way whilst hypnotized, as being 
equal intensity, unless they were given instructions explicitly identifying that one type of 
pain was required to be more intense than the other. Such explicit instructions were used in 
the early hidden observer experiments conducted by Hilgard and colleagues, which more 
often than not identified the expected outcome.
Acknowledging that hidden observer phenomenon may be influenced by experimental 
demands, Nogrady, McConkey, Laurence 8c Perry (1983) conducted a highly influential and 
unique study, which was designed to control the demand characteristics that might produce 
the hidden observer phenomenon. Using the real-simulator design (Orne, 1959), they 
found that 5 of the 12 highly suggestible participants displayed hidden observers, whilst 
none of the 10 high-medium suggestible participants and none of the 10 low suggestible 
participants simulating hypnosis produced a hidden observer response. The findings of the 
Nogrady et al., (1983) study, are supportive of the earlier studies by Hilgard and the 
neodissociation theory. However, the issue surrounding why the majority of highly 
suggestible participants do not display hidden observers remains, suggesting that all 
hypnotic phenomena can not be explained by fractionation of the executive ego and 
dissociation. In fact, according to Nogrady et al., (1983) only 4.28% of an unselected 
population can produce the hidden observer.
Neodissociation theory has been used to explain the apparent relationship between 
dissociation and hypnotic suggestibility in patients suffering from so-called pathological 
dissociation such as borderline personality and dissociative identity disorders (Brassfield,
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1983; Bliss, 1986); post-traumatic stress disorder (Spiegel, 1986; Spiegel, Hunt 8c 
Dondershine, 1988); and bulimia nervosa (Kranhold, Baumann & Fichter, 1992; Covino, 
Jimerson, Wolfe, Franko 8c Frankel, 1994). It is suggested that individuals with such 
disorders have a tendency to dissociate to cope with the extreme stress or trauma, and 
consequently acquire the skills necessary for high hypnotic ability by habitually dissociating 
from their traumatic experiences. The relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and 
pathological dissociation is far from definitive, and is based on low significant correlations, 
and it is evident the much more research is needed in this area before it can be claimed that 
there is a significant relationship between the two.
Dissociation has also been investigated as a personality trait as measured by the well 
researched scale: the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, version 1: Bernstein 8c Putnam, 
1986; DES version 2, Carlson 8c Putnam, 1993). The DES was originally designed to measure 
pathological dissociation and was intended for use in clinical populations as a tool to 
discriminate between patients diagnosed with and without dissociative disorders. Carlson 
and Putnam (1989) using factor analysis found three main factors that accounted for most 
of the variance in DES items (dissociative amnesia; depersonalisation/de-realisation; 
absorption).
Most research examining the relationship between dissociation scales and measures of 
hypnotic suggestibility have reported significant but low correlations of between 0.12 to 0.27 
(e.g. Butler 8c Bryant, 1997; Frischolz, Braun, Sachs, Schwartz, Lewis, Schaeffer, Westergaard 
8c Pasquotto, 1992; Nadon, Kihlstrom, Hoyt 8c Register, 1991; Oakman, Woody 8c Bowers, 
1996). With the exception of the study by Butler and Bryant (1997), the correlation between 
hypnotic suggestibility and the DES is only significant when the two are measured in the 
same context (Kirsch 8c Council, 1992). Frischolz et al., (1992) found that recall on the 
hypnotic amnesia item on the HGSHS:A, was negatively correlated with the total DES score 
as well as the dissociative amnesia, depersonalisation/de-realisation and absorption factors 
identified by Carlson and Putnam (1989), indicating a relationship between amnesia and
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these aspects of dissociation. However, few studies have examined the relationship between 
specific items on hypnotic suggestibility scales and the DES, which may elucidate any 
relationships. The relationship is further complicated by the fact that the DES is significantly 
correlated with the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS: Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), which is 
not surprising given that Carlson and Putnam identified absorption as one of the three main 
factors accounting for variance in the DES.
Bowers and colleagues (e.g. Bowers, 1992, 1994; Woody & Bowers, 1994) although 
continuing to hold on to dissociation as an explanation of hypnosis, formulated a revision 
of Hilgard’s neodissociation theory, based on Norman and Shallice’s (1986) 
neuropsychological model of voluntary and involuntary regulation of behaviour. The theory 
rejects the idea of an ‘amnesic barrier’, and relocates the influence of hypnosis and hypnotic 
suggestion with respect to Hilgard’s model. Bowers (1992) argues that if hypnosis involved 
an amnesic barrier, then all hypnotic phenomena would involve an element of spontaneous 
amnesia. You would also expect a high proportion of individuals to experience amnesia 
when it is suggested to them, which is not the case, with the amnesia item on hypnotic 
suggestibility scales often cited as one of the more difficult if not the most difficult item to 
pass.
According to Hilgard’s neodissociation theory, hypnosis acts upon the central executive ego, 
causing executive fractionation and indirectly controls the appropriate subordinate cognitive 
control systems through the part of the executive ego that is concealed from conscious 
awareness by the amnesic barrier. In contrast Woody & Bowers’ (1994) Dissociated Control 
theory, posits that hypnosis directly controls the appropriate subordinate cognitive control 
systems, bypassing and inhibiting the executive control over the subordinate subsystems.
The key difference between the two theories is that neodissociation theory describes the 
hypnotic response as an intentional act that is perceived as involuntary; whilst dissociated 
control theory suggests that the hypnotic response is truly involuntary and hypnosis affects 
the way behaviour is controlled, rather than only how it is experienced, with the hypnotic
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response and cognitive activity occurring simultaneously, rather than the latter mediating 
the former. A small number of studies have provided support for the dissociated control 
view, showing hypnotic phenomena such as hypnotic analgesia (e.g. Miller & Bowers, 1993) 
and hypnotic amnesia (e.g. Bowers 8c Woody, 1996) as being relatively automatic processes 
compared to so-called non-hypnotic phenomena such as stress inoculation procedures and 
suggestions in a non-hypnotic context. Woody and Bowers (1994) have often compared the 
hypnotized individual to a frontal lobe patient, and a study by Woody and Farvolden (1998) 
examined this possible relationship by comparing high and low hypnotic suggestibles in 
both a hypnotic and non-hypnotic context, on memory tasks that were sensitive to the 
functioning of the frontal lobe. Woody and Bowers hypothesis would be that high 
suggestibles in a hypnotic context would do significantly worse on the memory tasks 
compared to high suggestibles in a non-hypnotic context, or low suggestibles in either 
contexts. The results indicated that high suggestibles preformed poorly on memory tasks 
irrespective of context (as well as when compared to low suggestibles), which is inconsistent 
with the model, and may suggest that ‘hypnotic* suggestibility differences are more 
important than whether hypnosis is induced or not.
The evidence supporting dissociation theories (neodissociation and dissociated control) is at 
best inconclusive and at worst plagued with contradictions and conceptual difficulties 
(Dixon 8c Laurence, 1992; for a fuller critique of dissociation theories of hypnosis see Kirsch 
8c Lynn, 1998; for replies see Kihlstrom, 1998; Woody & Sadler, 1998b). Regarding 
neodissociation theory, the only direct evidence for the hypothesised amnesic barrier is that 
of the hidden observer, with the majority of studies indicating a very low proportion of 
highly suggestible individuals exhibiting the phenomenon. If, as neodissociation theory 
posits, dissociation is the basis of all hypnotic phenomena, then the hidden observer, which 
represents a split in executive functions and dissociation, should be present in the majority 
if not all high hypnotically suggestible individuals. However, the literature suggests that this 
is not the case, and as Woody and Bowers (1994) point out, a process requiring a very rare 
phenomenon such as spontaneous selective amnesia, can not be responsible for all hypnotic
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behaviours including very common responses, such as responses to simple ideomotor 
suggestions. It would also appear that hidden observer reports are extremely sensitive to 
demand characteristics and contextual cues, which indicates that it is more likely to be a 
suggested effect than a reflection of a dissociated non-hypnotized hidden part of 
consciousness (Kirsch & Lynn, 1998). The evidential base regarding neodissociation theory 
and studies assessing the relationship between dissociative ability and hypnotic suggestibility 
is small and unpredictable. The correlations between suggestibility measures and the DES 
are low but significant when both are measured in the same context, and almost non­
existent and non-significant when both are measured in separate contexts. Neodissociation 
theory also does not provide a satisfactory, and detailed systematic account of how and why 
the forms of dissociation are brought about in connection with hypnotic phenomena. There 
are a profusion of issues that need explaining including, how an amnesic barrier is produced 
and what it consists of; how the variety of hypnotic phenomena come into being; and how 
do hypnotist’s words influence individuals in this way (see Kirsch & Lynn, 1998).
Dissociated control theory is a relatively ‘young’ theory, which may explain partly why there 
is only a small empirical body of work in support of it, and why many of the specifics of the 
theory have not been elucidated. The strengths of dissociated control theory lie with (i) its 
consistency with contemporary neuropsychological work, and dual-system theories of 
automaticity and volition (e.g. Norman & Shallice, 1986; Goldberg, 1987); and (ii) its 
rejection of the notion of an amnesic barrier, consequently distancing itself from the 
problematic hidden observer phenomenon. A key shortcoming of dissociated control theory 
is that it proposes that hypnotic phenomena are produced by an altered state of 
consciousness. As discussed in detail earlier, there is still no evidence of a unique altered 
state of consciousness. This is somewhat problematic for the theory, as the effects of non­
hypnotic suggestions and post-hypnotic suggestions cannot be accounted for, as individuals 
are not presumed ‘hypnotized’ or in ‘an altered state of consciousness’ when they respond 
to these types of suggestions (Kirsch & Lynn, 1998). Equally problematic for dissociated 
theory is how to account for self-hypnosis, as the theory is based on the traditional hetero­
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induction. According to the theory executive control is inhibited during hypnosis, however, 
it would appear that self-hypnosis would require some form of executive control.
The theory also proposes that although social factors may account for responses to so-called 
‘easier’ ideomotor and challenge suggestions, dissociation is required for production of 
more ‘difficult’ suggestions such as analgesia, amnesia and hallucination (e.g. Balthazard & 
Woody, 1992; Hargadon, Bowers & Woody, 1995; Woody & Sadler, 1998b). However, a 
large number of studies have provided contrasting evidence, demonstrating that the 
generation of the more ‘difficult’ suggestions are also sensitive to expectations and 
contextual demands (e.g. Kirsch et al., 1995; Spanos, 1986; Spanos & Coe, 1992). Given this 
position, it is surprising that Woody and Bowers (1994) provide a detailed explanation of 
how ideomotor and challenge suggestions are generated, whilst not satisfactorily or 
systematically accounting for the so-called more ‘difficult’ suggestions.
A dissociation theory of hypnosis, whether it is conceptualised as a ff actionalisation of 
consciousness or weakened executive control, is intuitively compatible with hypnotic 
phenomena, as it is easy to conceive of individuals exhibiting various degrees of dissociation 
whilst generating hypnotic phenomena such as amnesia, analgesia and hallucinations.
Kirsch and Lynn (1998) argue that despite the conceptual problems and problematic 
empirical bases of both theories, the concept of dissociation should not be rejected, and the 
term dissociation should be used as a descriptive label, analogous to the ‘weak’ 
interpretation of the altered state -  ‘the domain of dissociation intersects with, but is not 
identical to hypnotic phenomena’ (Kirsch & Lynn, 1998, p. 112)
2.2.5. Hypnosis as an altered state of brain functional organisation
Research investigating the psychophysiological mechanisms of hypnosis can be traced as far 
back as Charcot and colleagues, although was not tested empirically till the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, with studies examining differences in hemisphericity and EEG activity. Since 
then research has become more sophisticated, complex and specialised, with probably the
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most influential developments in understanding in this area resulting from the expanding 
and evolving neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis (Crawford, 1994; Gruzelier,
1996, 1998; Crawford 8c Gruzelier, 1992). According to the neuropsychophysiological 
model, hypnosis is a state of altered brain function organisation, which involves shifts in 
physiological and cognitive activity and the relocation of attention. More specifically, as a 
highly suggestible individual enters and becomes deeply absorbed in the hypnotic procedure 
and context, the individual experiences a shift in consciousness characterised by a shift away 
from analytical, sequential types of processing, to a more holistic and imaginal mode, 
resulting in a decrease in reality testing and an increase in dissociative experiences.
The neuropsychophysiological model is essentially a working model that has been 
developed and built up from a vast programme of neurophysiological findings, and 
consequently there is a substantial body of research in support of it. Support for the notion 
that hypnosis involves a shift from left-hemisphere analytical and sequential types of 
processing, to more holistic right hemisphere oriented processes has been provided in 
studies by Gruzelier and colleagues (e.g. Gruzelier 8c Brow, 1985; Gruzelier, Hancock 8c 
Maggs, 1991; McCormack 8c Gruzelier, 1993). For example, Gruzelier and Brow (1985) 
demonstrated that in high suggestible participants habituation of electrodermal responses 
was faster to tones during hypnosis than in the non-hypnotic baseline. The electrodermal 
responses in highs were significantly lower on the left hand (i.e. right hemisphere) during 
hypnosis than in baseline, indicating a shift in lateralisation from left hemispheric influences 
in non-hypnotic baseline to right hemispheric influences in hypnosis. Low suggestibles did 
not show this difference. A subsequent investigation by Gruzelier, Allison and Conway 
(1988) (cited in Crawford 8c Gruzelier, 1992) replicated these findings, and demonstrated 
that facilitation of habituation does not occur in participants instructed to simulate being 
hypnotized. Support for the idea that left-hemispheric processes are inhibited whilst a shift 
towards more holistic right hemisphere orientated processes occur during hypnosis, has 
been shown in several studies (Cikurel 8c Gruzelier, 1990; Gruzlier, Brow, Perry, Rhonder 8c 
Thomas, 1984). Using haptic tactile discrimination tasks, high suggestible participants in
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these studies showed a significant slowing in right hand (i.e. left hemisphere) sorting times 
following the induction of hypnosis, with the degree of slowing correlating significantly with 
hypnotic suggestibility level. A series of studies by Crawford have also provided support for 
the hypothesised shift to holistic processes during hypnosis, reporting that high suggestible 
participants show substantial improvement on a variety of tasks, such as visual memory 
tasks and spatial memory for location, suggesting greater right-hemispheric involvement 
during hypnosis amongst high suggestible individuals (e.g. Crawford, 1989; Crawford & 
Allen, 1983; Crawford, Wallace, Nomura & Slater, 1986).
The essence of Gruzelier’s model (Crawford 8c Gruzelier, 1992; Gruzelier, 1998) and the 
findings of the vast programme of work is that hypnosis is a three-stage temporal process. 
Firstly, during the induction of hypnosis there is focussed attention on the words of the 
hypnotist with disattention to extraneous stimuli, as shown by greater frontal left- 
hemispheric activation in high suggestible compared to low suggestible participants prior to 
and during the beginning of the hypnotic induction (e.g. Gruzelier 8c Brow, 1985).
Secondly, once attention and the supervisory attentional system has been sufficiently 
engaged, and the highly suggestible individual enters and is deeply absorbed in the hypnotic 
experience, suggestions for relaxation and/or ‘letting go’ and ‘going with the flow’ bring 
about alterations in cognitive strategies, which bring about an inhibition of the left- 
hemisphere and shift to right hemisphere oriented processes (e.g. Gruzelier et al., 1984).
This corresponds to a shift away from analytical modes of processing to more holistic 
processing (e.g. Crawford 8c Allen, 1983). Finally, any further use of suggestions involve 
primarily the right hemisphere and the posterior cortical sites (e.g. Crawford, 1989).
The notion that hypnosis involves extremely focussed and sustained attention is also closely 
related to the concept of absorption, and numerous studies have shown significant 
relationships between the two (e.g. Crawford, Brown 8c Moon, 1993). A number of studies 
have reported relationships between attentional processing and hypnotic suggestibility.
High suggestibles have been shown to have superior performance on variants of the
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embedded figures task, using words (e.g. Wallace & Patterson, 1984) and pictures (Priebe & 
Wallace, 1986; Wallace, 1988). Differences in the embedded figure task have been explained 
in terms of high suggestibles abilities to flexibly shift attention, using holistic and analytical 
strategies to find embedded figures or words (Zelniker, 1989). A study by Van Nuys (1973) 
provides further support of this proposition, reporting significant negative correlations 
between hypnotic suggestibility and (i) the number of intrusive thoughts on a concentrative 
meditational task (r = -0.32); and (ii) participant’s own breathing during the task (r = - 
0.42). High suggestibles have also been shown to be more responsive and report 
significantly more reversals of reversible figures and illusions such as the Necker Cube and 
the Schroeder staircase (e.g. Wallace, 1988; Wallace, Knight and Garrat, 1976) as well as a 
variety of other perceptual illusions, including autokinetic movement (e.g. Atkinson 8c 
Crawford, 1992; Crawford et al., 1993; Wallace, Garrett 8c Anstadt, 1974).
However, a recent critical evaluation of the relationship between sustained attentional 
abilities and hypnotic suggestibility by Jamieson and Sheehan (2002), questions the notion 
that a high level of hypnotic suggestibility is significantly positively related to sustained 
attentional ability. They argue that a lack of replication of many of the studies cited in 
support of this relationship, and uncertainty regarding the nature of measures, makes a 
definitive interpretation difficult. Jamieson and Sheehan (2002) conducted a factor 
analytical study to explore the nature of the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility (as 
measured by the HGSHS:A; Shor 8c Orne, 1962) and a range of behavioural measures cited 
in the literature to index sustained and focussed attentional abilities, including -  the 
binaural word pairs test, signal detection intrusions, reversible figures, and a modified 
version of the TAS. Using a considerably larger sample (n = 182) than previous studies, they 
reported no evidence of a relationship between performance on a wide range of 
standardised tasks and hypnotic suggestibility for any of the experimental tasks included. 
They conclude that ‘the time is ripe for a conceptual and empirical re-evaluation of the role 
of attentional processes in hypnosis ... the future investigation of attention and hypnosis 
will need to take much greater cognizance of theories and methodologies within these
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disciplines if progress is to be made toward an integrated scientific understanding of this 
topic’ (p. 72).
Nevertheless, the lack of relationship between sustained attentional abilities and hypnotic 
suggestibility is not surprising, even within the neurophysiological framework. According to 
the neurophysiological model (Gruzelier, 1998, 2000), hypnosis is a temporal process, and 
consequently although sustained and focussed attention is a necessary pre-requisite of 
initiating hypnosis, i.e. stage 1, it does not imply that hypnosis is itself a more efficient and 
enhanced stated of focussed attention. Subsequent to this initial focussing of attention, it is 
proposed that instructions of the conventional hypnotic induction inhibit left frontal 
functions (Gruzellier & Warren, 1993; Kallio, Revonsuo, Hamalainen, Markela & Gruzelier, 
2001), which is consistent with the speculated reduced influence of the supervisory 
attentional system by Woody and Bowers (1994), as evidenced by deteriorated accuracy on 
the Stroop paradigm (e.g. Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004; Kaiser, Barker, Haenschel, Baldeweg 
& Gruzelier, 1997; Nordby, Hugdahl, Jasiukaitis & Spiegel, 1999). Jamieson and Sheehan 
(2004) argue that hypnosis is more consistent with diminished rather than enhanced 
executive functioning, and that the ‘deeply absorbed experiences that characterize high 
[suggestibles], both in hypnosis and in daily life, are not the products of more efficient 
frontal networks of attention control. Rather, they result from a perseveration in the object 
or theme of current awareness, due to the temporary and partial inhibition of these very 
processes of self-directed attentional control’ (p. 245).
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the neurophysiological model of hypnosis is its reliance 
on an altered state of consciousness, which it shares with other altered state theories, such as 
dissociated control theory (Bowers, 1992). Gruzelier (2000) proposes that the ‘instructions 
of the conventional hypnotic induction are there for a neurophysiological purpose, and are 
not simply a cultural artefact to bolster demonstrable power of contextual suggestion’ (p. 
54). However, as has been discussed earlier, phenomena can be suggested successfully 
without prior induction of hypnosis (e.g. Barber, 1969; Barber & Calverley, 1965). Related
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to this, is the lack of appropriate control conditions in many studies, and it remains unclear 
whether the physiological changes are unique to hypnosis or simply a mirror of the 
induction process being used. For example, would the same physiological changes occur if 
hypnosis were induced using a post-hypnotic suggestion or signal? In addition, similarly to 
dissociated control theory, the neuropsychophysiological model experiences problems when 
attempting to explain self-hypnosis, with the notion of inhibited executive control being 
incompatible with the idea that some level of executive control would be needed for self­
hypnosis (Gruzelier, 1998).
According to the neuropsychophysiological model, a hypnotized individual experiences a 
shift in consciousness characterised by a shift away from analytical, sequential types of 
processing, to a more holistic and imaginal mode, resulting in a decrease in reality testing 
and an increase in dissociative experiences. Conceptualisations such as ‘holistic and 
imaginal mode’ and ‘decrease in reality testing’ need to be systematically and defined in 
more detail. Moreover, although there is a considerable body of well-designed research 
detailing the various cognitive and physiological processes that occur during hypnosis, the 
details of how hypnotic inductions bring about hypnotic phenomena is still lacking.
2.3 Conclusions
The search for a unique state of hypnosis has yielded meagre results, with the evidence 
suggesting that there is no indicator of such a unique state. Many sociocognitive theorists 
cite this as evidence against a ‘special state’ of hypnosis. However, Gruzelier (2000) suggests 
that the quest for a unitary marker of hypnosis is naive. Woody and McConkey (2003) 
similarly posit that the search for a unitary hypnotic state is misguided, and although once 
an important issue in the history of hypnosis, is no longer a fruitful approach to hypnosis. A 
number of recent researchers have called for integration between theoretical perspectives 
(Gruzelier, 2000; Kihlstrom, 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 1995; Nadon, 1997; Wagstaff, 1998a), 
nonetheless, Woody & Sadler (1998b) write ‘in a field like hypnosis, in which we are still
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groping forward and many quite basic issues remain to be explored and resolved, we may 
not be anywhere near such a final and complete theory’ (p. 192).
Although an accepted integrative framework has yet to be developed, many researchers 
agree that different theorists are looking at diverse aspects, including social, cognitive, 
phenomenological, and physiological aspects, of the same phenomenon. The notion of 
levels of explanation has been offered as a framework to account for the diversity in 
explanations, which do not necessarily have conceptual incompatibility. For example, 
Wagstaff (2000) distinguishes psychological explanations from physiological explanations, 
writing that ‘the argument that [psychological] models cannot ultimately explain anything 
because they do not refer to physiology is mistaken ... it is more accurate to say that the 
processes described by such theories represent a different level of explanation’ (p. 155). 
Woody and McConkey (2003) suggest adopting a dynamic-systems conception of a state, 
which characterises the hypnotized person as a set of related or interacting variables, i.e. a 
system. According, to Woody and McConkey (2003) ‘the implications of this framework are 
that researchers should study the variety o f continuous states that occur within hypnosis, 
characterising the dimensions of the state space in a multivariate way, and examining the 
pattern o f change in these states across time’ (p. 312). This approach as seeing hypnosis as a 
continuous rather than a categorical state and a temporal process is almost synonymous to 
what once was a unique approach taken by Gruzelier and Crawford which considers 
hypnosis as dynamic interrelations between brain regions, brain rhythms and 
neurotransmitters (Gruzelier, 1998; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Crawford, 1994).
The dynamic-systems conception of the state, advocated by Tart and others (see section 
2.1.2), provides a potentially useful framework, and if adopted then research needs to focus 
on the underpinnings of these dynamic states and how they can be characterised (Woody & 
McConkey, 2003). However, if researchers look at the diversity of states that occur in 
hypnosis and their patterns across time, instead of a unique signature, the question still 
remains whether experiences produced by suggestion are in any way dependent on some, if
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any, of the states attained in hypnosis. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence to suggest 
that hypnotic inductions possess such properties, re-emphasising the importance of 
distinguishing between the hypothetical ‘hypnotic state’ and phenomena produced by 
suggestion (Kirsch, 1997; 2000a). Although many functional brain imaging studies have 
been cited as supporting evidence of the hypnotic state by showing accompanying changes 
in brain physiology (e.g. Kosslyn et al., 2000; Rainville et al., 1997; Szechtman et al., 1998), 
these studies have only examined the effect of hypnotic suggestions on various sensory and 
perceptual dimensions, and have not directly addressed the status of hypnotic states.
Two studies (Rainville et al., 1999; Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan & Price, 2002) 
have directly addressed the status of hypnotic states, without confounding the effects of 
‘hypnosis’ with the effects of specific suggestions. Both these studies identified and 
characterised hypnosis as involving changes in brain activity within regions involved in the 
control of consciousness states, such as the brainstem, the thalamus and the anterior 
cingulate cortex, as well areas such as the ventrolateral frontal and right posterior parietal 
cortices which have been shown to regulate attentional processes through the mechanisms 
of executive attention. The notion that the hypnotic state involves frontal alterations has 
also received strong support from studies that show that high hypnotic suggestibles exhibit 
impaired attentional control after hypnotic induction, as evidenced by deteriorated error 
performance on the Stroop (Stroop, 1935) paradigm (e.g. Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004; Kaiser 
et al., 1997; Nordby et al., 1999) and attenuated responses (Gruzelier & Brow, 1985; 
Gruzelier et al., 1988). Gruzelier (2005) notes that one cannot ignore the involvement of the 
frontal areas, with forthcoming evidence from numerous studies (also see section 2.2.5.) 
using a range of measures, including event-related potentials (Gruzelier, Gray & Horn,
2002; Jutai, Gruzelier, Golds & Thomas, 1993; Kaiser et al., 1997); EEG (Egner et al., 2005; 
Gruzelier, 1998); haptic sorting (Cikurel & Gruzelier, 1990; Gruzelier et al., 1984); letter 
versus category word fluency tasks (Gruzelier & Warren, 1993; Kallio et al., 2001); and 
FMRI (Egner et al., 2005). Indeed, Egner et al., (2005) provided evidence of decoupling 
between two regions frequently implicated as correlates of the hypnotic state, namely the
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anterior cingulate cortex and the lateral frontal cortex. At present it appears ‘that the neural 
correlates of the ASC [altered state(s) of consciousness] of hypnosis might be found in the 
changed activity in the frontal areas’ (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2005, p. 51).
Oakley and Halligan (2005) suggest that these structures are ‘exactly the ones we would have 
expected to be involved in such a process and that the ‘state’ of hypnosis appears to be a 
perfectly normal one in the sense of being based on mundane brain processes’ (p. 15). At 
present, although there is emerging evidence that hypnosis can be understood in terms of 
known attentional processes and brain systems, we still do not know about its necessity or if 
suggested effects that occur prior to a hypnotic induction are represented differently in the 
brain compared to suggested effects following a hypnotic induction. The following chapter 
critically examines the handful of experimental6 studies that have directly investigated the 
effect of ‘hypnosis’ on suggestibility, in which the same suggestions were given with and 
without prior induction of hypnosis.
6 In contrast to neuroimaging studies
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Chapter 3 
Hypnosis and Suggestibility
Chapter overview
The literature examined in the previous chapter indicated that there is no evidence for a 
hypnotic state involving unique patterns of psychological functions. The hypnotic state 
appears to be an inference rather than an observed fact and probably the only thing we can 
say with reasonable certainty is that procedures traditionally associated with inducing this 
hypothetical state have the ability in some cases to enhance responses to suggestions. This 
chapter critically evaluates the effect hypnosis, or more specifically a hypnotic induction 
procedure, has on responses to suggestion.
3.1. Hypnosis and suggestion
Hypnosis and suggestion have been inextricably linked since the nineteenth century by the 
investigations of Braid (1843) who viewed suggestions as acting more powerfully during 
hypnosis. There is no question that for Braid and a great many early investigators of 
hypnotic phenomena, responsiveness to suggestions were believed to be facilitated by the 
hypnotic ‘state’ and procedures labelled as hypnotic inductions. Bernheim (1902) wrote 
‘hypnotism ... facilitates suggestion when it can be induced’ (p. 141). Sidis (1898) 
understood ‘suggestion [to be] all-powerful in the hypnotic trance; [with] the hypnotic 
trance... in fact [being] a state of heightened suggestibility’ (p. 70). Hull (1933) believed ‘the 
essence of hypnosis [lay] in the fact of change in suggestibility’ (p. 391).
Increase in suggestibility has been so fundamental to views about hypnosis, that it has been 
considered by many to be a defining characteristic of hypnosis. The notion of ‘hypnosis as 
heightened suggestibility’ will be examined with evidence on the effects of hypnosis and
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hypnotic procedures on suggestibility being critically evaluated. Original evidence stems 
from: (i) early experiments published in Hull’s (1933) text, which tested suggestions for 
postural sway and lateral arm movement within (i.e. after a hypnotic induction) and outside 
hypnosis (Hull & Huse, 1930; Williams, 1930; Caster & Baker, 1932; Jenness, 1933); and (ii) 
more rigorous broad-scope experiments that used a battery of standardised test-suggestions 
to measure responsiveness to suggestions (Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961; Barber & Glass, 
1962; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Brafffnan & Kirsch, 1999). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise these 
findings. It was argued in Chapter 1, that the term hypnotizability is a misleading label 
(Kirsch & Braffman, 2001) and that strictly speaking, hypnotizability should be viewed as 
the change in suggestibility produced by inducing hypnosis. Nevertheless, hypnotic 
suggestibility (i.e. responsiveness to suggestions after a hypnotic induction - as measured by 
so-called hypnotic susceptibility scales) is often used on its own as a measure of 
hypnotizability. The handful of studies reviewed in this chapter measure hypnotizability in 
its conceptually more appropriate form, as they all control for non-hypnotic suggestibility 
(i.e. responsiveness to suggestions prior to hypnosis or a hypnotic procedure).
3.2. Early experiments involving a single test of suggestibility
Hull and Huse (1930) appear to have been the first to directly investigate the effects of 
hypnosis on suggestibility. Their approach was to compare the suggestibility of participants 
in the absence of any formal hypnotic induction (non-hypnotic context) with their 
suggestibility following a hypnotic induction (hypnotic context). Suggestibility was 
measured by the length of time in seconds required to evoke maximal postural reaction in 
response to postural sway suggestions. Hull and Huse (1930) found that every one of their 
eight participants showed a clear difference in speed of response in favour of the hypnotic 
context, indicating that participants are more responsive to suggestions following a hypnotic 
induction.
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Table 3.1. Suggestibility in non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts for investigations using a single test of 
suggestibility
Study Cases(N) Suggestion Measure Suggestibility
Difference
Effect Size
(cO
Hull & Huse 
(1930)
8 Postural suggestions to  
induce 'falls'
13.12 seconds 0.73
Williams (1930) 8 Postural suggestions to  
induce 'falls'
8.48 seconds 0.65
Caster & Baker 
(1932)
10 Suggestions to  move 
laterally a horizontally 
extended arm a distance of 
8-inches
23.90 seconds 0.82
Jenness (1933) 8 Suggestions to  move 
laterally a horizontally 
extended arm a distance of 
8-inches
16.09 seconds 0.70
Note.
Suggestibility difference is the mean time for responses to suggestion following a hypnotic induction 
(hypnotic suggestibility) minus the mean time for responses to suggestion prior to a hypnotic induction 
(non-hypnotic suggestibility). Effect Sizes were calculated using original standard deviations, rather than 
paired t-test values, as recommended by Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke (1996). See later in this 
chapter for a discussion of effect sizes and their interpretation (section 3.3.3)
In recognition of the importance of the question involved to views on the nature of 
hypnosis, three studies soon after (see Table 3.1), investigated the effects of hypnosis on 
suggestibility, using similar methodology to that of Hull and Huse (1930). The results 
reported by Williams (1930), Caster and Baker (1932) and Jenness (1933) follow the same 
general pattern of those reported by Hull and Huse (1930), with the vast majority of 
participants responding to suggestions faster following a hypnotic induction. Taken 
together, these four studies, demonstrate that hypnosis increases individuals’ responsiveness 
to suggestion, although Hull (1933) concluded that ‘the amount of... hypersuggestibility... 
while considerable... is probably far less than the classical hypnotists would have supposed 
had the question ever occurred to them’ (p. 298).
However, these studies were beset with weaknesses (Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 
1961). A great shortcoming of these early studies is the use of only a single test of
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suggestibility (e.g. postural sway suggestions), and as a consequence the potential of 
individuals to produce a variety of so-called hypnotic phenomena (e.g. amnesia, 
hallucinations) in response to suggestions were not measured. As Hull (1933) himself noted, 
‘responses to suggestions of postural movement is only one of many possible ways of 
securing quantitative evidence of hypersuggestibility.’ (p. 298). Another weakness was, with 
the exception of the study by Jenness (1933), all the hypnotic inductions and suggestions in 
these studies were given verbally, leaving open the possibility of the experimenter(s) 
unwittingly biasing the experimental outcome. In addition, the hypnotic induction 
procedures used in these studies are unclear, with one study (Jenness, 1933) using a 
‘standardised hypnotic technique’ and others using eye-closure as the sole criterion of the 
presence of hypnosis.7
3.3. Experiments involving standardised test-suggestions
Although the data from studies that used a single test of suggestibility were consistent with 
the assumption that responsiveness to suggestions were facilitated by hypnotic procedures 
labelled as hypnotic inductions, it was not until 30 years later that this assumption was 
tested rigorously using a broad-scope of test suggestions, by three seminal studies.
Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) used 17 standardised test-suggestions, to quantitatively 
assess and compare non-hypnotic suggestibility with hypnotic suggestibility. The 
suggestions included eight items from the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form A 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959), as well as other suggestions that would be categorised as 
‘difficult’ cognitive suggestions (e.g. automatic writing, hallucinated voice, age regression, 
negative visual hallucination). Hilgard (1973) describes these ‘difficult’ cognitive 
suggestions as ‘true hypnotic’ suggestions that are indicative of ‘true’ hypnotic phenomena. 
Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) reported a small but significant increase in suggestibility
7 As discussed in Chapter 2 there is no evidence of a unique marker indicating an individual is 
‘hypnotized’. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that eye-closure is an essential component of 
hypnosis (e.g. Barber & Calverley, 1965)
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following a hypnotic induction, with a mean change of 2.30 suggestions. Thirteen (30 %) 
participants did not experience an increase in responsiveness to suggestion following a 
hypnotic induction, and of the 31 (70%) participants showing increased suggestibility, only 
8 (18%) showed relatively large increases in suggestibility (5 or more suggestions on a 17- 
suggestion scale).
Table 3.2. Suggestibility in non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts for investigations using standardised test- 
suggestions
Study Cases (N) Suggestion Measure Suggestibility
Difference
Effect 
Size (d)
W eitzenhoffer & 
Sjoberg (1961)
44 17-test suggestions, 
including 8 items from 
th e  SHSS:A
2.30 suggestions 0.63
Barber & Glass 
(1962)
30 8-test suggestions, which 
later becam e th e  BSS 
(1965).
0.5 suggestions *
Hilgard & Tart 
(1966) Exp. 1
40 10-test suggestions from 
th e  SHSS:C
2.01 suggestions 0.73
Braffman & Kirsch
(1999) Exp. 1 92 7-test suggestions from 
th e  CURSS.
0.90 suggestions 0.55
Exp. 2 170 0.53 suggestions 0.30
Note.
Suggestibility difference is the mean behavioural score for hypnotic suggestibility minus the mean 
behavioural score for non-hypnotic suggestibility. The Effect Size of the Barber and Glass (1962) study 
could not be determined as standard deviations were not included in the original paper.
A year later Barber and Glass (1962) conducted an investigation along similar lines. They 
used 8 standardised test-suggestions, and again compared participants’ non-hypnotic 
suggestibility with their hypnotic suggestibility. Similar to the results reported by 
Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961), Barber and Glass (1962), found a small but significant 
increase in suggestibility following a hypnotic induction, with a mean change of 0.5 
suggestions. Fifteen (50%) participants did not increase in suggestibility following a 
hypnotic induction, and of the 15 (50%) participants showing increased suggestibility, only
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8 (27%) showed relatively large increases in suggestibility (1.5-3 suggestion on a 8- 
suggestion scale).
A third experiment carried out by Hilgard and Tart (1965), confirmed the previous findings 
of Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) and Barber and Glass (1962). In this study 10 
standardised test-suggestions from the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C 
(SHSS:C, Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962) were used. Participants’ responses to test 
suggestions following a hypnotic induction, increased significantly by 2.01 suggestions.
Taken together, the results of these studies indicate that hypnotic induction increases mean 
levels of responsiveness to suggestion by a significant, but very modest degree and only in 
some individuals. Approximately, 30-50% of participants do not experience an increase in 
suggestibility following a hypnotic induction; with a small increase in suggestibility 
experienced by 25% of participants, and a relatively large increase in suggestibility 
experienced in the remaining 25% of participants. The data from these studies also indicate 
that participants’ responsiveness to suggestions in the absence of a hypnotic induction is 
relatively high, with some responses and experiences being produced easily by the vast 
majority of people. For example, on average, participants in the Hilgard and Tart (1966) 
responded to 3 suggestions out of 10 (from the SHSS:C) prior to a hypnotic induction, and 
5 suggestions after a hypnotic induction.
3.3.1. Limitations
Although laboratory data have shown an enhancement of suggestibility to exist, there are 
several caveats concerning this research that need to be identified. Most importantly, all the 
participants in the three studies received suggestions prior to a hypnotic induction first, and 
the same suggestions following a hypnotic induction, second. There was no 
counterbalancing of the order of non-hypnotic and hypnotic assessment of suggestibility. 
Moreover, all the participants in these studies knew that they were participating in a study 
that involved hypnosis from the start, and were aware that their responses to suggestions
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without hypnosis were being compared to their responses to suggestions during hypnosis. 
This may have affected the participants’ responses in either context as it has been argued 
that some participants may hold back their responses, whether deliberately or 
unconsciously, to suggestions in a non-hypnotic context, if they know there responses are 
being compared with their responsiveness during hypnosis. Equally, participants may 
exaggerate their responses during hypnosis, if they have been previously assessed in the 
absence of hypnosis. (Zamansky, Scharf & Brightbill, 1964).
There is also a problem regarding the measurement of responses to suggestions by these 
studies. All three studies only measured behavioural responses, and failed to measure: (i) 
involuntariness and (ii) the subjective experiences associated with the suggestions used. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the experience of involuntariness is often cited as one of the 
hallmarks of a true response to a suggestion (e.g. Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 1990). A necessary 
characteristic of a communication to be termed a suggestion is that the suggested 
behaviours and experiences are accompanied by a feeling of involuntariness -  the ‘classic 
suggestion effect’ (Weitzenhoffer, 1953, 2000). Communications intended to be suggestions 
could easily be responded to voluntarily and as these studies only assessed behavioural 
responses to suggestions, they were wide open to false positive scoring.
Similarly, subjective experiences are fundamental to responses to suggestions. The essence 
of the phenomena produced in response to suggestions does not lie in participants’ 
behavioural responses (e.g. moving an arm up in response to an arm levitation suggestion), 
but in their ability to experience what is suggested (e.g. arm feels as light as a feather), and 
more importantly, that their experience was involuntary or automatic. It could be argued 
that in the absence of suggested alterations in involuntariness and subjective experience, 
behavioural responses to suggestions could simply be due to compliance, thus emphasising 
the importance of measuring involuntariness and subjective experience.
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3.3.2. Braffman & Kirsch (1999)
Perhaps due to the prevailing beliefs at the time, these caveats seem to have been ignored 
and the association between hypnotic and non-hypnotic responsiveness to suggestion was 
not directly investigated again for another 30 years. However, in the late 1990s Braffman 
and Kirsch (1999) re-examined the issue in a study that addressed many of the problems 
with the earlier studies. Firstly, the order of assessment was counterbalanced, with non­
hypnotic suggestibility assessed before or after hypnotic suggestibility. Participants were also 
not informed about the second suggestibility assessment until the first had been completed, 
and therefore participants were aware of the comparison during the second trial and not the 
first. Secondly, the degree to which participants felt the subjective effects called for in each 
suggestion (i.e. subjective experience) was measured, in addition to behavioural responses, 
as measured by earlier studies. Subjective experience was scored out of 21, i.e. measured on 
a scale of 0-3 for each of the seven suggestions. They also used a considerably larger sample, 
(92 participants, exp 1; 170 participants, exp 2), compared to the relatively small samples 
used in previous studies (30-44 participants).
Braffman & Kirsch (1999) administered the seven standardised test-suggestions of the 
Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos et al., 1983) twice, 
once before a hypnotic induction and once without a hypnotic induction, patterned after 
the methodology of previous studies. Consistent with previous research, Braffman and 
Kirsch (1999) found a small but significant overall increase in behavioural responses, with a 
mean change of 0.9 suggestions (experiment 1). Similarly, there was a small but significant 
increase in subjective experience scores, with a mean increase of 2.43. However, this increase 
was moderated by the order in which hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestibility had been 
assessed. The order affected responsiveness to non-hypnotic suggestion, although it did not 
appear to affect responsiveness to suggestions in a hypnotic context. When participants’ 
non-hypnotic suggestibility was assessed first (i.e. not aware that they would be assessed 
later in a hypnotic context), their mean change in behavioural responses was 0.36
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suggestions. This was markedly different from the mean change in behavioural responses for 
participants who had been given the hypnosis condition first, of 1.43 suggestions. The 
results were consistent with Zamansky et al’s (1964) hypothesised hold-back effect, with 
participants who had been assessed in hypnosis first, responding to fewer non-hypnotic 
suggestions than those who had received non-hypnotic suggestions first (0.92 non-hypnotic 
suggestions vs. 1.89 non-hypnotic suggestions). A similar pattern of results was found for 
subjective experience scores.
Braffman and Kirsch (1999) concluded that the participants in their study whose non- 
hypnotic suggestibility was assessed prior to hypnosis and without knowing that there 
would be a second test, would provide a more accurate indication of the effects of inducing 
hypnosis. With the data from experiment 1 indicating a non-significant effect of hypnosis 
when non-hypnotic suggestibility was assessed prior to hypnotic suggestibility, Braffman 
and Kirsch (1999) carried out a second experiment with a much larger sample of 170 
participants, with all participants receiving non-hypnotic suggestions prior to hypnosis. 
Participants were not informed that hypnosis would be induced until after non-hypnotic 
responding had been assessed. In contrast to the data from experiment 1, data from 
experiment 2 using a larger sample indicated a significant effect for the hypnotic induction. 
However, the effect was relatively small with mean increase in: (i) behavioural responses of 
0.53 suggestions; and (ii) subjective experience scores of 0.89. Forty-three (25%) 
participants reported a decrease in behavioural responses following a hypnotic induction, 50 
(29%) reported no change, and of the 77 (46%) exhibiting greater behavioural responses, 40 
(24%) showed relatively large increases (2 or more suggestions on a 7-suggestion scale). The 
frequency distribution of subjective scores followed a similar pattern, with 51 (30%) 
participants reporting less change, 42 (25%) reporting no change, and 77 (45%) reporting 
greater change8 in subjective experience following induction of hypnosis.
8 The number of participants that reported relatively large increases in subjective experience scores could 
not be determined from the data included in the original paper.
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Recently, Poulsen and Matthews (2003)9 replicated the study by Braffman and Kirsch 
(1999) with 44 child psychiatric patients. Non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility was 
measured using the Stanford Hypnotic Clinical Scale for Children (SHCS-C: Morgan & 
Hilgard, 1978-1979b), which consists of five suggestions. Scoring on the SHCS-C is 
dependent on the judgement of the administrator providing a 0-5 range of scores (i.e. a 
behavioural measurement). Participants were tested individually, and based on Braffman 
and Kirsch’s (1999) recommendation, non-hypnotic suggestibility was assessed prior to 
hypnosis, with no knowledge of the second test. Poulsen and Matthews (2003) found the 
mean behavioural score for non-hypnotic suggestibility to be 4.30 suggestions. With a 
hypnotic induction, the mean score increased to 4.93 suggestions, demonstrating a small 
increase in suggestibility. Poulsen and Matthews (2003) concluded that these findings were 
equivalent to those reported earlier by Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) and Kirsch and 
Braffman (1999). Nevertheless, it is important to note that this modest increase in 
suggestibility may be due to a ceiling-effect imposed by this scale. The mean score for non­
hypnotic suggestibility was 4.30 out of a possible 5.0, and consequently the scale may have 
imposed a highly restrictive ceiling on hypnotic suggestibility (with the mean hypnotic 
suggestibility score nearly reaching the maximum).
The results reported by Braffman and Kirsch (1999), are supportive of those of previous 
studies (Barber & Glass, 1962; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 
1961), indicating that the effect of inducing hypnosis on suggestibility is small, though 
significant and consistent. Their data also importantly highlighted that a substantial 
minority of participants (25%) are more responsive to suggestions when not hypnotized. 
These findings characterise this negative effect on suggestibility as occurring in a higher 
proportion of individuals than reported in earlier studies. For example, among the samples 
assessed by Weitzenhoffer and Sjoberg (1961) and Barber and Glass (1962), only 4.5% and
9 This study is not included in the general review of studies as the population (i.e. child psychiatric 
patients) and scale (SHCS-C) used differed significantly from those used in previous research. This study 
is merely briefly considered here simply for ‘completeness’ of the literature being examined.
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13% of participants respectively, displayed fewer responses in the hypnotic condition than 
in the non-hypnotic condition. Although, taken together these studies (i.e. Barber & Glass, 
1962; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961) do 
indicate that the increase in suggestibility is of moderate average amount; for the 50% 
(approximately) of participants that show an increase in suggestibility following hypnosis, 
half of those show an increase that is very great indeed.
3.3.3. The ‘true’ effect of hypnotic inductions
Although, previous research, characterises the increase in suggestibility produced by 
hypnotic inductions as being small, but significant, this is not a true reflection of the efficacy 
of hypnotic inductions, as the size of the experimental effect has not been considered 
(Kirsch, 1997). Whereas statistical tests of significance inform us of the likelihood that 
experimental results differ from chance expectations, effect size measurements allow us to 
calculate the relative magnitude of an experimental treatment (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). 
In other words they tell us the size of the experimental effect. Despite, Cohen’s seminal work 
on the utility of effect sizes researchers continue to focus on p  values to the exclusion of 
effect sizes (Cohen, 1992)
Cohen’s criteria that identify effect sizes of 0.20 as small; 0.50 as medium; and 0.80 as large, 
provide a known and established benchmark against which to compare an experiment’s 
effect size. The mean effect sizes of the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility (excluding 
Braffman & Kirsch, 1999) vary from 0.63 to 0.82, which results in a mean weighted effect 
size of 0.69 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). If we consider that the mean effect size for 
psychological treatments in general is 0.47 and the mean effect size of medical outcomes 
(other than mortality) ranges from 0.24 to 0.80 (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993), the effect of the 
induction of hypnosis on suggestibility is substantial. These calculations are consistent with 
the mean effect size of adding hypnosis to cognitive behavioural therapy which is 0.52 
(Kirsch, Montgomery & Sapirstein, 1995), and the substantial data on the clinical efficacy of
87
hypnosis as an adjunct to psychological and pharmacological therapies, which has been 
shown for many different conditions, including those which can be functional or 
psychosomatic in origin, or at least exacerbated by anxiety, stress or psychological factors 
(e.g. Lang, Benotsch, Fick, Lutgendorf, Berbaum, Berbaum, Logan 8c Spiegel, 2000; 
Montgomery, DuHamel & Redd, 2000; Patterson 8c Jensen 2003)
3.3.4. Group administered vs. individually administered
The mean effect sizes of the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility for the Braffman 8c 
Kirsch (1999) study, however, paint a less impressive picture. The mean effect size for 
experiment 1 was 0.55, which is similar to those reported in previous studies. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned earlier, the effect was moderated by the order in which hypnotic and non­
hypnotic suggestibility assessed. The issue of the hold-back effect was addressed in 
experiment 2, which resulted in mean effect size of 0.30, a contrastingly smaller 
experimental effect compared to those of previous studies.
Apart from the improvement in experimental design another key difference between the 
Braffman and Kirsch (1999) study and previous ones, was that Braffman and Kirsch 
administered their suggestions in groups, using a group scale (CURSS; Spanos et al., 1983), 
as opposed to the individually administered scales and suggestions used by previous studies. 
Research that has examined the efficacy of group scales compared to individually tested 
suggestibility measures indicates that group scales introduce a number of problems (e.g. 
Green, Lynn 8c Carlson, 1992; Kurtz 8c Strube, 1996; Moran, Kurtz 8c Strube, 2002; Register 
8c Kihlstrom, 1986). As Moran et al., (2002) observed, self-scoring methods used by group 
scales do not necessarily reflect participants’ responses accurately. For many of the 
responses, participants are required to remember whether they moved their arm or head a 
certain number of inches. Judging such behavioural responses, which occurred with closes 
eyes, could prove to be problematic for many. In addition, these judgements rely on 
accurate long-term memory, as the responses may have occurred up to an hour earlier. In
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contrast, for individually administered scales the experimenter usually measures 
participants’ behavioural responses immediately, and therefore memory-based error is 
minimal for both the participants and the experimenter.
Responses to group administered scales are also more open to distortion due to the nature 
of social interaction. Participants may be influenced by peer comparison and facilitation, 
and consequently responses may be inflated or understated depending on the dynamics of 
the group setting. Register and Kihlstrom (1986) posit that the subtle nuances of the 
hypnotic experience cannot be measured or examined in a group setting, with some 
participants not knowing how to label their experiences using self-scoring, and 
consequently the best way to examine participants’ responses is to ask them. The problems 
with group administered scales are widely recognised (e.g. Bowers, 1993; Moran et al., 
2002), with groups scales such as the WSGC (Bowers, 1993; 1998) and HGSHS:A (Shor & 
Orne, 1962) being considered inadequate replacements for their parent individually 
administered scales such as the SHSS:C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). Nevertheless the 
relative effect of group scales on suggestibility as compared to the effect of individually 
administered scales on suggestibility has not been investigated, and a definitive answer to as 
to whether the mean effect sizes of the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility is lower when 
suggestibility is measured in a group setting as opposed to individually is still lacking.
3.4 General conclusions and outline o f empirical chapters
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that after decades of research, it is still impossible to 
independently determine whether an individual is ‘hypnotized’, or in a hypnotic state. The 
phenomena and effects that are usually attributed to hypnosis and a hypnotic state, may be 
more accurately described as ‘suggested’ effects, as research indicates that most of these 
responses and experiences can be elicited without a hypnotic induction, and some of them 
can be produced easily by the vast majority of people outside hypnosis.
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Given the stability of ‘hypnotizability’ scores measured on the standardised hypnosis scales, 
it seems surprising that research has failed to find correlates that account for a substantial 
proportion of the variance in the natural occurrence of responsiveness to hypnotic 
suggestion. As argued earlier, the term hypnotizability is a misleading label (Kirsch & 
Braffman, 2001), and strictly speaking ‘hypnotizability’ (as measured by so-called hypnosis 
scales) is the change in suggestibility produced by inducing hypnosis. The fact remains that 
non-hypnotic suggestibility is the only variable that substantially predicts hypnotic 
responsiveness, typically accounting for about 45 % of hypnotic suggestibility. However this 
does not explain ‘hypnotic’ suggestibility.
So what can we say with little doubt about the hypnotic state and the hypnotic induction 
procedures which are presumed to induce ‘hypnosis’? It is worrying for the field of hypnosis 
research perhaps, but probably the only thing we can say with any conviction, is that 
hypnotic induction procedures appear to enhance suggestibility in some cases. The data that 
exist are based on studies in which the same suggestions were given with and without prior 
induction of hypnosis. Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind that, as the review of 
previous work indicates, the effect of the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility is 
substantial, comparable to psychological treatments in general and medical outcomes.
However, suggestibility is not hypnotizability, and unfortunately almost all studies that have 
professed to measure hypnotizability have neglected to control for non-hypnotic 
suggestibility, and many subjects that have supposedly been highly hypnotisable, may have 
simply been highly suggestible. It is also important to note that suggestibility as an index 
cannot tell us for certain whether an individual is hypnotized or non-hypnotized, and 
although enhanced suggestibility may indicate that an individual is in a hypnotic state, any 
conclusions based on suggestibility measures with regard hypnosis are only strictly 
inferences.
Although the experience of involuntariness and the classic suggestion effect (Weitzenhoffer, 
1953) is widely recognised as being the hallmark of a hypnotic response, the measurement
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of experienced involuntariness is mainly ignored, which is one of the most significant 
weaknesses of previous studies, including the most recent ones.
Data on the nature and role of hypnotic inductions is still somewhat lacking, which is 
surprising given that inductions are communications intended to elicit hypnotic 
phenomena (Edmonston, 1991). With healthcare turning to the effects of the clinical 
efficacy of hypnosis as an adjunct to psychological and pharmacological therapies (e.g. 
Kirsch et al., 1995; Patterson & Jensen 2003) and its cost saving role, and mainstream 
psychology using hypnosis as a tool to study cognitive phenomena, it is fundamental that 
the necessity for hypnotic inductions, and mechanisms by which they exert their influence 
be established. This will be the focus of this thesis. More specifically, it will consider which 
of the independent variables subsumed under the label of ‘hypnotic induction’ are 
instrumental and which are extraneous.
To answer this question it is necessary to identify each independent variable. Broadly 
speaking there are four main elements that distinguish a hypnotic induction from similar 
procedures such as relaxation procedures. First, the ‘typical’ hypnotic induction includes, in 
addition to mental and physical relaxation, specific instructions for the participating 
individual to become absorbed or focussed on their internal experience (Roche & 
McConkey, 1990). Instructions for absorption tend to take the form of active attentional 
focussing (e.g. ‘focus and narrow your attention as much as you can’). Second, the ‘typical’ 
hypnotic induction includes instructions to avoid thinking critically about any behaviours 
suggested during a hypnotic situation (e.g. ‘don’t think about what is happening, just let it 
happen’) -  an absence of monitoring, judging and interpreting (Cardena & Spiegel, 1991). 
Third, the hypnotic induction is distinctive in that it is explicitly labelled as ‘hypnosis’ -  
participants’ perceptions are therefore influenced by their lay beliefs, expectations and 
motivations concerning hypnosis and its effects on behaviour and experience (Spanos, 
1982). Finally, hypnotic inductions explicitly request certain activities (e.g. ‘close your eyes 
and relax’) and then proceed to suggest the same responses (e.g. ‘your body is feeling very
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relaxed’). Requests and suggestions differ in their depiction of behavioural causation.
Briefly, a request (e.g. ‘please raise your arm ’) defines the recipient as the source of action, 
whereas a suggestion (e.g. ‘your arm is rising’) defines a source external to the self as the 
cause of action.
The chapters of the thesis will now proceed as follows. Chapter 4, the initial empirical 
chapter, will examine whether there is bodily asymmetry in responses to suggestions. 
Although this chapter does not directly investigate the nature and role of hypnotic 
inductions as outlined above, lateralisation of response to suggestion and the notion that 
one side of the body may be more responsive to suggestion, has important implications on 
how non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility will be measured in the rest of the thesis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will investigate the effects of absorption and reduced critical thought on 
responses to suggestions. Chapter 7 will examine the label ‘hypnosis’ and determine the 
extent to which responses to suggestion are affected by the induction technique itself or/and 
the perception that a hypnotic procedure is being carried out. Chapter 8 will explore the 
effects that compliance to prior requests has on responsiveness to suggestion. Finally, 
Chapter 9 will integrate the data and suggest directions for further research.
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Chapter 4
Study 1: Is There a Lateral Asymmetry in Bodily Response to 
Suggestion?
Chapter overview
Hypnotic suggestibility scales often include suggestions involving directions for responses 
on a specific side of the body, which as a result may influence the scores obtained by them. 
The idea that one side of the body is more responsive to suggestions has important 
implications for the methodology used in this thesis, as well as the efficacy of hypnosis and 
suggestion in some forms of therapy. This first empirical chapter therefore, examines lateral 
differences in bodily response to suggestion.
4.1. Introduction
The notion that hypnosis is related to lateralised brain function has a long history, but 
remains controversial. Both the right (Bakan, 1969; Gur & Gur, 1974; Morgan, Macdonald 
& Hilgard, 1974) and the left (Jasiukaitis, Nouriani, Hugdahl & Spiegel, 1997) hemispheres 
have been proposed as the neurophysiological mediator of the hypnotic experience. Taken 
together, Crawford and Gruzelier (1992; Crawford 1994; Gruzelier 1996, 1998) have 
arguably yielded the most influential developments in the understanding of within- 
hemisphere dynamics during hypnosis. Specifically, they posit that hypnosis involves a shift 
from an analytical to a holistic style of thinking characterised by activity shifts from the left 
to the right hemisphere during hypnosis.
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4.1.1. Hypnosis as a right-hemisphere function
Early evidence of right hemisphere mediation of responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions 
stems, in the main, from studies of lateral eye movements, lateral bias in classroom seating 
and EEG alpha.
Bakan (1969) first introduced the notion of direction of conjugate lateral eye movements as 
an index of hemisphericity. He also suggested that these movements were a reliable 
correlate of hypnotic suggestibility, and found that people who consistently moved their 
eyes to the left (i.e. left movers), when face-to-face with an examiner, were more 
hypnotically suggestible than right movers. It was later discovered that left and right movers 
differed in their self-reported preferences for classroom seating. Left movers preferred to sit 
on the right side of classrooms, whereas right movers preferred the left side (Gur, Gur, & 
Marshalek, 1975). The finding that left movers and individuals with right-side seating 
habits10 have higher levels of hypnotic suggestibility than right movers and individuals with 
left-side seating habits has been reported in several studies (Gur & Gur, 1974; Gur & Reyher, 
1973; Sackeim, Paulhus & Weiman, 1979). Apart from these studies, however, evidence 
concerning the right-hemisphere and hypnotic suggestibility has been contradictory 
(DePascalis & Penna, 1990).
Morgan, McDonald and Macdonald (1971) made what appears to be the first attempt to 
relate alpha states with hypnotic suggestibility. They used what they called ‘right hemisphere 
spatial tasks’ and ‘left hemisphere verbal tasks’, which were presumed to activate the right or 
left hemispheres respectively. They found no relationship between right-hemisphere alpha 
and hypnotic suggestibility, with no differences in right hemisphere alpha between high and 
low hypnotic suggestibles. The effect of task type was also found to have no effect on 
right/left alpha proportion, which may be a consequence of the tasks employed, as there was 
very little empirical evidence to suggest that these tasks actually selectively activated the right
10 Both taken to be indices of right hemispheric activation
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or left hemisphere (Jasiukatis et al., 1997). Replications by Morgan, Macdonald & Hilgard 
(1974) and MacLeod-Morgan and Lack (1982) failed to find any reliable relationships 
between hemispheric alpha states and hypnotic suggestibility.
Although there are indications from these early studies of some relationship between the 
right hemisphere and hypnotic suggestibility, the evidence remains insufficient to 
definitively establish the nature of the relationship. Gruzelier (1998) points out that many of 
these studies are methodologically flawed and can be criticised due to their lack of 
standardisation and their failure to consider the responses of low suggestible participants.
4.1.2. Hypnosis as a sequence of left followed by right hemisphere function
More recently, a number of methodologically sound studies have been carried out in 
support of the neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis (see Crawford & Gruzelier,
1992; Gruzelier, 1998 for reviews) and the idea that hypnosis involves a shift towards more 
holistic, right hemisphere oriented processes. A study by McCormack and Gruzelier (1993), 
for example, using a signal detection paradigm reported an association of right hemispheric 
changes with high hypnotic suggestibility. They found that high but not low hypnotically 
suggestible individuals showed significant visual processing improvement in the left visual 
field (i.e. right hemisphere) during hypnosis. Gruzelier and Brow (1985) demonstrated that 
in high hypnotically suggestible participants habituation of electrodermal responses was 
faster to tones during hypnosis than in a non-hypnotic baseline, whilst the reverse was 
found in low hypnotically suggestibles. The electrodermal responses in highs were found to 
be significantly lower on the left hand (i.e. right hemisphere) during hypnosis than in 
baseline, indicating a shift in lateralisation from left hemispheric influences in non-hypnotic 
baseline to right hemispheric influences in hypnosis. However, low hypnotically suggestibles 
did not show this difference. Studies showing that right hemisphere oriented processes 
during hypnosis are accompanied by the inhibition of the critical faculties of the left 
hemisphere also provide strong support for the holistic-shift hypothesis. Gruzelier, Brow,
95
Perry, Rhonder and Thomas (1984), for example, using a haptic processing task found that 
high hypnotically suggestibles showed a significant slowing in right hand (i.e. left 
hemisphere) sorting times following the induction of hypnosis, with the degree of slowing 
correlating significantly with hypnotic suggestibility level. Cikurel and Gruzelier (1990) 
replicated these findings using an active-alert induction procedure (Banyai and Hilgard, 
1976).
The essence of Crawford and Gruzelier’s model (1992; Crawford, 1994; Gruzelier, 1998) and 
the findings of the vast programme of supporting work is that hypnosis is a three-stage 
process. Firstly, during the induction of hypnosis there is focussed attention on the words of 
the hypnotist with disattention to extraneous stimuli, which engages the supervisory 
attentional system of the frontal lobes, primarily in the left hemisphere. Secondly, once 
attention has been sufficiently engaged, and the individual is deeply absorbed in the 
hypnotic experience, suggestions for relaxation and/or ‘letting go’ and ‘going with the flow’ 
bring about a left-frontal inhibition. This corresponds to a shift away from more analytical 
modes of processing to more holistic processing. Finally, any further use of suggestions (e.g. 
for therapeutic or experimental work) engages posterior cortical sites, primarily in the right 
hemisphere.
As Jasiukaitis et al., (1997) point out, contrary to the early view that hypnosis was 
characterised by right hemisphericity, the programme of work by Crawford and Gruzelier 
and their neuropsychophysiological model denies the exclusive role of the right-hemisphere 
in hypnosis. There are aspects such as focussed attention, which have often been cited as 
being essential to hypnosis, which are more commonly associated with left-hemispheric 
processes Moreover, the model describes hypnosis as a sequence of left-hemisphere followed 
by right-hemisphere activation which is consistent with the lack of evidence that individuals 
rely on one hemisphere for a variety of cognitive tasks, with most cognitive activity 
consisting of stages, which subsequently correlate with the activation of different parts of the
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brain (Gruzelier, 1998). The evidence suggests that viewing hypnosis solely as a function of 
one or the other hemisphere could be a gross oversimplification.
4.1.3. Parallels between conversion disorder symptoms and suggested effects
The notion that responses to suggestions and the medically unexplained symptoms of 
conversion hysteria are inextricably linked, stems from the writings of Janet. He described 
‘suggestion [as] a precise and relatively rare phenomenon; [which] presents itself 
experimentally or accidentally only with hystericals, and, inversely, all hystericals, when 
[studied] from this standpoint, present this same phenomenon in a higher or lower degree’ 
(Janet, 1907/1929, p. 292). This view was developed by Babinski, who emphasised that the 
essential feature of hysteria was abnormal suggestibility (Babinski 8c Froment, 1918), and 
has continued in theoretical discussions to the present (Bryant 8c McConkey, 1999; Hilgard, 
1977; Kihlstrom, 1992; McConkey, 2001; Oakley, 1999b, 2001; Roelofs, Hoogduin, Keijsers, 
Naring, Moene 8c Sandijk, 2002).
Oakley (1999b) outlines a number of similarities between suggested phenomena and the 
symptoms of hysteria, and goes on to propose that they may depend on similar 
neurophysiological mechanisms. A recent study by Roelofs, Keijsers, Naring, Hoogduin, 
Moene and Sandijck (2002) provides initial support for this. They compared patients with 
conversion disorder with matched control patients and found conversion patients to be 
significantly more responsive to hypnotic suggestions than the controls. In addition, there 
was a significant correlation between responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions and the 
number of conversion symptoms in conversion patients. Further supporting evidence 
comes from neuroimaging. Halligan, Athwal, Oakley and Frackowiak (2000) found in a 
single-case study, using PET (Positron Emission Tomography), that a hypnotic suggestion 
for paralysis activated similar brain areas to those found in conversion disorder paralysis 
(Marshall, Halligan, Fink, Wade and Frackowiak, 1997). Nevertheless, studies in this area 
are few in number and the related predictions that patients with conversion disorder are
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more responsive to suggestions when compared to a control group and that the same 
patterns of brain activity should be seen with hypnotically suggested effects as compared to 
the corresponding conversion symptom, remain relatively untested.
4.1.4. Lateralisation of conversion disorder symptoms
If conversion disorder symptoms have psychological, and possibly neuropsychological, 
mechanisms in common with suggested ‘hypnotic’ phenomena in general, a strong 
prediction is that they should show common patterns of lateralisation in their expression.
Traditionally, the functional or ‘psychogenic’ motor and sensory symptoms of conversion 
disorder have been reported to be unilateral, with the preponderance of symptoms 
occurring on the left side. (e.g. Briquet, 1859; American Psychiatric Association, 1994;
Galin, Diamond 8c Braff, 1977; Pascuzzi, 1994; Sierra 8c Berrios, 1999; Stern, 1977). Possible 
explanations for this predominance of symptoms on the left side of the body, have included 
hemispheric specialization, with the non-dominant hemisphere having a leading role in the 
pathogenesis of symptoms, and the ‘convenience hypothesis’ that a dysfunction on the non­
dominant side is easier to ‘maintain’ and has less of a detrimental effect on everyday life. 
However, other studies have failed to confirm this left-sided predominance (e.g. Bishop, 
Mobley & Farr, 1978; Keane, 1989; Roelofs, Naring, Moene 8c Hoogduin, 2000; Stefansson, 
Messina, & Meyerowitz, 1976;) or have found symptoms to occur more commonly on the 
right side (e.g. Fallik 8c Sigal, 1971; Regan 8c LaBabera, 1984)
A recent systematic review of 121 studies, involving 1139 patients, investigated this long 
held belief that functional motor and sensory symptoms occurred more frequently on the 
left (Stone, Sharpe, Carson, Lewis, Thomas, Goldbeck, Warlow, 2002). Basing their 
conclusion, on the pooled results, they found that 58% of patients had functional weakness, 
sensory symptoms or both on the left side of their bodies. Although, the overall results 
showed a slight left lateralizing effect, this does not reveal the whole picture. On re-analysis 
by study type, the proportion of left sided symptoms rose to 66% in studies in which the
title referred to laterality, compared to 53% of patients where laterality was measured 
incidentally. This indicated an outcome variable reporting bias, with the data from ‘headline 
studies’ more likely to be consistent with the hypothesis that functional weakness and 
sensory symptoms are more common on the left than the right, compared to the incidental 
laterality data from ‘non-headline’ studies. Stone et al (2002) concluded that their review 
provided little support for the hypothesis that functional weakness and sensory symptoms 
are more common on the left than the right. They suggested that the long held belief that 
functional weakness and sensory symptoms occur more commonly on the left may have 
been due to the outcome variable reporting bias they found.
Stone et al., also analysed studies on functional movement disorder (tremor, dystonia, 
myoclonus) separately and in contrast with the data on functional weakness and sensory 
symptoms, functional or ‘psychogenic’ movement disorder were found to occur in 68% of 
patients on the right side. They speculated that ‘active’ motor symptoms may be more 
prevalent on the right. However, the data currently available are insufficient to answer this 
question definitively. Based on the results of Stone et al.’s systematic review and the 
conflicting findings of previous studies, there is no compelling evidence that conversion 
disorder is characterised by symptom lateralisation.
4.1.5. Lateralisation of responses to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions
As far as the author is aware only two studies have addressed the effect of laterality on 
responsiveness to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions. Sackeim (1982), following up the observations 
made by numerous earlier studies (e.g. Galin et al., 1977; Stern, 1977) that symptoms of 
conversion disorder were more frequently found on the left, found that subjects given 
hypnotic ideomotor suggestions responded more strongly on the left side of their bodies. 
Although the difference was statistically significant, it was very small. A replication of this 
study by Otto-Salaj, Nadon, Hoyt, Register 8c Kihlstrom (1992), using almost 15-times the 
number of subjects as Sackeim, failed to find the asymmetry. The evidence for left lateral
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response bias to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions thus remains inconclusive though, as with 
conversion symptoms, the weight of evidence seems to be against there being a lateral bias.
So far there is no compelling evidence to assign hypnotic phenomena to either of the 
hemispheres. Indeed viewing hypnosis as a function of one or the other hemisphere appears 
to be an oversimplification. Nevertheless, lateralisation of response to suggestion and the 
idea that one side of the body is more responsive to suggestions has important implications 
on how non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility are measured in this thesis, as well as the 
efficacy of hypnosis and suggestion in the treatment of conversion disorders. A third of the 
items on standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales, such as the Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scale, form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962), involve ideomotor 
or challenge suggestions (e.g. arm immobility; arm levitation) with directions for responses 
on a specific side of the body. If, as found by Sackeim (1982), participants given motor 
suggestions respond more strongly on the non-dominant side of their bodies11, subjects’ 
responsiveness to suggestion could be a function of whether the suggestion is directed 
towards a specific side of the body.
4.1.6. Study objectives
In view of the contrasting and inconclusive results of previous research, the current study 
aimed to directly address the issue of whether there is a lateralised response to typical 
‘hypnotic’ suggestions. It investigated (i) the reports that response to test suggestions occur 
more strongly on the left sides of subjects’ bodies and (ii) the possibility that responsiveness 
to suggestion is related to handedness. Previous studies have used lateralised test suggestions 
comparing responsiveness to right and left versions of suggestions either within-subjects 
(Sackeim, 1982) or between-groups (Otto-Salaj et al., 1992). However, to establish 
definitively whether there is a lateralised response to suggestion no reference should be
11 Right-handed subjects being more responsive to hypnotic suggestions on the left side of their bodies, 
whilst in contrast, left-handed and ambidextrous subjects being more responsive on the right side their 
bodies.
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made to the side on which responsiveness should occur. In the present investigation, the 
suggestions used were not lateralised and made no reference to responses on a specific side 
of the body. This allowed a systematic evaluation of whether there was a lateral response 
bias to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions and whether it was related to handedness. Participants were 
tested individually with either an ideomotor or a challenge suggestion measure and 
behavioural, subjective, and involuntariness ratings were obtained.
In contrast to the studies by Sackeim (1982) and Otto-Salaj et al (1992) it was decided not to 
use a hypnotic induction procedure, or to pre-select participants of high hypnotic 
responsiveness, but to investigate the effects of suggestion in non-hypnotised individuals. 
This decision was based on seven main considerations: (a) the large body of research 
demonstrating that the majority of typical ‘hypnotic’ phenomena can be produced without 
a hypnotic induction; (b) the observation that the suggestions to be used are consistently 
‘passed’ by the majority of subjects on the behavioural and subjective criteria of 
standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales; (c) there is a very high correlation between non­
hypnotic suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility as measured by standardised 
suggestibility scales (see Braffman & Kirsch, 1999); (d) the view that non-hypnotic and 
hypnotic suggestibility are in reality the same phenomenon (‘imaginative suggestibility’, 
Kirsch 1997; also see Chapter 1, section 1.9) measured under two different conditions; (e) 
evidence that hypnotic inductions enhance suggestibility only for some individuals, with the 
mean levels of responsiveness to suggestion increasing to only a very modest degree; (f) the 
importance to the methodology used in this thesis of responsiveness to ‘hypnotic’ 
suggestions in a non-hypnotic context; and finally (g) whilst it is claimed that they are 
produced by suggestion there is no evidence that the parallel phenomena in conversion 
disorder are the product of a formal hypnotic induction.
On the basis of the evidence reviewed above, it was not expected that significant differences 
would be found in response strength on the left compared to the right side of subjects’ 
bodies, irrespective of handedness. However, these same data allowed the possibility of a
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slight right lateralizing effect for the ‘active’ ideomotor suggestion, and a slight left 
lateralizing effect for the ‘passive’ challenge suggestion.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
The present study was based on a total of 312 participants who volunteered for a study 
concerned with individual responsiveness to spoken suggestion. Equal numbers of 
participants were randomly allocated on the day of assessment to one of the two 
experimental conditions: Arm Levitation or Arm Immobility. The Arm Levitation sample 
consisted of 72 males and 84 females, with an average age of 23.51 years (SD = 8.89 years; 
range 18-53 years). A total of 139 (89.1%) identified themselves as right-handed and 17 
(10.9 %) as left-handed. The Arm Immobility sample consisted of 67 males and 89 females, 
with an average age of 25.61 years (SD = 10.66 years; range 18-59 years). A total of 134 
(85.9%) identified themselves as right-handed and 22 (14.1%) as left-handed. The joint 
UCL/UCLH Committee on the Ethics of Human Research approved this study; informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.
4.2.2. Measures
4.2.2.1. Responsiveness to suggestion
An Arm Levitation (ideomotor) and an Arm Immobility (challenge) suggestion were used 
to measure responsiveness to suggestion. These were taken from the Barber Suggestibility 
Scale (BSS: Barber, 1965) and the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, form C (SHSS:C; 
Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962) respectively. For the present experiment, a modified 
version of these suggestions was constructed in which all reference to the side of the body 
targeted by each of the original lateralised suggestions was removed (modified ideomotor 
and challenge suggestions presented in Appendix 4.1). Consequently, the suggestions used
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here were non-lateralised and did not target either side of the body. Although these 
suggestions are ones that have been traditionally used in hypnotic contexts, no formal 
hypnotic induction was used or any reference to hypnosis made for the reasons outlined in 
the introduction.
Behavioural, subjective and involuntariness scores were all taken. Behavioural responses 
were recorded by the experimenter, who observed which hand moved (i.e. left or right) 
during the responsiveness to suggestion test and how much it moved. For subjective 
responses, participants were asked to indicate which arm felt: ‘light and was moving upwards’ 
or ‘heavy and unable to move’. The questions were dependent on the group they were in, i.e. 
referring to arm lightness for those participants in the Arm Levitation sample, and arm 
heaviness for those in the Arm Immobility sample. Involuntariness scores were taken if 
participants had produced a response during the behavioural assessment. Involuntariness 
was measured by asking subjects to rate on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from (1) 
completely voluntary to (5) completely involuntary, the degree to which their behavioural 
response was experienced as involuntary (scoring criteria presented in Appendix 4.2)
Suggestions were recorded onto audio-tape. There were two versions. Version A (5 minutes, 
32 seconds) suggested arm levitation, whilst version B (6 minutes, 58 seconds) suggested 
arm immobility (taped instructions presented in Appendix 4.1). The taped instructions 
were played to participants on a standard tape recorder placed in the midline in front of 
them.
4.2.2.2. Handedness questionnaire
This was adapted from the handedness questionnaire by Coren (1992) and used to 
determine whether participants were right-handed, left-handed or ambidextrous. 
Participants reported frequency of hand usage for twelve manual tasks (questionnaire 
presented in Appendix 4.3).
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4.2.3. Design and procedure
The study followed an independent sample design. Half the participants were given an 
ideomotor suggestion to levitate one of their arms (Arm Levitation sample); whilst the other 
half was given a challenge suggestion that one of their arms was immobile (Arm Immobility 
sample). Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. They were informed that the 
experiment involved listening to and following instructions on a tape. They were reassured 
that they would not be asked to experience or to do anything embarrassing or harmful and 
could leave the experiment at any time without having to give a reason. It was ensured that 
participants were sitting as comfortably as possible, symmetrically, and upright with both 
feet on the floor. They were then instructed to rest their hands on their legs, to close their 
eyes and to focus all their attention on the tape. Responses to suggestions were then scored 
behaviourally and subjectively. Finally, participants were asked to complete the handedness 
questionnaire.
4.3. Results
One hundred and sixteen participants (74.4%) in the Arm Levitation sample (N = 156) 
were unilateral responders to the arm lightness suggestion, with a bilateral response 
occurring in 9 participants (5.8%) and 31 participants (19.8%) giving no response 
behaviourally. One hundred and forty-two participants (91.0%) in the Arm Immobility 
sample (N = 156) produced a unilateral behavioural response to the arm heaviness 
suggestion, with 2 participants (1.3%) eliciting a bilateral response, and the remaining 12 
participants (7.7%) showing no response.
4.3.1. Arm levitation sample
The lateralised responses for participants in the arm levitation sample are presented in Table
4.1. Fifty-five participants (47%) responded behaviourally, to the arm levitation suggestion, 
with their right side and 61 participants (53%) responded behaviourally with their left side.
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This distribution did not differ significantly from chance [two-tailed binomial test; 
probability = 0.5: p = 0.64]. There were no significant relationships between: (i) response 
side and gender, x2 (2, N = 116) = 0.18, p = 0.67; or (ii) response side and handedness, x2 (2, 
N = 116) = 3.48, p = 0.06. It may be worth noting that relationship between response side 
and handedness approaches significance. However, the test is underpowered and 
consequently no definitive interpretations can be made.
Table 4.1. Lateralisation of responses to the arm levitation suggestion according to behavioural and 
subjective criteria
Criterion & Side of Response for Arm Levitation Suggestion
Handedness
Behavioural Subjective
Right Side Left Side Right Side Left Side
Right-handed
Males 23 27 26 33
Females 29 24 34 30
Total 52 51 60 63
Left-handed
Males 1 2 1 3
Females 2 8 2 7
Total 3 10 3 10
All handedness
Males 24 29 27 36
Females 31 32 36 37
Total 55 61 63 73
For subjective responses to the arm levitation suggestion, 63 participants (46%) responded 
with their right side and 73 participants (54%) showed a left sided response. The same 
pattern of results was found as the behavioural responses to the arm levitation suggestion, 
with no significant differences in subjective right/left sided responses [two-tailed binomial 
test; probability = 0.5: p = 0.44]. There were also no significant relationships between: (i) 
response side and gender, %2 (2, N = 136) = 0.57, p = 0.45; or (ii) response side and 
handedness, x2(2, N = 136) = 3.12, p = 0.08. As with behavioural responses, the relationship 
between response side and handedness for subjective responses similarly approaches 
significance. However, the test is again underpowered and consequently no definitive 
interpretations can be made. Furthermore, participants with left-sided responses to the arm
levitation suggestion did not significantly differ in scores of involuntariness (M = 3.30, SD = 
1.26) from participants with right sided responses (M = 3.53. SD = 1.15), t (114) = 1.03, p -  
0.30.
4.3.2. Arm immobility sample
The lateralised responses for participants in the arm immobility sample are presented in 
Table 4.2. 62 participants (44%) responded behaviourally, to the arm heaviness suggestion, 
with their right side and 80 participants (56%) responded behaviourally with their left side. 
This distribution did not differ significantly from chance [two-tailed binomial test; 
probability = 0.5: p = 0.15]. There were no significant relationships between: (i) response 
side and gender, %2 (2> N = 142) = 0.05, p = 0.82; or (ii) response side and handedness, x2 (2, 
N = 142) = 0.42, p = 0.52.
Table 4.2. Lateralisation of responses to the arm immobility suggestion according to behavioural and 
subjective criteria
Criterion & Side of Response for Arm Immobility Suggestion
Handedness
Behavioural Subjective
Right Side Left Side Right Side Left Side
Right-handed
Males 24 27 23 24
Females 31 41 29 41
Total 55 68 52 65
Left-handed
Males 2 5 2 6
Females 5 7 5 6
Total 7 12 7 12
All handedness
Males 26 32 25 30
Females 36 48 34 47
Total 62 80 59 77
Subjective responses to the arm immobility suggestion resulted in 59 participants (53%) 
responding with their right side and 77 participants (43%) showing a left sided response. 
The pattern of results was the same as the behavioural responses to the arm heaviness
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suggestion, with no significant differences in subjective right/left sided responses [two-tailed 
binomial test; probability = 0.5: p  = 0.15]. No significant relationships were found between: 
(i) response side and gender, / 2 (2, N = 136) = 0.16, p = 0.69; or (ii) response side and 
handedness, x2 (2, N = 136) = 0.39, p = 0.54. Moreover, participants with left-sided 
responses to the arm immobility suggestion did not significantly differ in scores of 
involuntariness (M = 3.33, SD = 1.23) from participants with right sided responses (M = 
3.13. SD = 1.49), t (140) = 0.86, p = 0.39.
4.3.3. ‘Classic suggestion effect’
The experience of involuntariness is often cited as one of the hallmarks of a ‘true’ response 
to a suggestion (e.g. Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 1990; Weitzenhoffer, 1953, 2000).
Weitzenhoffer claims that a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a 
communication to be viewed as a suggestion is that the response to it be accompanied by a 
feeling of involuntariness, a phenomenon that has been labeled the ‘classic suggestion 
effect’. Accordingly, the data from this experiment were re-analysed considering only those 
participants who scored ‘4’ or ‘5’ on the 5-point Likert-type scale (1= completely voluntary; 
5 = completely involuntary) that assessed the degree to which their behavioural response 
was experienced as involuntary. The lateralised responses for participants that scored 4-5 on 
experienced involuntariness for either the arm levitation suggestion or the arm immobility 
suggestion are shown in Table 4.3.
For the arm levitation suggestion, a total of 66 participants (57% of those that responded 
behaviourally) experienced their response as involuntary. Thirty-four of those participants 
responded behaviourally with their right side, whilst 32 participants responded with their 
left sides. This distribution was not significantly different from chance [two-tailed binomial 
test; probability = 0.5: p  = 0.90]. There were no significant relationships between: (i) 
response side and gender, %2 (2, N = 66) = 0.06, p  = 0.81; or (ii) response side and 
handedness, %2 (2, N = 66) = 1.38, p  = 0.24
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Table 4.3. Lateralisation of involuntary behavioural responses to the arm levitation and arm immobility 
suggestions
Suggestion & Side of Response
Handedness
Arm Levitation 
Right Side Left Side
Arm Immobility 
Right Side Left Side
Right-handed
Males
Females
Total
Left-handed
Males
Females
Total
All handedness 
Males 
Females 
Total
17
14
31
18
16
34
15
11
26
16
16
32
13
15
28
14
18
32
13
22
35
17
25
42
For the arm immobility suggestion, a total of 74 participants (52% of those that responded 
behaviourally) experienced their response as involuntary. Thirty-two of those participants 
responded behaviourally with their right side and 42 participants responded with their left 
side. This distribution did not differ significantly from chance [two-tailed binomial test; 
probability = 0.5: p  = 0.30]. There were no significant relationships between: (i) response 
side and gender, %2 (2, N = 74) = 0.08, p  = 0.78; or (ii) response side and handedness, x2 (2, 
N = 74) = 0.25, p = 0.62.
4.4. Discussion
The objective of the present study was to determine whether there is a lateralisation of 
responsiveness to test suggestions typically included in tests of hypnotic suggestibility. As 
noted above, previous findings are conflicting, showing either a left sided lateralisation 
(Sackeim, 1982) or no lateralisation in the suggested response (Otto-Salaj et al., 1992). In 
the present experiment, no substantial evidence of lateralisation of responsiveness to 
suggestion was obtained for either of the two items tested. Although the pooled results of 
the participants that produced a unilateral response to the ideomotor or challenge
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suggestion indicates a very slight left sided lateralisation, the left-right distribution of 
responses did not differ significantly from chance. This finding was consistently obtained 
regardless of whether the response was defined behaviourally, subjectively or by experienced 
involuntariness. Moreover, no specific subgroups of participants with response 
lateralisation could be identified. Neither gender nor handedness showed a significant effect 
on lateralised responses to suggestion. The findings, using a substantial sample size, thus 
provide support for those previously reported by Otto-Salaj et al., (1992), and fail to 
confirm the notion that response to suggestions is stronger on the left side of the body.
4.4.1. ‘Suggestive’ approach vs. use of ‘hypnotic’ procedures
In evaluating these results, it should be noted that the present study differed in several ways 
from previous studies that have explored the possible laterality of responses to direct 
suggestion. Firstly, it used non-lateralised test suggestions, as opposed to lateralised ones, 
and involved only two different suggestions, compared to nine used by Sackeim (1982) and 
four used by Otto-Salaj et al., (1992). Nevertheless, using an item-by-item analysis Sackeim 
(1982) obtained a positive result, whilst in contrast and similarly to the findings of the 
current study, Otto-Salaj et al., (1992) found a negative result. Perhaps most importantly, 
the present study used a suggestive approach without a formal hypnotic induction 
procedure. It could therefore be argued that a lateralisation effect was not found because 
our participants did not receive ‘hypnosis* as defined by engagement with procedures 
typically identified as hypnotic inductions (Kihlstrom, 1985) or by the achievement of a 
specific ‘hypnotic* state (Hilgard, 1977). However, as we have already noted, most 
‘hypnotic’ phenomena can be produced by suggestion without the use of a formal hypnotic 
induction or explicit reference to hypnosis (Barber, 1965; Barber & Calverley, 1964) and 
there is also no proposition that the parallel conversion disorder phenomena with which 
they are compared as suggestion-based effects are the products of formal hypnosis 
procedures. Furthermore, the conclusion that a person is in a ‘hypnotic’ state is usually 
based on their responsiveness to suggestion following an induction. In the present study
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80.2% of participants showed a behavioural response and 87.2% responded subjectively to 
the arm levitation suggestion; whilst 92.3% responded behaviourally and 87.2% showed a 
subjective response to the arm immobility suggestion.
Moreover, 57% of the participants in the present study that responded to the arm levitation 
suggestion and 52% of the participants that responded to the arm immobility suggestion 
identified their responses as being involuntary. The experience of involuntariness is widely 
cited as being a hallmark of a ‘true hypnotic’ response to suggestion, and these percentages 
are consistent with the percentages of ‘hypnotised’ subjects that experience their responses 
to suggestion as involuntary -  which range between 25% to 67% (K.S. Bowers, 1981; P. 
Bowers, 1982; Spanos & Gorassini, 1984; Weitzenhoffer, 1974). Given the high 
responsiveness to the arm levitation and arm immobility suggestions used, it is doubtful 
that a formal hypnotic procedure would have affected the results significantly.
4.4.2. Implications for conversion disorder
This study has implications for the parallels that have been drawn between symptoms of 
conversion disorder and phenomena produced in response to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions. In 
particular, both suggested phenomena and conversion disorder symptoms are experienced 
as ‘involuntary’ and subjectively ‘real’, both appear ‘faked’ when objective tests are applied, 
and both participants and patients appear to have ‘implicit knowledge’ that transcends the 
phenomena/symptoms they display (Kihlstrom, 1994; Oakley, 1999b, 2001). Overall, the 
findings of this study of suggested effects in normal participants are consistent with those of 
Stone et al. (2002) in their systematic review of conversion disorder symptoms and further 
underline a commonality of features between symptoms of conversion disorder and 
phenomena typically suggested in hypnosis contexts. Specifically, despite earlier 
assumptions to the contrary, neither appears to be characterised by lateralisation of 
expression.
110
The fact that there are similarities between suggested phenomena and conversion symptoms 
is consistent with, but does not prove, a common neuropsychological mechanism for the 
two. One potentially powerful source of evidence relating to the possibility of common 
mechanisms is neuroimaging and the study by Halligan et al., (2000) which found that 
suggested paralysis activated similar brain areas to those activated in conversion hysteria, 
provides an experimental paradigm for future studies.
4.4.3. Conclusions
Restricting the neuropsychological underpinnings of hypnosis and hypnotic suggestion to 
merely a matter of left versus right hemisphere is of course over simplistic. As found by 
Otto-Salaj et al., (1992), this study provides no evidence of a laterality effect on 
responsiveness to suggestions. These results have direct implications for the methodology 
used in the rest of the thesis, and indicate that although hypnotic suggestibility scales often 
consist of suggestions involving directions for responses on a specific side of the body, 
lateralised test items would not be expected to influence the scores obtained by them. 
Consequently, the lateralised test items contained in standardised hypnotic suggestibility 
scales will be used in their original form to measure responsiveness to suggestions in both 
non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts in the remaining studies to be reported in this thesis.
I l l
Chapter 5
Study 2: Effects o f Absorption and Reduced Critical 
Thought on Responses to Suggestion
Chapter overview
Evidence presented in the previous chapter answered an important question relating to 
possible lateral biases in measures used to assess changes in suggestibility in the remaining 
studies reported here. This chapter is the first of four that directly investigate the nature and 
role of hypnotic inductions and the independent variables subsumed under the label of 
‘hypnotic induction’ outlined at the end of Chapter 3. This chapter explores the notion that 
absorption and reduced critical thought are instrumental in how inductions exert their 
influence.
5.1. Introduction
The concepts of hypnosis and suggestion have been inextricably linked since the late 
nineteenth century (Gheorghiu, 1989a). As discussed in the introductory chapters a very 
significant observation is that of the consistently very high correlation between so-called 
non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestion (Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997). A 
parsimonious interpretation of these findings would be that non-hypnotic and hypnotic 
suggestions are governed by the same basic causal mechanisms (see Kirsch & Lynn, 1997). 
Nevertheless, it is also evident from empirical research that an individuals’ response to 
suggestion may be significantly increased by the induction of hypnosis, a change that is 
more than comparable in its effect size to psychological treatments in general and a range of 
medical outcomes (see Chapter 3).
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5.1.1. How do hypnotic inductions facilitate responses to suggestion?
Theories of hypnosis disagree over why suggestibility increases during hypnosis. The 
‘generic non-state’ view, as taken by socio-cognitive theorists, argues that it is the unusual 
nature of the hypnotic situation and the beliefs and attitudes associated with it, which are 
likely to have a profound role in shaping the character and occurrence of behavioural 
experiences such as increases in suggestibility (e.g. Barber, 1969; Kirsch, 2000a; Sarbin 8c 
Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986; Wagstaff, 1981). In contrast, the ego-psychological and 
dissociation theorists within the ‘generic state’ view (e.g. Bowers, 1992; Fromm, 1979, 1992; 
Woody 8c Bowers, 1994) argue that increased suggestibility during hypnosis is due to the 
implementation of a special state of psychological functioning characterised by unique 
cognitive, behavioural, phenomenological and physiological processes. The source of the 
increase of suggestibility during hypnosis remains controversial, and although there is a vast 
amount of empirical research that lends credence to the various positions, there has been 
very little explicit recognition of the relative influence of the hypnotic induction, which is 
surprising given that inductions are communications intended to elicit hypnotic 
phenomena (Edmonston, 1991). However, the pioneering work of Price, Barrell, Rainville 
and colleagues, provides potentially useful insights on how the induction of hypnosis 
changes experience and increases suggestibility, of which will now be discussed.
5.1.1.1. The experiential-phenomenological approach
The experiential paradigm of Price and Barrell (1980) is one that is increasingly being cited 
as elucidating the experiential dimensions of various conditions including anxiety (Barrell, 
Madieros, Barrell & Price, 1985); emotion (Price & Barrell 1984; Price, Barrell 8c Barrell, 
1985); pain (Price, 1999; Price, Barrell 8c Rainville, 2002); and particularly relevant to this 
discussion the phenomenal experience that characterises the feeling of being ‘hypnotised’ 
(Price, 1996; Price 8c Barrell, 1990; Rainville et al., 1997; Rainville et al., 2002; Rainville 8c 
Price, 2003; Sheehan, 1992). The experiential-phenomenological approach (Price 8c Barrell, 
1980) utilises first-person and third person perspectives to discover the common
dimensions and interrelationships within specific types of experiences, and consists of four 
main stages: (i) questioning and observing; (ii) describing experiences from a first-person 
perspective; (iii) understanding experiences through discovering common factors and their 
interrelationships; and (iv) application of quantitative methods to tests relationships 
between common factors (Price et al., 2002).
Two studies using this experiential-phenomenological approach have directly examined the 
common elements that comprise the experience of being ‘hypnotised’ or being in a 
‘hypnotic state’. Price and Barrell (1990) identified, among other dimensions, (i) a feeling of 
deep relaxation and mental ease (i.e. ‘letting go’; becoming at ease); (ii) absorption and 
focussed attention; (iii) an absence of judging, monitoring and censoring; (iv) a suspension 
of usual orientation; and (v) experience of one’s own responses as automatic. In addition 
they proposed that some of the dimensions were necessary for the emergence of others and 
formulated a model of these interrelationships. A second study by Price and Barrell (1990) 
subsequently tested this model of hypothesised interrelationships and through path analysis 
confirmed the statistical validity of the model (see also Price, 1996, 1999). Based on the 
results of these experiential studies, Rainville and Price (2003) propose ‘that hypnosis can be 
defined as changes in subjective experience induced by suggestions and characterised by mental 
ease, absorption, reduction in self-orientation, and automaticity.y (p. 113).
Recently, Rainville and colleagues (Rainville et al., 2002; Rainville et al., 1999) investigated 
the changes in brain activity underlying ‘mental relaxation’ and ‘mental absorption’, two of 
the critical experiential dimensions identified by Price and Barrell (1990). In the first of 
these studies using positron emission tomography (PET), the effects of hypnotic induction 
on regional cerebral blood flow were described for 8 highly hypnotically suggestible 
participants (Rainville et al., 1999). PET scans were carried out in a pre-hypnosis baseline 
condition and a hypnosis condition which followed a standard hypnotic induction 
procedure taken from the SHSS:A (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959). Rainville et al., (1999) 
reported hypnosis-related bilateral increases in activation in the occipital lobes and in the
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inferior frontal gyrus; increases in the left insula; increases on the right in anterior cingulate 
cortex and anterior superior temporal gyrus; and decreases in right inferior parietal lobule, 
right medial precuneus, left posterior gingulate gyrus, left medial superior frontal gyrus and 
left posterior middle temporal gyrus.
In the second of these experiments (Rainville et al., 2002), 10 participants were tested under 
both baseline and hypnosis conditions, as in Rainville et al., (1999), with a similar induction 
procedure. Hypnosis-related changes in activation were confirmed by comparing the results 
of a subtraction analysis (hypnosis minus baseline) with those of Rainville et al., (1999), 
again showing: increased activations in both occipital lobes, right inferior frontal and 
superior temporal gyri, left insula and right anterior cingulate cortex regions; and decreased 
activations in right parietal cortex and left posterior temporal cortex. In an extension of 
their previous study, Rainville et al., (2002) asked participants to rate their level of mental 
relaxation and absorption immediately after each scan in both the baseline and hypnosis 
conditions, allowing them to use regression analyses to examine the brain changes 
specifically associated with mental relaxation and mental absorption. Feelings of mental 
relaxation were specifically associated with lower levels of activation in the midbrain, the 
thalamus and the anterior cingulate cortex, known to be involved in the regulation of 
vigilance, wakefulness and the brain’s arousal level. Similar lower levels of activation in these 
areas have been shown for slow-wave sleep (Paus, 2000). Consistent with the possibility of a 
link with general reduction in cortical arousal, relaxation was additionally associated with 
decreases in activation of somatasensory areas and insula. Rainville and Price (2003) suggest 
that ‘hypnotic relaxation may reflect a state of decreased vigilance and an attenuation of the 
state of readiness to engage with, or orient toward, external sources of stimulation’ (p. 118). 
In contrast with the effects of relaxation, the brain activations associated with absorption 
were specifically associated with increases in areas including the upper pons, thalamus, 
rostral areas of the anterior cingulate cortex, right ventrolateral frontal cortex, right inferior 
frontal cortex and right inferior parietal lobule. These areas have been shown to be 
associated with the regulation of attentional processes, error detection and monitoring.
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At the moment these two studies (Rainville et al., 2002; Rainville et al., 1999) as well as 
studies that have investigated the altered and disconnected frontal functions associated with 
hypnosis (e.g. Gruzelier, 1998, 2004; Egner et al., 2005; see also Chapter 2) offer an 
indication as to the brain systems that may be involved in the induction of hypnosis, 
independent of the effects of specific suggested phenomena (e.g. hallucinations, amnesia, 
analgesia). The results thus far indicate that the induction of hypnosis produces changes in 
activity within the brain’s arousal and attentional systems, and as Rainville et al., (2002) 
argue such activity is consistent with mechanisms that are involved in the basic aspects of 
the regulation of consciousness and body-self representation.
5.1.1.2. Summary
The consideration raised so far indicates that multiple factors within the psychosocial 
context of hypnotic procedures as well the experiences of participants may explain why 
hypnotic inductions facilitate responsiveness to suggestion. Both mental absorption and 
mental relaxation have been shown to be key dimensions of the experience of being 
hypnotised, however, in the authors opinion although relaxation is commonly assumed to 
be an essential component of hypnosis, there is no good evidence that relaxation is an 
essential component of the hypnotic state. Studies that have used hypnotic inductions based 
on increasing mental alertness and physical activity provide evidence to the contrary (e.g. 
Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Cardena et al., 1998; see also Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). As outlined 
above, this chapter aims to investigate the effect of two factors, namely absorption and 
reduced critical thought on suggestibility and although both these factors were 
independently hypothesised as potentially instrumental components of hypnotic induction 
procedures (see Chapter 3, section 3.4) from those of Price’s experiential model of hypnosis 
(Price, 1999), there are common elements that can be identified. The concept of absorption 
to be investigated in this thesis is identical to the concept offered by Price (1996, 1999). This 
is not surprising, given that absorption is often cited as an important feature of hypnosis 
and is widespread within the field (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). The concept of reduced
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critical thought, although not completely synonymous with any of the dimensions identified 
by Price, is similar to concepts of ‘letting go’ as well as ‘an absence of judging, monitoring 
and censoring’. The role of the induction will now be examined in more detail with regard 
to absorption and reduced critical thought and their relationship with enhanced 
suggestibility during hypnosis.
5.1.2. Absorption
One of the most commonly reported experiences during the hypnotic situation is 
absorption or ‘openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences’ (Tellegen and Atkinson, 
1974). In a review of hypnosis, Spanos and Barber (1974) described the concept of 
absorption as being the most significant point of convergence between many different 
theories of hypnotic responding. Hilgard (1974) describes the experience of the hypnotised 
person as one of deep ‘immersion in the activity, with indifference to distracting stimuli in 
the environment’ (p. 5). Absorption has most often be operationalised as a personality 
variable as measured by the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS) (Tellegen and Atkinson,
1974), which measures self reported frequency of episodes indicative of absorption during 
one’s everyday life. Tellegen and Atkinson (1974) define absorption as ‘a total attention, 
involving a full commitment of available perceptual... imaginative and ideational resources 
to a unified representation of the attentional object’ (p. 168).
Numerous studies have shown that there is a small but reliable correlation between scores 
on hypnotic suggestibility scales and scores on the TAS (e.g. Nadon et al., 1991; Perlini et al., 
1992; Zachariae et al., 2000; for a review of these studies see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). 
However, there are a number of studies that have shown that this correlation is dependent 
on subjects being given the TAS in a context which is related to hypnosis during which 
hypnotic suggestibility is assessed. If contexts are controlled the correlation is almost always 
non-significant (see Milling et al., 2000; Chapter 2). Overall, studies in this area indicate at 
best a low to moderate relationship between absorption and hypnotic responsiveness.
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The TAS was designed to measure the frequency of episodes indicative of absorption 
(Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974), and this may explain why it is not a good predictor of 
hypnotic responding when administered outside of the hypnotic context. Brown and Oakley 
(2004) propose a model of cognition in which hypnosis is intrinsically linked to a shift 
towards a low level, holistic mode of information processing (i.e. non-analytical, intuitive, 
rapid and dynamic, see Brown & Oakley, 2004, for further explanation), while maintaining 
focussed attention. If this definition is followed, absorption begins to look more like one of 
intense and effortless concentration, a process during which one can become involved with 
an attentional object to various degrees (Brown & Oakley, 2004). Support for this notion 
has been provided by studies that indicate that highly suggestible participants experience a 
decrease in the deployment of attention in the peripheral portions of the visual field during 
hypnosis (e.g. Graham, 1970a; 1970b). Taking this evidence into account, one possible 
explanation for the patterns of results, is that while frequency of episodes indicative of 
absorption are not strongly predictive of hypnotic response, the administration of the scale 
in a hypnotic context provides a possible clue as to the kind of processing required to 
successfully experience an increase in suggestibility (Braffman and Kirsch, 1999).
5.1.3. Reduced critical thought
A number of researchers have hypothesised that a reduction in critical thought is an integral 
state associated with the hypnotic situation (Bowers, 1978; Brown, 1999; Deikman, 1966; 
Fromm 1979, 1992; Gheorghiu, 1989a, 1989b), and as such would increase suggestibility in 
a hypnotic context. Brown (1999) notes that most hypnotic inductions encourage subjects 
to adopt an uncritical mode of thinking either implicitly or explicitly. The Harvard Group 
Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS, Shor & Orne, 1962), for example, instructs 
participants not to think about what is occurring and ‘just let whatever is happening ... 
happen by itself (Shor & Orne, 1962). Many of the responses termed as ‘trance logic’ (Orne, 
1959), where hypnotic subjects appear to tolerate logical inconsistencies without regarding 
them as strange, seem to also require a temporary suspension of critical thought.
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Field (1979) performed a comprehensive linguistic content analysis of hypnotic inductions 
and contrasted them with parallel analyses of formal and informal speech in non-hypnotic 
situations. Field found that hypnotic induction wording serves to reduce vigilance and to 
diminish abstract, logical and critical thought processes.
Fromm’s (1979, 1992) ego-psychological framework of hypnosis stresses the notion that the 
hypnotic individual relinquishes critical thought. Fromm offers the concept of ‘ego 
receptivity’ as being central to hypnosis, where active goal-directed thinking and strict 
adherence to reality orientation are temporarily given up, and the participant can ‘just let 
go’. When the ego is receptive, defences are supposed to be relaxed, allowing into 
consciousness the emergence of fluid thoughts, associations and images -  phenomena that 
in the non-hypnotic state are usually below the level of conscious awareness. In hypnosis, 
ego receptivity is encountered primarily as increased suggestibility (i.e. increased openness 
to stimuli). Bowers (1978) similarly argues that heightened subconscious processing and 
receptivity lies behind the experience of effortlessness and lack of critical thought during 
hypnosis and that it is this extra receptivity to subconscious processing that contributes to 
enhanced suggestibility.
The concept of a reduction in critical thought also corresponds to the 
neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Gruzelier,
1998). According to this model, the suggestible individual shifts from an analytical, 
sequential type of processing to a more holistic and imaginal mode during hypnosis. The 
notion that hypnosis subsequently involves a shift from analytical to a holistic style of 
thinking is based on a number of early psychophysiological studies showing activity shifts 
from the left to the right hemisphere during hypnosis (e.g. Gur 8c Gur, 1974; see Chapter 4). 
Such a shift underpins a reduction in generalised reality testing and increases in dissociative 
experiences (Shor, 1959), and has been supported by many cognitive and physiological 
studies (e.g. Crawford 8c Allen, 1983; Gruzelier, 1998; Gruzelier et al., 1984). This evidence 
provides support for the notion that relinquishing critical thought allows extra receptivity to
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subconscious processing that in turn contributes to enhanced suggestibility in the hypnotic 
context.
5.1.4. The effects of instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought
Given that both absorption and critical thought are possible factors that may contribute to 
the process of enhanced suggestibility within the hypnotic context, what influence might 
instructions for absorption or reduced critical thought have on the degree to which 
individuals will respond to suggestions during hypnosis? A recent study by Brown,
Antonova, Langley and Oakley (2001) addressed this question and found that instructions 
for absorption and reduced critical thought significantly increased suggestibility in a 
hypnotic context. They measured suggestibility behaviourally and subjectively in both non­
hypnotic and hypnotic contexts. Brown et al. (2001) created three hypnotic induction 
conditions defined by whether the induction included instructions for absorption, critical 
thought or just relaxation. These researchers compared the change in suggestibility 
following the three hypnotic induction conditions and the results indicated that changes in 
both behavioural and subjective responses to suggestion were significantly greater when 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought were given, compared with 
relaxation alone.
Although the study provides some evidence that absorption and reduced critical thought 
increases suggestibility during hypnosis, caution needs to be taken when interpreting these 
findings. Brown et al. (2001) found that instructions for relaxation alone were insufficient to 
produce an increase in suggestibility, despite the presence of a hypnotic context and positive 
expectation. According to previous findings simply labelling the context as ‘hypnosis’ 
increases suggestibility (e.g. Barber and Calverley, 1964, 1965), and thus an increase in 
suggestibility would have been expected in all three conditions, including the relaxation 
condition. Furthermore, Brown et al.’s (2001) study did not include any measures of levels 
of absorption or critical thought. Consequently there is no way of determining that
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participants’ psychological states were changed in the intended way by the addition of 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought. Moreover, it remains unclear 
whether any such changes -  should they have been present -  were responsible for the 
increased suggestibility observed in these conditions.
5.1.4. Study objectives
The current study aimed to replicate and extend that of Brown et al (2001). In particular it 
corrected the shortcomings of the original by including self-report measures of absorption 
and critical thought. A similar method to that used by Brown et al (2001) was employed. 
Participants were initially presented with a suggestibility measure in the absence of any 
formal instructions or mention of hypnosis. The context was then explicitly defined as 
hypnosis and participants were presented with the suggestibility measure for a second time 
following standard relaxation (RX condition), relaxation plus absorption (ABS condition) 
or relaxation plus reduced critical thought instructions (RCT condition)12. Behavioural, 
subjective, and experienced involuntariness measures of responsiveness to suggestion and 
self-report ratings of absorption, critical thought and relaxation were obtained. It was 
hypothesised that suggestibility change would be significantly greater when instructions for 
absorption or reduced critical thought were given, compared with instructions for 
relaxation alone. Therefore, it was predicted that that the inclusion of instructions to 
produce a state of (i) absorption and (ii) reduced critical thought would increase 
suggestibility, independent of any effect produced by the hypnotic context alone or by 
relaxation.
12 In line with the methodology used by Brown et al., (2001), relaxation instructions were included in all 
induction conditions (i.e. RX, ABS & RCT) to enhance the face validity of each of the inductions as 
‘hypnotic’ and provide a realistic hypnotic context. Relaxation is commonly assumed to be an essential 
component of hypnosis and although most traditional hypnotic inductions include instructions for 
physical and mental relaxation, there is no evidence that relaxation is an essential component of hypnotic 
inductions. Studies that have used hypnotic inductions based on increasing mental alertness and physical 
activity provide strong evidence to the contrary (e.g. Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Cardena et al., 1998; also see 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.2)
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5.2. Method
5.2.1. Design
This study is the first of a series of experiments aimed to establish the effects of hypnosis and 
hypnotic procedures on suggestibility. To do this systematically, both non-hypnotic 
suggestibility (i.e. suggestibility prior to an induction) and hypnotic suggestibility (i.e. 
suggestibility following an induction) need to be measured. Hypnotic susceptibility happens 
to be a measure in which there are very wide individual differences, and even a tendency to 
bimodality in the distributions that are found (e.g. Hilgard, 1965, 1973). With this in mind, 
selecting groups for treatment on a random basis requires fairly large groups before 
significant mean differences will be detected. The testing of large random groups is costly 
and inconvenient in terms of time, effort and availability of participants. Hilgard (1965; 
Hilgard & Tart, 1966) identifies two alternatives to the testing of larger random groups. The 
first is to stratify participants on the basis of their known/measured hypnotic susceptibility 
and then to assign them randomly to experimental/control groups. However, as Hilgard 
points out, this method: (1) eliminates the possibility of beginning with naive participants 
and (2) allows experienced participants (i.e. participants that have had their susceptibility 
previously measured) to detect any contrast between non-hypnotic and hypnotic 
conditions.
The second alternative is to use participants as their own controls, which is the experimental 
design used for this and subsequent studies (outlined in Chapter 3, section 3.4). This allows 
the use of naive participants, which is essential for an accurate comparison between non- 
hypnotic and hypnotic responsiveness. It also shares the advantage with the random 
assignment method. When participants do not serve as their own controls in studies of 
suggestibility with and without induction, no advantage is taken of the very high correlation 
between non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestion in determining gains from one condition to 
the other. The key disadvantages of not stratifying participants on the basis of their
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measured susceptibility (i.e. high, medium, low) are: (1) you may get a disproportionate 
number of high, medium and low hypnotically suggestible individuals in your experimental 
and control groups; and (2) there is the potential for ceiling effects for the very responsive 
individuals. However, there is no evidence for either of these in previous studies (Ns ranging 
between 30-170) that have adopted this design (Barber & Glass, 1962; Braffman & Kirsch, 
1999; Hilgard & Tart, 1966; Weitzenhoffer 8c Sjoberg, 1961)
While there are possible disadvantages, this design is the most economical and instructive 
method, and has been used by all previous studies that have investigated the effect of 
hypnotic induction on suggestibility (Barber 8c Glass, 1962; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; 
Hilgard 8c Tart, 1966; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961; See Chapter 3 for a 
detailed review).
A 3 x 2 (condition x context) between-within design was employed, with induction 
condition as the three level independent variable (RX vs. ABS vs. RCT). The RX condition 
served as a control, since it has been shown by previous research that relaxation is not an 
essential component of hypnotic inductions nor is relaxation necessary or sufficient on its 
own to produce the increase in suggestibility usually found during hypnosis (Banyai & 
Hilgard, 1976; Cardena et al., 1998; Cardena 8c Spiegel, 1991; Fellows, 1986; Fellows 8c 
Richardson, 1993). Suggestibility was assessed for all participants in a non-hypnotic context 
(SAji first suggestibility assessment) and in a hypnotic context (SA2: second suggestibility 
assessment). Changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness 
suggestibility scores from SA, to SA2 were the principle dependent variables. The self-report 
ratings of relaxation, absorption and critical thought were the secondary dependent 
variables, which also served as predictor variables, as they were used to predict changes in 
suggestibility.
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5.2.2. Measures
5.2.2.1 Suggestibility scale
Existing suggestibility scales were unsuitable for the present study due to length, practicality 
of using the same scale twice, and the lack of both behavioural and subjective measures. 
Also, most existing scales contained items that were deemed unsuitable for repeated 
presentation. For these reasons and to ensure comparability, suggestibility was measured 
using the scale constructed by Brown et al. (2001), which incorporated items from a 
number of existing suggestibility scales (full scale presented in Appendix 5.1). The scale was 
used to measure suggestibility before (SAj) and after (SA2) the hypnotic induction 
manipulation. Following the methodology of Brown et al (2001) and the recommendations 
of Braffman and Kirsch (1999), the order of the so-called ‘non-hypnotic’ and ‘hypnotic’ 
suggestibility assessments was not counterbalanced, with the ‘non-hypnotic’ condition first, 
so as to maintain participants’ naivety concerning hypnosis during the non-hypnotic 
assessment. This is important, as there is a tendency, whether deliberate or unconscious, for 
participants to modify their behaviour under control conditions when they know that a 
hypnotic session is to follow (Zamansky et al., 1964).
The scale lasted approximately 10 minutes and consisted of eight suggestions in total taken 
from the Barber Suggestibility Scale (BSS: Barber, 1965), the Carleton University 
Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam & Bertrand, 
1983), the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & 
Hilgard, 1962) and the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS: Barber & Wilson, 1979). There 
were three challenge suggestions (BSS: hand lock; CURSS: arm immobility and arm 
rigidity), three cognitive suggestions (BSS: thirst hallucination; SHSS:C: taste hallucination; 
CIS: music hallucination), and two ideo-motor suggestions (BSS: arm levitation; CURSS: 
hand repulsion). Two versions of the scale were created, with the same items in different 
testing orders, which were counterbalanced and presented across the conditions. However,
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the relative order of ideomotor, challenge and cognitive suggestions was always maintained 
across the two tests.
Behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness suggestibility scores were measured 
for both SA, and SA2 (scoring booklet and criteria presented in Appendix 5.2). Scoring of 
the suggestibility items was adapted from Brown et al., (2001) and the BSS (Barber, 1965). 
Behavioural scores were measured in a dichotomous fashion for each suggestion, and 
participants scored ‘one point’ if they enacted behaviour consistent with the suggested effect 
(e.g. hands moving apart during hand repulsion) and ‘zero’ if they did not. In line with the 
original BSS version (Barber, 1965) half a point was awarded for the hand lock suggestion, if 
the participants’ hands were still together after 5 seconds and a full point if their hands 
remained together after 15 seconds. Therefore, total behavioural suggestibility scores ranged 
from zero to eight.
Subjective scores were taken for all suggestions. Ratings were based on how real the 
suggestion felt to the participant. Participants were asked to rate on a scale o f ‘1-10’, for each 
suggestion, the extent to which they actually felt the suggestion. Total subjective 
suggestibility scores ranged from eight to eighty.
Experienced involuntariness scores were taken for each item for which the participant 
obtained a score on the behavioural assessment (including the half-point on the hand lock 
item), with the exception of the thirst, taste and music hallucinations for which 
involuntariness scores were taken irrespective of a behavioural response score. Ratings were 
made on a ‘forced-choice’ scale and were based on how involuntary the suggested effect was 
felt to be by the participant. Participants scored ‘one point’ for every behavioural response 
that was perceived as being involuntary and ‘zero’ if they reported that they complied with 
the situational expectation and carried out the behaviour on purpose. Total experienced 
involuntariness suggestibility scores ranged from zero to eight.
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5.2.2.2. Absorption and critical thought
Absorption and critical thought were assessed following SA2 (full questionnaire assessing 
levels of absorption and critical thought presented in Appendix 5.3). Absorption scores were 
obtained for each suggestion, by asking participants to rate on a five point Likert scale (1 = 
much harder than normal; 5 = much easier than normal), how easy it was to focus their 
attention on the suggestion. Total absorption scores were calculated by summing the 
absorption ratings for each suggestion, creating a scale range from eight to forty. A high 
score indicated that the participant was highly focussed or ‘absorbed’, whilst a low score 
suggested that the participant found it difficult to focus their attention on the suggestions.
Critical thought scores were obtained for each suggestion, by asking participants to rate on a 
four point Likert scale (1 = always attentive to suggestion; no extraneous thoughts; 4 = hardly 
attended to suggestion at all; mostly extraneous thoughts), how many thoughts unrelated to 
the suggestion they had. Total critical thought scores were calculated by summing the 
critical thought ratings for each suggestion, with a possible range from eight to thirty-two. A 
high score indicated that the participant thought critically about the suggestions, whereas a 
low score inferred that the participant had little or no extraneous thoughts and did not 
critically analyse. Relaxation scores were also obtained by asking participants to rate on a 
scale o f ‘0-100’ (a score of 100 indicating total relaxation) how relaxed they were during SA,
5.2.3. Hypnotic context and inductions
A hypnotic context was explicitly established by making reference to hypnosis after SA,, 
using the following instructions:
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions, only this time we will ask you to experience them whilst in hypnosis. So in 
this version, the suggestions will be preceded by a hypnotic induction to help you become 
hypnotised.’
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This enabled the study to address the question of whether the inclusion of instructions for 
(a) absorption and (b) reduced critical thought contribute to the suggestibility change 
observed following a hypnotic induction, over and above that produced by an explicit 
hypnotic context alone.
Three induction conditions were created each consisting of initial relaxation instructions 
plus additional instructions for either relaxation, absorption or reduced critical thought 
depending on which condition the induction was to be used in (instructions for relaxation, 
absorption and reduced critical thought presented in full in Appendix 5.4). Initial relaxation 
instructions were adapted from the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale 
(CURSS: Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam & Bertrand, 1983) by adding opening and closing 
statements and removing all references to sleep. When using relaxation procedures it is 
important to recognise the difference between mental and physical relaxation and their 
potentially different properties and effects. The relaxation procedure used in this study 
consisted of instructions for both physical and mental relaxation. These instructions served 
as a standard relaxation procedure (adapted relaxation instructions presented in Appendix 
5.5). All induction conditions included instructions for relaxation in order to provide a 
realistic hypnotic context and to maximise responsiveness to suggestions in all conditions. 
All instructions were recorded onto standard audio-cassettes to increase experimental 
control.
5.2.4. Participants
In all 102 participants (37 males 8c 65 females) took part in this study. All participants were 
undergraduate university students, with the majority being recruited from University 
College London. The age of participants ranged from 18-50 years, with a mean age of 22.31 
years (SD = 4.10). All participants signed up for an experiment entitled, ‘the influence of 
state and context on behaviour’, were randomly allocated on the day of assessment and 
participated in one of the following three conditions: RX (N=34, 10 male & 24 female); ABS
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(N=34, 14 male & 20 female) or RCT (N=34, 13 male & 21 female). Participants were 
recruited via advertisements placed around university. To avoid selection bias and to 
maintain participants’ naivety concerning hypnosis during SA,, there was no mention of 
hypnosis on the advert. Psychology students were excluded from the sample due to 
familiarity with hypnotic procedures, methodology, and investigators. The joint 
UCL/UCLH Committee on the Ethics of Human Research approved this study; informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.
5.2.5. Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room and were told that the experiment 
would involve listening to and following instructions on an audio-cassette. They were given 
an information sheet, which stated that the experiment was designed to measure ‘the effects 
of context and state on thought and behaviour’. Any reference to ‘hypnosis’ was strictly 
avoided. The information sheet emphasised that participants were free to withdraw from 
the study at any point, without having to give a reason. After reading the information sheet 
and giving consent, participants were presented with SA,. Participants were informed that it 
was a measure of imagination. After scoring SA„ a hypnotic context was explicitly 
established and participants were informed that the remaining part of the study would be 
similar in content to the part they had already completed, but their ability to experience the 
same suggestions would now be measured after receiving a hypnotic induction. At this 
point, participants were given an explicit opportunity to withdraw from the study. All 
participants were then given standard progressive relaxation instructions plus additional 
instructions for either relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS) or reduced critical thought (RCT) 
depending on which experimental condition they had been assigned to. SA2 was then 
presented and behavioural, subjective and experienced measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion were scored. Finally, participants were asked to rate their levels of absorption and 
critical thought for each of the eight suggestions during SA2.
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5.2.6. Statistical analyses
SPSS for Windows (version 10.1) was used for the analyses of data. The effect of condition 
on suggestibility (behavioural, subjective, involuntariness) was tested using a 3 x 2 
(condition x context) between-within analyses of covariance (ANCOVA), taking 
suggestibility scores at SA, as the covariate. Comparison of the means were carried out by 
Fisher’s protected least significant difference (LSD) test (Carmer & Swanson, 1973; Howell, 
1997). Paired-samples Student’s t-tests were carried out to compare suggestibility scores for 
the first suggestibility assessment (SA,) with suggestibility scores for the second 
suggestibility assessment (SA2). A rejection region with at least a value of p < 0.05 was 
selected and used throughout (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001)
5.3. Results
Means and standard deviations of responses to suggestion in non-hypnotic (SA,) and 
hypnotic (SA2) contexts for each condition are presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. As an 
important part of the analyses, quantification of the effect of condition on responsiveness to 
suggestion was calculated (see Table 5.1). The data were screened for univariate and 
multivariate outliers. No cases were found to have standardised scores in excess of ± 3.29 
(p< 0.001, two-tailed test). The data were normally distributed, with no skewness and 
kurtosis values exceeding standardised scores of ± 3.29 (p< 0.001, two-tailed test). 
Mahalanobis distances (critical values, y?{6) = 22.458, p <0.001) were calculated. No cases 
were found to have Mahalanobis distances greater that the critical value demonstrating the 
absence of multivariate outliers.
Correlations between non-hypnotic suggestibility (SA,)and hypnotic suggestibility (SA2) 
were significant for all measures, in each condition: behavioural (RX: r = 0.762, p < 0.001; 
ABS: r = 0.599, p < 0.001; RCT: r = 0.545, p < 0.001); subjective (RX: r = 0.608, p < 0.001; 
ABS: r = 0.655, p < 0.001; RCT: r = 0.403, p < 0.025); experienced involuntariness (RX: r = 
0.878, p < 0.001; ABS: r = 0.596, p < 0.001; RCT: r = 0.624, p < 0.001). Concerning
behavioural responses, 15 participants (44%) in the RX condition passed fewer suggestions 
following instructions for relaxation only, 8 (24%) showed no change at all, and 11 (32%) 
exhibited greater suggestibility. Nine participants (26%) in the ABS condition showed a 
decrease in behavioural scores, with 4 participants (12%) showing no change, and 21 (62%) 
showing a greater behavioural response following instructions for absorption. Six 
participants (18%) in the RCT condition reported reduced behavioural responses, whilst 7 
(20%) reported no change, and 21 (62%) reported greater behavioural responses following 
instructions for reduced critical thought. The frequency distributions of changes in 
behavioural, subjective and involuntariness measures of responsiveness to suggestion for 
each condition are displayed in Table 5.2.
5.3.1. Effect of condition on suggestibility
The ANCOVA for behavioural scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F 
(2,98) = 4.728, p < 0.025]. This effect revealed that change in behavioural suggestibility scores 
was significantly different between: (i) the ABS and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.01]; and
(ii) the RCT and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.025]. The difference between the ABS and 
RCT conditions on change in behavioural suggestibility scores was non-significant. There 
were no significant differences in behavioural scores at SAj. Paired samples t-tests indicated 
that behavioural scores increased from SA1 to SA2, for both the ABS [ t(33) = 3.209, p < 0.01] 
and RCT [ t(33) = 3.476, p < 0.001] conditions. No significant difference in behavioural 
scores from SAj to SA2, was found for the RX condition.
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Table 5.1. Mean (standard deviation) responses to suggestion for the relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS)
and reduced critical thought (RCT) conditions, in both non-hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts.
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
SA, sa2 Effect 
Size (d)
SA, SA2 Effect 
Size (d)
SA, SA2 Effect 
Size (d)
RX 2.97 2.93 -0.02 27.27 26.91 -0.04 2.06 1.91 -0.09
(1.90) (2.20) (10.05) (9.64) (1.52) (1.94)
ABS 3.06 4.13 0.52 26.24 36.84 0.92 2.12 3.56 0.90
(1.65) (2.42) (11.51) (11.77) (1.45) (1.79)
RCT 2.92 3.88 0.57 24.88 30.44 0.62 2.09 3.06 0.69
(1.56) (182) (8.67) (9.46) (1.26) (1.59)
Note.
Behavioural scores are ratings of behavioural responses to suggestions & are defined as the number of 
suggestions passed out of eight. Subjective scores are ratings of degree to which participants felt the 
subjective effects called in each suggestion & were rated out of eighty (i.e. measured on a scale of 1-10 for 
each of the eight suggestions). Involuntariness scores are ratings of experienced involuntariness of 
suggestions & defined as the number of suggestions experienced as being involuntary out of eight
Table 5.2. Frequency distribution (percentages) o f changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced 
involuntariness measures of suggestibility as a function of instructions for relaxation (RX), absorption 
(ABS) and reduced critical thought (RCT)
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase
RX 15 8 11 18 0 16 15 8 11
(44%) (24%) (32%) (53%) (0%) (47%) (44%) (24%) (32%)
ABS 9 4 21 4 0 30 2 7 25
(26%) (12%) (62%) (12%) (0%) (88%) (6%) (20%) (74%)
RCT 6 7 21 6 2 26 3 10 21
(18%) (20%) (62%) (18%) (6%) (76%) (9%) (29%) (62%)
Note.
A decrease was when participants’ responses to suggestion were lower at SA2 (after an induction) when 
compared to their responses at SA, (prior to an induction). Same refers to when participants responses to 
suggestions were the same at both SA, and SA2. An increase was when participants’ responses to suggestion 
were higher at SA2 when compared to their responses at SA,
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Figure 5.1. Mean (standard error) behavioural, subjective and involuntariness suggestibility scores for the 
relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS) and reduced critical thought (RCT) conditions
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As with behavioural scores, the ANCOVA for subjective scores indicated a significant main 
effect for Condition [F(298) = 10.688, p  < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in 
subjective suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the ABS and RX 
conditions [LSD test, p  <  0.001]; and (ii) the RCT and RX conditions [LSD test, p  <  0.01].
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The difference between the ABS and RCT conditions on change in subjective suggestibility 
scores was non-significant. There were no significant differences in subjective scores at SA,. 
Paired-samples t-test indicated, again as with behavioural scores, revealed a significant 
increase in subjective scores from SA, to SA2, for both the ABS [t (33) = 5.910, p < 0.001], and 
RCT conditions [t (33) = 4.106, p < 0.001]. No significant difference in subjective scores from 
SA, to SA2, was found for the RX condition.
The ANCOVA for experienced involuntariness scores indicated a significant main effect for 
Condition [F (2 98) = 16.971, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in experienced 
involuntariness suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the ABS and RX 
conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; (ii) the RCT and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; and
(iii) the ABS and RCT conditions [LSD test, p < 0.01]. There were no significant differences 
in experienced involuntariness scores at SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated a significant 
increase in experienced involuntariness from SA, to SA2 for both the ABS [ t(33) = 6.112, p < 
0.001] and RCT [ t(33) = 3.569, p < 0.001] conditions. No significant difference in experience 
involuntariness scores from SA, to SA2 was found for the RX condition.
5.3.2. Absorption, critical thought and relaxation
Means and standard deviations of self-report ratings for relaxation (a score reflecting change 
in relaxation between non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts), absorption, and critical 
thought are presented in Table 5.3. The former rating was measured in relation to both 
non-hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic contexts (SA2), whilst the latter two ratings were 
measured in to relation to the hypnotic context only (SA2). A significant positive correlation 
was found between self-reported absorption and relaxation, for both the ABS (r = 0.470, p < 
0.01) and RCT conditions (r = 0.363, p < 0.05). No relationship was found between self- 
reported absorption and relaxation for the RX condition. A significant negative correlation 
between self-reported absorption and critical thought was found for all conditions (RX: r = 
-0.420, p < 0.05; ABS: r = -0.768, p < 0.01; RCT: r = -0.553, p < 0.01). No significant
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relationship was found between self-reported relaxation and critical thought for any of the 
conditions. Correlations between self-report ratings, SAj scores and SA2 scores are presented 
in Table 5.4.
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were preformed to measure whether scores of 
absorption, critical thought and relaxation predicted changes in behavioural, subjective and 
experienced involuntariness measures of hypnotic suggestibility (SA2). Hypnotic 
suggestibility scores (SA2) were entered as the dependent variable. Non-hypnotic 
suggestibility scores (SAj) and induction condition were used as covariates and entered in 
block 1. Absorption, critical thought and relaxation scores were entered in block 2 in a 
stepwise fashion. Stepwise regression was used, as the IVs used in these analyses could not 
be assigned theoretical importance with regard suggestibility.
Non-hypnotic suggestibility, induction condition and absorption all predicted behavioural 
responses to suggestion, with variance associated with the other variables controlled (non­
hypnotic suggestibility: (5 = 0.574, p < 0.001; condition: (3 = 0.160, p  < 0.05; absorption: p = 
0.294, p < 0.001). Together these variables accounted for 51.1% of the variance in hypnotic 
behaviour, with absorption scores uniquely accounting for 8.3% of the variance in hypnotic 
behaviour. Neither relaxation scores nor critical thought ratings predicted change in 
behavioural suggestibility.
A similar pattern of results was found for subjective responses to suggestions, with non­
hypnotic suggestibility, induction condition and absorption all predicting subjective 
responses to suggestion, when variance associated with the other variables is controlled 
(non-hypnotic suggestibility: p = 0.580, p < 0.001; condition: p = 0.154, p < 0.25; 
absorption: p = 0.374, p < 0.001). Together these variables accounted for 56.4% of the 
variance in hypnotic behaviour, with absorption scores uniquely accounting for 13.4% of 
the variance in hypnotic behaviour. Again, neither relaxation scores nor critical thought 
ratings predicted change in subjective suggestibility.
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Table 5.3. Mean (standard deviation) ratings for relaxation, absorption and critical thought
Rating
Condition
RX ABS RCT
Relaxation 7.85 14.24 11.12
(11.44) (12.07) (11.91)
Absorption 21.20 27.50 27.00
(9.10) (8.80) (7.40)
Critical Thought 14.40 15.50 14.60
(8.30) (9.10) (8.80)
Note.
Relaxation ratings were rated out of 100, with the scores in the table reflecting change in relaxation 
between SA, and SA2. Absorption ratings were rated out of 40 (measured on a scale of 1-5 for each of the 
eight suggestions). Critical thought ratings were rated out of 32 (measured on a scale of 1-4 for each of the 
eight suggestions)
Table 5.4. Correlations between self-report ratings, suggestibility scores in a non-hypnotic context (SA,), 
and suggestibility scores in a hypnotic context (SA2)
Condition & Self- 
report Ratings
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
SA, SA2 SA, SA2 SA, sa2
RX
Relaxation 0.14 0.02 0.18 0.17 -0.09 -0.14
Absorption 0.38* 0.47** 0.20 0.45** 0.30 0.34*
Critical Thought -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.32 -0.01 -0.12
ABS
Relaxation 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.12
Absorption 0.31 0.48** 0.24 0.62** 0.16 0.57**
Critical Thought -0.16 -0.30 -0.13 -0.49** -0.74 -0.54**
RCT
Relaxation 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.11 0.12
Absorption 0.27 0.46** 0.16 0.60** 0.27 0.54**
Critical Thought -0.17 -0.20 -0.17 -0.31 -0.17 -0.29
Note.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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Four variables were found to predict experienced involuntariness suggestibility scores, when 
variance of the other variables was controlled (non-hypnotic suggestibility: p = 0.473, p  < 
0.001; condition: p = 0.195, p < 0.01; absorption: p = 0.4245, p < 0.001; relaxation: P =
0.172, p < 0.025). Together these variables accounted for 59.5% of the variance in hypnotic 
behaviour, with absorption scores uniquely accounting for 22.1% and relaxation uniquely 
accounting for 2.7% of the variance in hypnotic behaviour. Critical thought ratings did not 
predict change in experienced involuntariness scores of suggestibility.
5.3.3. Manipulation check
Independent groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyse whether there was 
an effect of induction on the self-report ratings of absorption, critical thought and 
relaxation. This was in essence ‘manipulation check* to analyse whether the induction used, 
actually produced the effects (i.e. absorption and reduction in critical thought) that they 
were designed for. ANOVAs revealed no significant effects for Condition on self-reported 
absorption, critical thought or relaxation (ps >0.1)
5.4. Discussion
Presenting suggestions in a hypnotic context increases suggestibility for many individuals. 
This study set out to investigate whether absorption and a reduction in critical thought are 
possible factors that may contribute to the process of enhanced suggestibility within the 
hypnotic context. In line with expectation, behavioural, subjective and involuntariness 
measures of responsiveness to suggestion increased significantly (from SAj to SA2) following 
the inclusion of instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought. The mean effect 
sizes of adding either instructions for absorption or reduced critical thought to a hypnotic 
induction on suggestibility were substantial, varying from 0.52 to 0.92 (see also Chapter 3). 
Neither behavioural, subjective nor involuntariness measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion changed significandy following instructions for relaxation only. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the changes in behavioural, subjective and involuntariness measures of
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suggestibility were significantly higher in both the ABS and RCT conditions compared to 
the RX condition. These findings provide support for those previously reported by Brown et 
al., (2001) and indicate that instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought 
facilitate suggested responding, over and above that produced by the hypnotic context 
alone.
The current study addressed the shortcomings of the original Brown et al., (2001) study, by 
including self-report measures of absorption, critical thought and relaxation which were 
used to get a more comprehensive idea of what was associated with the changes in 
suggestibility. The results indicate that self-reported absorption was associated with the 
changes in suggestibility. Absorption ratings were found to significantly predict behavioural, 
subjective and involuntariness measures of hypnotic suggestibility, accounting for 8.3% - 
22.1% of the variance in hypnotic behaviour. Relaxation scores were also found to predict 
the subjective measure of hypnotic suggestibility. However, self-reported critical thought 
ratings were found not to be predictive of any measures of hypnotic suggestibility. The 
finding that reduced critical thought was not predictive of hypnotic suggestibility could be 
due to the instructions used to produce a reduction in critical thought. Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter and White (1987) in an experiment on thought suppression, found that when 
participants were asked not to think of a white bear (i.e. attempting to suppress a thought), 
participants became more pre-occupied by it and reported an increase in thought of the 
bear. Similarly, the instructions used to produce a reduction in critical though in the 
currently study, instructed participants to ‘avoid thinking critically’, and not to ‘question’ or 
‘analyse’ which may have produced an effect similar to the ones found in the suppression 
experiments (e.g. Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991).
5.4.1. The hypnotic context and suggestibility
Overall, 6-26% of participants in the ABS and RCT conditions reported a decrease in 
responses to suggestion following either instructions for absorption or reduced critical
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thought in a hypnotic context; with 6-29% reporting no change; and 62-74% of participants 
in these conditions exhibited greater responses to suggestions. These findings are in line 
with previous research (e.g. Barber & Glass, 1962; Hilgard & Tart, 1965; Weitzenhoffer & 
Sjoberg, 1961; see also Chapter 3). However, as in the Brown et al. (2001) study, it was 
found that instructions for relaxation alone (RX condition) were insufficient to produce a 
significant mean increase in suggestibility, despite the presence of an explicit hypnotic 
context. Indeed, for the behavioural and experienced involuntariness measures of 
suggestibility, the majority of participants in the RX condition (approximately 70%) 
experienced a decrease or no change in suggestibility. This finding is contrary to previous 
research, as simply labelling the situation as ‘hypnosis’ should significantly increase 
suggestibility (Barber & Calverley, 1965; Starr & Tobin, 1970). There is even strong evidence 
that virtually anything described as hypnosis, tends to produce ‘hypnotic’ effects (e.g.
Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Barber, 1977; Kroger & Schneider, 1959). The current finding goes 
against this very powerful effect (i.e. expectation) and it must be emphasised how 
unexpected a finding this is.
5.4.2. The role of state changes in determining increases in suggestibility
The central question of interest concerning the findings is: why do instructions for 
absorption and reduced critical thought increase suggestibility? One possibility is that 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought may have brought about state 
changes that account for these results. Brown & Oakley’s (2004) cognitive model of 
suggestibility provides a theoretical framework that may explain how states of absorption 
and reduced critical thought increase suggestibility. Based on Norman and Shallice’s (1986) 
model of attentional control of action, Brown & Oakley propose that routine and automatic 
behaviour is governed largely by ‘low level’ attentional systems, which serve to select from 
memory, behavioural and perceptual representations that fit the stimulus environment. 
These representations are then passed on to higher-level attentional systems for conscious 
processing. High level perceptual processing occurs when retrieval of representations from
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memory is insufficient and is based on general problem solving algorithms (Logan, 1988). 
Thus, what a person experiences, is an inference based on the best fitting perceptual 
hypothesis available to them. According to the theory, response to a suggestion depends on 
the automatic selection of perceptual or behavioural representation corresponding to the 
suggestion, from a range of possible representations of the environment. Instructions for 
absorption and reduced critical thought may cause a decrease in the amount of high level 
processing occurring within an individual, as well as increasing the salience of the 
suggestion within the stimulus environment. Thereby, biasing selection of perceptual and 
behavioural representations corresponding to the suggested effect, and increasing 
suggestibility.
5.4.3. Have state changes occurred?
The findings of the present investigation suggest that an altered psychological state 
characterised by being ‘absorbed’ or a ‘reduction in critical thought’ plays a role in 
increasing suggestibility typically observed during hypnosis. These findings appear to imply 
that socially orientated research and so-called ‘non-state’ factors, such as expectation and 
motivation, although crucial to the understanding of hypnotic suggestibility, cannot 
represent a full explanation, and therefore must be complemented by the understanding of 
state changes associated with hypnosis. However, for this interpretation to have any validity, 
there needs to be evidence that the instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought 
actually did bring about the state changes that they were designed for. The self-reported 
measures indicated that there were no differences with regard to levels of absorption, critical 
thought, or relaxation, in participants, between the three experimental conditions. This data 
provides ambiguous results and suggests that instructions for absorption and reduced 
critical thought did not increase suggestibility by bringing about state changes or at least not 
in the way intended.
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A possible reason for the homogeneity of absorption and critical thought ratings across the 
conditions may lie in the original formulations of the concepts. Absorption and reduced 
critical thought may be viewed as working synergistically during hypnosis and it is 
conceivable that they reflect different aspects of the same cognitive processes (Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974; Brown, 1999). It is possible that instructions to become relaxed may also 
‘tap’ these mechanisms. This suggests that relaxation, absorption and reduced critical 
thought may be inextricably linked. Instructions to increase absorption may also lead to less 
critical thought and increased relaxation; similarly, instructions for a reduction in a critical 
thought may in turn increase absorption and relaxation levels. However, this interpretation 
that there may have been similar levels of absorption and reduced critical thought across the 
conditions, cannot account for the differences in suggestibility between the conditions.
An alternative explanation is that levels of absorption and critical thought did differ across 
conditions and it was the choice of scales used in this study that were not sensitive enough 
to detect these differences. Bowers, Laurence and Hart (1988) point out the inadequacies of 
some forced-choice scales in which options that are available to subjects do not cover the 
range of possible responses. Participants, perceiving that they are obliged to use one of the 
options that are available to them (despite their failing to accurately reflect what has been 
experienced) may use the scales in idiosyncratic ways that are misleading. Measures in the 
‘either-or’ format have to be treated with some caution because they may mask important 
differences in individual responses and ‘states’ and can conceal relevant data and distort 
judgements. Another potentially key limitation of the scales used in this study relates to the 
measurement of critical thought. Critical thought was measured by asking participants to 
rate on a four point Likert scale (1= always attentive to suggestion; no extraneous thoughts; 4= 
hardly attended to suggestion at all; most extraneous thoughts), how many thoughts unrelated 
to the suggestion they had. However, on examination of the wording and descriptors used 
(also see Appendix 5.3) the scale seems to address intrusive and extraneous thoughts rather 
than critical and analytical thoughts per se, and consequently critical thought may not have 
been measured in the way intended. In addition, the use of wording such as ‘attentive’ and
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‘attended’ may of resulted in the critical thought scale measuring some form of focussed 
attention or a concept closely related to absorption, which could have also contributed to 
the uniformity of absorption and critical thought ratings found. Based on these 
considerations, it is essential that the future measurement of critical thought explicitly refers 
to ‘critical thought’ and only critical thought, with scales using descriptors and wording such 
as ‘critical’ and ‘analytical’ instead of ‘extraneous’ and ‘distracting’.
The current study also did not include measures of absorption and critical thought in a 
non-hypnotic context. Consequently, change in levels of absorption and critical thought 
could not be calculated. This is of great importance, as absorption and a reduction in critical 
thought are not necessarily unique to the hypnotic context, and by measuring them in a 
non-hypnotic context in addition to in a hypnotic context, variability in non-hypnotic levels 
of absorption and critical thought can be controlled for. This will allow a more systematic 
examination of the effect of absorption and a reduction in critical thought on suggestibility.
Future studies should consider using visual analogue scales with appropriate descriptors in 
both non-hypnotic as well as hypnotic contexts. In addition, overall ratings for absorption 
and critical thought for the suggestibility scale as a whole may be preferred, over ratings of 
absorption and critical thought for each suggestion, as the latter is heavily dependent on 
very accurate long-term memory. W ith this in mind, instructions for absorption and 
reduced critical thought may have increased suggestibility because they brought about state 
changes. However, more sensitive techniques such as visual analogue scales (e.g. Price, 
McGrath, Rafii, & Buckingham, 1983) and those used by Bowers (1982) to measure 
effortless experiences, may seem necessary to assess the subtle variations in responses when 
measuring absorption and critical thought.
Although it is clear that more sensitive techniques are needed to measure levels of 
absorption and critical thought, the fact remains that absorption was the only significant 
predictor of suggestibility change, with it predicting behavioural, subjective and experienced
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involuntariness measures of hypnotic suggestibility, regardless of condition. This remains an 
interesting finding but one that is not easy to explain in the context of the present study.
5.4.4. The use of strategies
A possible explanation for why absorption significantly predicted suggestibility change, 
regardless of condition may be related to the use of strategies. The common aspects of the 
hypnotic inductions in each of the three conditions (i.e. excluding instructions for 
absorption/reduced critical thought/further relaxation) may have helped identify strategies 
that facilitate suggestions. This explanation acknowledges that hypnotic participants are not 
passive responders. They actively cognise so as to fit their responses to the suggestions, and 
use problem-solving approaches to accomplish this goal. As a result of using strategies to fit 
their responses to suggestions, participants may have used strategies that were characterised 
by ‘focussing their attention’ or being ‘absorbed’.
The use of strategies may also offer an explanation, unrelated to state changes, to why 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought increased suggestibility. The 
inclusion of instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought may have made it 
considerably easier to identify strategies to facilitate suggestion, or perhaps aided 
participants to identify a range of strategies. For, example ‘concentrative’ strategies 
(Sheehan & McConkey, 1982), characterised by participants concentrating on the 
suggestions and imaging a literal interpretation of the suggestions; or ‘independent’ 
strategies characterised by participants interpreting the suggestion in a manner that is 
meaningful to them, could have both been identified by instructions for absorption and 
reduced critical thought. Strategy selection and hypnotic performance is dealt with more 
comprehensively in Chapter 8.
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5.4.5. The effects of expectation
Supportive of a social-cognitive viewpoint is the explanation that instructions for 
absorption and reduced critical thought may have increased suggestibility as the hypnotic 
inductions including these instructions may have been more consistent with the lay view of 
what constitutes an appropriate hypnotic induction. It may have been that the role of 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought may have enhanced the credibility 
of the definition of the situation as hypnotic, and thus increased expectation and 
consequently suggestibility (e.g. Barber, 1969; Barber & Calverley, 1964, 1965; Sarbin & Coe, 
1972). It is highly likely that participants possessed varied beliefs and attitudes about 
hypnosis, based on experiences of friends and family, and/or the watching of films and 
television shows involving its use. Due to this culturally transmitted information about 
hypnosis, participants may expect hypnosis to occur if some special procedure is used and 
instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought may be particularly consistent with 
the lay view of hypnotic inductions. Future studies should incorporate a measure of 
‘typicality* to assess how ‘authentic* the hypnotic inductions were perceived to be.
5.4.6. Conclusions
This study provides evidence that instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought 
increase suggestibility, over and above that produced by the hypnotic context alone. 
Therefore, the present findings are consistent with those previously reported by Brown et al 
(2001). The results may be interpreted as supporting the idea that states of absorption and 
reduced critical thought facilitate suggested responding. However, the self-report measures 
used did not provide strong evidence that participants’ levels of absorption and critical 
thought were affected by the instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought. 
Consideration of the possibility that the increased suggestibility may be unrelated to state 
changes was also taken. Instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought may have 
increased suggestibility because (i) they identified strategies that facilitate suggestion or (ii)
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they are more consistent with the lay view of what constitutes an appropriate hypnotic 
induction. Absorption was also found to predict behavioural, subjective, and experienced 
involuntariness measures of hypnotic suggestibility regardless of condition, which could 
possibly be explained by the use of strategies
Changes in suggestibility in relation to absorption and critical thought have been measured 
here using suggestions from standardised hypnotic scales. There are other types of suggested 
effects within the ‘domain of hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973) that are not reflected in these scales 
but play an important part in applied clinical and medical settings. One of the aims of the 
thesis is to discover relationships between induction procedures and suggestibility that are 
of clinical relevance and can increase the efficacy of hypnosis as a clinical and experimental 
tool. The use of suggestion in the management of pain is a good example of a practical use 
of hypnosis that is not reflected in the test items used in the standardised scales. It is worth 
noting that the use of hypnosis in pain management is one of the few clinical areas where a 
strong relationship has been demonstrated between hypnotic suggestibility (as measured by 
these scales) and outcome (e.g. Freeman, Barabasz, Barabasz, & Warner, 2000; Hilgard, 
1969; Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983; Hilgard & Morgan, 1975; Miller, Barabasz & Barabasz, 1991; 
Montgomery, DuHamel & Redd, 2000). However, most of the samples used in these studies 
consist of almost only high and low hypnotically suggestible individuals, with medium 
hypnotically suggestible individuals being either excluded entirely or under-represented 
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1995). This selection process ignores the individuals that make up the 
majority of the clinical population and may provide an inaccurate and inflated estimate of 
the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and hypnotic pain reduction (Kirsch,
1999). The next study continues the work reported in this chapter but uses responsiveness 
to suggestion for pain modulation to measure changes in suggestibility resulting from an 
induction procedure. The association between pain modulation and hypnotic suggestibility 
will also be examined using a representative sample of high, medium and low hypnotically 
suggestible participants.
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Chapter 6
Study 3: Effects o f Absorption and Reduced Critical 
Thought on Responses to Suggestion for Pain Modulation
Chapter overview
The study to be reported here explores further the effects of absorption and reduced critical 
thought on responsiveness to suggestion using modulation of pain experience as the 
dependent variable rather than test items from standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales. 
Pain is widely recognised as a multi-dimensional experience. Pain is personal and subjective, 
is affected by mood and psychosocial factors and demonstrates tremendous individual 
variation. The pain reducing effect of hypnotically suggested analgesia is arguably the most 
useful of all hypnotic phenomena. In addition, the use of hypnosis in pain management is 
one of the few clinical areas where a strong relationship has been demonstrated between 
hypnotic suggestibility and outcome (e.g. Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983; Montgomery et al.,
2000). However, most of the samples used in these studies consist of almost only high and 
low hypnotically suggestible individuals, with medium hypnotically suggestible individuals, 
who make up the majority of the clinical population, being excluded or under-represented. 
This chapter, therefore, will also examine the association between pain modulation and 
hypnotic suggestibility using a representative sample of high, medium and low hypnotically 
suggestible participants. This has important implications for treating and managing pain by 
psychological approaches and may encourage the application of ‘hypnotically’ suggested 
pain modulation to a wider range of people.
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6.1. Introduction
One of the most widely held beliefs about hypnosis is that it is particularly effective in the 
relief and abolition of pain. Hypnosis has played some part in pain reduction and 
management for over a century in modem medical practice. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the efficacy of hypnosis in reducing analogue pain in the laboratory setting 
(e.g. Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983) and clinical pain problems, including acute and chronic pain 
(e.g. Barber, 1977, 1996; Hawkins, 2001; Patterson & Jensen, 2003). In a recent meta­
analysis of the effects of hypnosis on pain, Montgomery, DuHamel and Redd (2000) 
classified hypnosis as a ‘well established treatment’. They included 18 studies and calculated 
27 effect sizes in their meta-analysis, and overall their findings indicated a moderate to large 
effect size of 0.7413. They found that for 75% of the sample population hypnosis provided 
substantial pain control in both laboratory and clinical settings14, and concluded that 
hypnotic suggestion is an effective analgesic from which the majority of the population 
(with the exception of low hypnotic suggestibles) should obtain ‘at least some’ benefit. In 
addition, they found the effect size of hypnotic analgesia was mediated by hypnotic 
suggestibility, with individuals that were highly suggestible tending to demonstrate larger 
responses to hypnotic suggestions for analgesia compared to low suggestible individuals.
The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily on the effects of hypnosis on induced 
pain in the laboratory setting, including theoretical explanations and physiological 
correlates of hypnotic pain control. For a comprehensive review of hypnosis and clinical 
pain, see Patterson and Jensen (2003).
6.1.2. Two theoretical approaches towards hypnotic pain control
Although it is well established that hypnosis can reduce both acute and chronic pain in 
adults and children, the mechanisms of hypnotic analgesia are still poorly understood (e.g.
13 Cohen (1992) describes effect sizes of: 0.20 as small; 0.50 as medium; and 0.80 as large
14 There was no difference in effectiveness between clinical patients and healthy participants
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Barber, 1996; Hilgard & Hilgard, 1983; Price, 1996, 1999). These mechanisms may involve 
cognitive factors such as expectancy, motivation and memory, as well as subtle changes in 
consciousness and unconscious mechanisms. Much of the research on induced pain in the 
laboratory setting is organised around two major theoretical paradigms (Patterson & Jensen, 
2003; Spanos, 1989), which have been previously identified as the ‘generic altered state’ 
conception of hypnosis and the ‘generic non-state’ view (Kirsch, 2004; also see Chapter 2 for 
a fuller account of contemporary theories).
The ‘generic altered state’ approach maintains that hypnosis is a special state of 
psychological functioning characterised by unique cognitive, behavioural, 
phenomenological and physiological processes. In contrast, the ‘generic non-state’ 
perspective, explains hypnotic analgesia by psychological factors including contextual cues, 
demand characteristics, expectancies and role enactment (Kirsch 8c Lynn, 1995; Spanos, 
1986). This perspective rejects the notion that a hypnotic induction or the existence of an 
altered state of consciousness is necessary for hypnotic responding.
From both perspectives, a plethora of laboratory pain studies have demonstrated an 
association between analgesia and hypnotic suggestibility (e.g. Greene 8c Reyher, 1972; for 
reviews see Hilgard 8c Hilgard, 1983; Spanos, 1989). Studies have confirmed that both 
reduction in cold pressor pain (e.g. Freeman, Barabasz, Barabasz 8c Warner, 2000; Hilgard, 
1969; Hilgard 8c Hilgard, 1983; Hilgard, Morgan 8c Macdonald, 1975) and ischemic muscle 
pain (Hilgard 8c Morgan, 1975; Knox, Morgan 8c Hilgard, 1974) are related to suggestibility 
as measured by standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales. These findings are consistent 
with the effects reported by Montgomery et al., (2000) who found that the effect size of 
hypnotic analgesia was mediated by hypnotic suggestibility. In other words high suggestibles 
tend to demonstrate larger responses to hypnotic suggestions for analgesia compared to low 
suggestibles. Laboratory studies have also found experimental hypnotic analgesia to be 
associated with expectations (e.g. Chaves 8c Barber, 1974; Neufeld 8c Thomas, 1977; Spanos, 
Hodgins, Stam 8c Gwynn, 1984), cognitive strategies (Miller 8c Bowers, 1986; Spanos, Perlini
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& Robertson, 1989); compliance (Spanos, Perlini, Patrick, Bell &Gwynn, 1990); and 
instructional sets (Spanos & Katsanis, 1989).
More recently, a number of researchers (e.g. Gruzelier, 2000; Kihlstrom, 1997; Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1995) have called for integration between theoretical perspectives, as explaining the 
effects of hypnosis solely in terms of one theory, as Kihlstrom (1998) puts it ‘dooms oneself 
to an incomplete understanding of a phenomenon* (p. 189). Most researchers would agree 
that different theorists are looking at diverse aspects, including social, cognitive, 
phenomenological and physiological aspects of the same phenomenon. Consequently, 
findings from studies driven by these two ‘contrasting’ perspectives have helped to identify 
the factors and possible mechanisms that effect and contribute to hypnotic analgesia. 
Laboratory studies supporting the ‘generic state* approach to hypnosis, indicate that high 
hypnotic suggestibles are more likely to respond to suggestions for analgesia. The findings 
from studies within the ‘generic non-state’ framework emphasise the importance of 
patients’ attitudes, expectations and beliefs, as well as contextual and cognitive factors as 
being critical in the modulation of the experience of pain (Chaves, 1999). Taken together, 
one has the beginnings of a comprehensive framework for understanding and investigating 
hypnotic analgesia.
6.1.3. Physiological correlates of laboratory hypnotic pain control
Many researchers have sought for the ‘holy grail’ of specific physiological indicators of the 
‘special’ state of hypnosis. There is a voluminous literature regarding the physiological 
correlates of the hypnotic ‘state’. Nevertheless as has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 
there is no evidence, as of yet, of a ‘discrete state’ or ‘discrete states’ of hypnosis involving 
unique patterns of psychological and physiological structures. In fact, most ‘hypnotic’ 
phenomena can be produced by suggestion, without the induction of hypnosis (e.g. Barber, 
1969). Although much of the research that has attempted to investigate the hypnotic state 
has yielded meagre results, research on the phenomenon of suggested hypnotic analgesia has
148
been more fruitful, raising important hypotheses and identifying consistent physiological 
correlates (Patterson & Jensen, 2003; Price, 1996, 1999). The physiological evidence of 
responses to hypnotic analgesia stems, in the main, from: electroencephalographic (EEG) 
studies; somatasensory event-related potentials (SERP) studies; positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies; studies on spinal mechanisms; and studies on the different 
components of pain. The following does not intend to be an exhaustive review of the 
literature on the physiological correlates of laboratory pain modulation, as this is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but will provide a backdrop to the current study.
6.1.3.1. EEG studies
Extensive experimental work involving surface EEG recordings made during hypnotic 
analgesia have indicated some specific physiological correlates. The most consistent finding 
in this area is that theta power (3-7 Hz) is related to hypnotic suggestibility (Crawford,
1994). According to Crawford and Gruzelier (1992) theta rhythm is associated with the 
cognitive experience of suppressing awareness, as well as being linked with hypnotic 
suggestibility. In a review, Crawford (1994) reported that when assessing EEG correlates of 
experimental pain in non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts in both high and low 
suggestibles, high suggestibles consistently generate more theta power (5.5-7 Hz) than lows 
during pain and hypnotic analgesia. High suggestibles show greater theta power, especially 
in the temporal regions, in the left hemisphere during the experience of pain, whereas this 
reverses and shifts towards greater theta power in the right hemisphere during hypnotic 
analgesia. Low suggestibles by comparison show little in terms of hemispheric differences.
Crawford (1994) interprets these results by relating these inhibitory patterns of theta activity 
to ‘disattention’, which results from suggestions for hypnotic analgesia. Crawford (1994) 
argues that high hypnotic suggestibility is an expression of special abilities to attend 
exclusively to suggested events and disattend to non-suggested events, which includes 
greater cognitive flexibility and a greater ability to shift from left to right hemispheric 
functioning. Nevertheless, a recent critical evaluation of the relationship between sustained
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attentional abilities and hypnotic suggestibility by Jamieson and Sheehan (2002), questions 
the notion that a high level of hypnotic suggestibility is significantly positively related to 
sustained attentional ability. If hypnosis is seen as a temporal process (e.g. Gruzelier, 1998), 
although sustained and focussed attention may be a necessary pre-requisite of initiating 
hypnosis, it does not imply that hypnosis is itself a more efficient and enhanced state of 
focussed attention. It has been proposed that hypnosis involves the suspension of a higher 
order attention system (e.g. Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Woody 8c Bowers, 1994) and other 
anterior executive functions (Gruzelier, 1998, 2004). A recent study by Croft, Williams, 
Haenschel and Gruzelier (2002) provides support for this. They found that increased 
gamma activity (32-100 Hz) over pre-ffontal scalp sites is related to the subjective 
experience of pain. This relationship was shown in the control condition (pre-hypnosis) for 
both high and low hypnotically suggestibles. However, following the induction of hypnosis, 
while the relationship remained in low suggestibles, it was no longer seen in high 
suggestibles. For highs, gamma was no longer related to their subjective experience. Croft et 
al., (2002) suggest that hypnotic analgesia with respects to the subjective experience of pain 
is underpinned by the dissociation of preffontal cortex from other neural functions.
However, the picture is further complicated by the results of a unique study by De Pascalis, 
Magurano, Belusci 8c Chen (2001). They compared the analgesia effects produced by 
experimental conditions of relaxation, dissociated imagery, focused analgesia and placebo to 
a control condition, and found suggestions for dissociated imagery to be as effective as 
suggestions for focussed analgesia. This poses a problem for explanations of hypnotic 
analgesia purely in terms of attentional mechanisms, and more likely indicates that the 
mechanisms that underlie hypnotic analgesia are suggestion specific (Patterson & Jensen, 
2003; Price, 1999). EEG studies do imply some role for attentional processes in hypnotic 
suggestibility, however the nature of this relationship is unclear (Jamieson 8c Sheehan,
2002).
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6.1.3.2. Somatasensory event-related potentials
Somatosensory event-related potentials (SERPs) have been shown to be important 
indicators of pain, and have yielded some interesting findings (Crawford, Knebel, Kaplan, 
Vendemia, Xie, Jameson & Pribram 1998). For example, the late components of pain- 
associated ERP amplitudes (300-400 ms after stimulation) have been found to correlate 
positively with reported pain intensity and perceived pain level (e.g. Chen, Chapman & 
Harkins, 1979; Danziger, Fournier, Bouhassira, Michaud, De Broucker, Santarcangelo,
Carli, Chertock 8c Wilier, 1998). SERPs, which have been used as an index of pain, have 
shown reductions during hypnotic analgesia (e.g. Arendt-Nielsen, Zachariae 8c Bjerring, 
1990; Crawford, 1994; De Pascalis, Magurano, Bellusci, 1999; Spiegel, Bierre 8c Rootenberg, 
1989; Zachariae 8c Bjerring, 1994). However, some studies have not found this reduction 
(e.g. Meier, Klucken, Soyka 8c Bromm, 1993). Patterson and Jensen (2003) conclude that 
although SERP studies demonstrate an effect of suggested analgesia on a physiological 
response that is associated with pain intensity and is not under conscious control, they say 
very little concerning the actual physiological substrates of hypnotic analgesia.
6.1.3.3. Positron emission tomography (PET) studies
More, recently, studies using PET have helped identify the physiological correlates of 
hypnotic analgesia (e.g. Faymonville et al., 2000; Hofbauer et al., 2001; Rainville et al.,
1997). In a seminal study, Rainville et al., (1997) used PET scans to investigate the brain 
activity of 8 high suggestibles exposed to hot water pain prior, during and after hypnotically 
suggested modulation of pain unpleasantness. The pattern of activations in response to hot 
water pain prior to suggested analgesia, involved anterior cingulate cortex, somatosensory 
cortex and rostral insula, all areas that have been shown by previous neuropsychological 
work to be associated with pain (Oakley & Halligan, 2005). Hypnotically induced suggested 
analgesia related changes for the affective component of pain were directly related to 
changes in anterior cingulate cortex, but not changes in the primary somatosensory cortex. 
Indicating that the anterior cingulate cortex could be the key brain area responsible for
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modulating the experience of pain affect. In a follow-up study, Hofbauer et al., (2001) 
replicated the Rainville et al., (1997) study but this time used hypnotic suggestions for the 
modulation of pain intensity rather than pain affect. This time hypnotically induced 
analgesia related changes for the sensory component of pain, were directly related to the 
primary somatosensory cortex, with no significant modulation of activity in the anterior 
cingulate cortex. These studies show that direct suggestions for analgesia can produce clear 
and predictable changes in brain areas related to the modulation of pain affect (producing 
changes in the limbic system) and pain intensity (inhibition nociceptive signals arriving at 
the somatosensory cortex) -  see also Oakley 8c Halligan (2005); Price (1996, 1999).
6.1.3.4. Spinal mechanisms
There is some evidence that the general mechanism that may underlie hypnotic analgesia is 
an inhibitory system that modulates nociceptive signals at the level of the spinal chord. 
Endogenous opiates have been shown to rely heavily for their analgesic effects on a 
descending spinal chord inhibitory mechanism (Price, 1996, 1999). Two studies have 
investigated whether endogenous opiates mediate hypnotic analgesia (Barber 8c Mayer,
1977; Goldstein 8c Hilgard, 1975). In both studies, pain thresholds increased in response to 
hypnotic suggestions for analgesia, however when nalaxone hydrochloride (an opiate 
antagonist) was introduced following hypnotic analgesia, the pain thresholds remained 
unaffected. These results indicate that endogenous opioids may not be responsible for 
hypnotic analgesia, however, research in this area is somewhat lacking, with only two studies 
investigating the role of endogenous opioids, and it is evident that more research is required 
before a definitive conclusion can be made regarding an opiate descending control 
mechanism (Price, 1996, 1999)
More recently, the involvement of descending inhibitory controls during hypnotic analgesia 
has been investigated using a measure of spinal nociceptive function -  the spinal nociceptive 
(R-III) reflex (e.g. Danziger et al., 1998; Kiernan, Dane, Philips 8c Price, 1995). Kiernan et 
al., (1995) found the nociceptive reflex (R-III) to be significantly correlated with suggestions
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for analgesia, although the activation of descending spinal modulation accounted for only a 
portion of the reduction of pain during hypnosis. In a subsequent study, Danziger et al., 
(1998) using similar methodology to Kiernan et al., (1998) found that 61% of the highly 
suggestible participants in their study showed a strong inhibition, and 39% of participants 
showed strong facilitation of the R-III reflex with hypnosis, therefore the activation of 
descending spinal modulation was only demonstrated in a sub-group of high suggestibles. 
Both studies indicate that although many highly suggestible individuals show a significant 
change in R-III reflex in response to hypnotic analgesia suggestions, the activation of 
descending spinal modulation does not appear to be the only mechanism that underlies 
hypnotic analgesia (De Benedittis, 2003)
6.1.3.5. Sensory vs. affective components
The notion that suggested hypnotic analgesia has differential effects on ‘sensory’ and 
‘affective’ components of pain has been addressed by several studies (see Hilgard 8c Hilgard, 
1994 for review). In one of the earlier studies, Price and Barber (1987), reported that both 
components were reduced following suggestions for hypnotic analgesia. However, the mean 
reduction in affective pain was much larger and consistent compared to the reduction in 
sensory pain. They found a small but statistically significant correlation between hypnotic 
suggestibility and sensory ratings of pain, but not affective ratings. Early studies in this area 
indicated that suggested hypnotic analgesia has a greater effect on affective dimensions of 
pain due possibly to their cognitive component, as opposed to the sensory dimensions, 
which possibly were more directly associated with the intensity of a noxious input.
However, a recent unique and influential study by Rainville, Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell 
and Duncan (1999) aimed to clarify the relationship between suggested hypnotic analgesia 
and the affective and sensory dimensions of pain that had been identified in the 
neuroimaging studies reviewed above. Rainville et al., (1999) conducted two experiments, 
one in which suggestions were selectively targeted toward altering the affective­
unpleasantness dimension of pain, and another in which suggestions were selectively
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targeted toward altering the sensory-intensity dimension of pain. In the first experiment, 
pain affect-unpleasantness was significantly modulated (i.e. increased or decreased), with no 
corresponding changes in pain sensation-intensity. In the second experiment, pain 
sensation-intensity was also significantly modulated, however, this time pain affect- 
unpleasantness was modulated in parallel. Hypnotic suggestibility was significantly 
correlated with pain affect-unpleasantness modulation in the first experiment, and with 
pain sensation-intensity in the second experiment.
Unlike previous studies, Rainville et al., (1999) demonstrated that hypnotic suggestions 
could selectively modulate the affective and the sensory dimensions pain. These results also 
have implications on the direction of causation between sensory and affective dimensions, 
indicated that although hypnotic suggestibility appears to be associated with reductions in 
pain affect when suggestions are solely targeted at the affective component of pain, it is not 
associated with pain affect, when pain affect is reduced in parallel as a consequence of pain 
intensity (Price, 1999) This recent evidence does not support the notion that hypnotic 
analgesia effects affective pain to a greater extent than sensory pain, and emphasises the 
importance of the wording of suggestions for analgesia (see also De Pascalis et al., 2001)
6.1.3.6. Summary
Investigations about the psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms and correlates 
of hypnotic analgesia strongly indicate the existence of multiple factors and mechanisms 
(Price, 1996, 1999). Research indicates that high suggestibles show different behavioural, 
subjective and cortical responding than low suggestibles. Both EEG and SERP studies 
indicate that physiological inhibitory processes may be involved in hypnotic analgesia. The 
recent influential work of Rainville and colleagues demonstrates that different dimensions 
of pain can be selectively modulated, with modulations of pain affect showing 
corresponding changes in the anterior cingulate cortex, whilst modulations of pain 
sensation showing corresponding changes in the somatasensory cortex. There is also
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evidence that hypnotic analgesia may also involve to a certain extent descending spinal 
chord inhibitory mechanisms.
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of research on hypnotic analgesia (as well as hypnosis in 
general) is that the effects of hypnosis and suggestion are not considered separately. In 
nearly all documented evidence, it is difficult to know to what extent ‘hypnosis* was 
involved, and whether suggestions for analgesia alone, or suggestions for analgesia in a 
hypnotic context would have produced similar effects. The lack of non-hypnotic control 
conditions in much of the research prevents any clear conclusions regarding the relative 
effect of hypnotic versus non-hypnotic suggestions for analgesia. Moreover, most laboratory 
studies have specifically pre-selected high and low suggestible participants, and some have 
argued that little can be concluded regarding the importance of suggestibility, if medium 
suggestibles, which make up the majority of population, are not included in studies (e.g. 
Kirsch 8c Lynn, 1995).
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that points to greater analgesia in response to 
suggestions following a hypnotic induction, particularly in the few studies that have 
employed a repeated-measures design, with participants receiving the same suggestions with 
and without prior induction of hypnosis (e.g. Hilgard, Macdonald, Morgan & Johnson,
1978; Jacobs, Kurtz & Strube, 1995; Malone, Kurtz, & Strube, 1989; Stacher, Schuster,
Bauer, Lahoda, Schulze, 1975). Based on decades of both experimental as well as clinical 
observations, it seems reasonable to claim that hypnotic inductions can at least facilitate the 
analgesia produced by suggestions (Barber, 1996; Barber 8c Adrian, 1982). Although, 
hypnotic inductions per se are not necessary for the elicitation of hypnotic phenomena (e.g. 
Barber 8c Calverley, 1964, 1965), it is important to keep in mind that the effect of the 
induction of hypnosis on suggestibility is substantial, comparable to psychological 
treatments in general and medical outcomes (see Chapter 3).
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6.1.4. Study objectives
The consideration raised so far indicates that multiple factors within the psychosocial 
context of hypnotic procedures as well the experiences of participants may explain why 
hypnotic inductions facilitate responsiveness to suggestions for pain modulation. Study 2 
investigated the effects of two of these factors, namely absorption and reduced critical 
thought, on suggestibility and demonstrated that instructions for both facilitated suggested 
responding over and above that produced by the hypnotic context. The findings provide 
some support for the view that absorption and reduced critical thought are important 
components of hypnosis.
The current study aimed to examine a wider range of potential relationships between 
absorption and reduced critical thought in relation to suggestibility, by assessing suggestions 
for pain modulation. There is evidence to indicate that there are ceiling effects for hypnotic 
suggestions for pain reduction (Kiernan et al., 1995; Rainville et al., 1999), and consequently 
suggestions designed to modulate pain in both directions were used, which has been an 
approach adopted by several researchers (Ardent-Nielsen et al., 1990; Kiernan et al., 1995; 
Meier et al., 1993; Rainville et al., 1999). A similar method to that used in Study 2 and by 
Rainville et al., (1999) was employed. In addition, the current study aimed to investigate the 
association between pain modulation and hypnotic suggestibility. High hypnotically 
suggestible participants (HHSp), medium hypnotically suggestible participants (MHSp) and 
low hypnotically suggestible participants (LHSp) received a pain stimulus twice in a non­
hypnotic context, in the absence of any formal instructions or mention of hypnosis; and 
twice in a hypnotic context, following standard relaxation (RX condition), relaxation plus 
absorption (ABS condition) or relaxation plus reduced critical thought instructions (RCT 
condition). Before and during each pain stimulus all participants received suggestions for 
either an increase in pain or suggestions for a decrease in pain. Pain intensity and pain 
unpleasantness ratings were obtained during each pain stimulus. Levels of absorption, 
critical thought and relaxation were also measured.
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The current study also addressed some of the recommendations made in the previous 
chapter for improvements. In contrast to Study 2, absorption and critical thought were 
measured in the non-hypnotic context, as well as the hypnotic context, thus controlling for 
variability in non-hypnotic levels of absorption and critical thought and allowing a more 
systematic examination of the effect of these factors. In Study 2 ratings for absorption and 
critical thought were in the ‘either-or’ format, which were deemed inadequate as they may 
mask important differences in individual responses and may not cover an adequate range. 
Moreover, ratings were for each suggestion, which was heavily dependent on very accurate 
long-term memory. Consequently absorption and critical thought, in the current study, 
were measured using visual analogue scales to assess the subtle variations in responses, and 
overall ratings for responses to pain modulation suggestions in both non-hypnotic and 
hypnotic contexts as whole were taken, as opposed to ratings for each suggestion. Another 
limitation of Study 2 concerned the scale used to measure critical thought, which appeared 
to address extraneous rather than critical thought. Due to this the descriptors and wording 
for the visual analogue scale used to measure critical thought in this study explicitly referred 
to only ‘critical’ and ‘analytical’ thought. In addition, the current study also incorporated a 
measure of ‘typicality’ to assess how ‘authentic’ the hypnotic inductions were perceived to 
be, as well an assessment of participants’ awareness of hypnosis before, during and after the 
experiment.
Based on the results of Study 2, it was hypothesised that change in responses to suggestions 
for pain modulation would be significantly greater when instructions for absorption or 
reduced critical thought were given, compared with instructions for relaxation alone. In line 
with the data reviewed above, it was also expected that HHSp would show a greater increase 
in responses to pain modulation suggestions following a hypnotic induction, compared to 
LHSp and MHSp.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1. Design
In contrast to Study 2, this study used suggestions for pain modulation as the dependent 
variable rather than items from standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales. The use of 
suggestions not reflected in these scales enabled the stratification of participants on the basis 
of their previously measured hypnotic susceptibility (before being assigned randomly to 
experimental/control groups), whilst still maintaining naivety concerning hypnosis and 
hypnotic procedures (see also chapter 5, section 5.2.1, for design considerations) This 
allowed the systematic examination of the association between hypnotic suggestibility and 
pain modulation. This study is the second of a series of experiments aimed to establish the 
effects of hypnosis and hypnotic procedures on suggestibility. The study did not attempt to 
investigate the effect of suggestion for pain modulation on pain per se, and consequently 
ratings of pain without suggestion were not obtained.
The effect of suggestions for pain increase and pain decrease was tested in a 3 x 3 x 2 
(condition x hypnotic suggestibility x context) between-within design. Participants in each 
of the three experimental conditions (RX vs. ABS vs. RCT) received a pain stimulus twice in 
a non-hypnotic context (SAp first suggestibility assessment) and twice in a hypnotic context 
(SA2: second suggestibility assessment). Before and during each pain stimulus, participants 
received suggestions either for increase in pain or suggestions for decrease in pain. 
Suggestions within each context were counterbalanced, i.e. participants received both 
suggestions for increase and decrease in pain, in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts. 
However, the order of non-hypnotic and hypnotic assessments of pain modulation were not 
counterbalanced as recommended by Braffman and Kirsch (1999), and in line with the 
methodology used in Study 2.
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6.2.2. Participants
In all 105 participants (48 males & 57 females) pre-selected for high, medium and low levels 
of hypnotic suggestibility, took part in this study. All participants were undergraduate 
university students, with the majority being medical or psychology students recruited from 
University College London. The age of participants ranged from 18-28, with a mean age of 
20.70 years (SD = 2.00). The assessment of hypnotic suggestibility was carried out 
independently up to five years prior to the present study, using the Harvard Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS-A: Shor & Orne, 1962). Participants were 
designated as: high hypnotically suggestible participants (HHSp) if behavioural scores were 
£ 9 and subjective scores were 2: 32 on the HGSHS-A; medium hypnotically suggestible 
participants (MHSp) if behavioural scores were between 5-8 and subjective scores were 
between 17-31; and low hypnotically suggestible participants (LHSp) if behavioural scores 
were ^  4 and subjective scores were ^16 . Participants were randomly assigned to conditions 
with the restriction that there were at least 10 HHSp, 10 MHSp, and 10 LHSp in each of the 
following three conditions: RX (N=35, 11 high, 10 medium, 14 low); ABS (N=35, 10 high, 
14 medium, 11 low); or RCT (N=35, 10 high, 13 medium, 12 low).
Great care was taken to ensure that participants had no knowledge that the investigators or
experiment was related to hypnosis (see Procedure, section 6.2.6, for the questions 
participants were asked to respond to concerning the possible knowledge of the hypnosis 
component). The experimenters remained blind to the level of hypnotic suggestibility of all 
participants throughout the study and no mention of hypnosis or hypnotic suggestibility 
was made at any other time other than explicitly specified in the experimental conditions. 
Participants were contacted by telephone or e-mail and informed that their name had been 
selected from a large subject pool used in psychological research, and then were invited to 
participate in a study investigating ‘the influence of state and context on thought, behaviour 
and pain’. The joint UCL/UCLH Committee on the Ethics of Human Research approved
this study; informed consent was obtained from all participants.
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6.2.3. Stimulation
Pain was produced by immersion of the hand up to the wrist in circulating water for 1 
minute. The temperature of the water was adjusted individually, pre-experimentally, to 
produce pain intensity ratings > 40/100 at a level (45.0-47.5°C) that the participant could 
tolerate for the complete 1 minute stimulation (Rainville et al., 1999). Stimulation 
alternated between hands during the whole experiment, with half of the participants 
beginning with their right hand, and half with their left hand. The minimum inter-stimulus 
interval for a given hand was 5 minutes (Rainville et al., 1999).
6.2.4. Hypnotic inductions and pain modulation suggestions
Both instructions for establishing a hypnotic context after SAj, and the three induction 
conditions used each consisting of initial relaxation instructions plus additional instruction 
for either relaxation (RX condition), absorption (ABS condition) and reduced critical 
thought (RCT condition) are described in Chapter 5, section 5.2.3 (instructions for 
relaxation, absorption and reduced critical thought presented in full in Appendix 5.4). 
Direct suggestions to modulate pain in both directions -  suggestions for pain increase and 
suggestions for pain decrease (pain modulation suggestions presented in Appendix 6.1) - 
were adapted from Rainville et al., (1999). However, in contrast to the indirect suggestions 
to selectively modulate different dimensions of pain used by Rainville et al., (1999), 
suggestions used in this study were direct suggestions for pain modulation, and did not 
selectively target sensory or affective components of pain (see Introduction, section 6.1.3.5). 
All instructions and suggestions were recorded onto audio compact disc to maximise 
experimental control.
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6.2.5. Measures
6.2.5.1. Pain ratings
Following the methodology of Rainville et al., (1999) participants gave separate numerical 
ratings (0-100) of the maximum pain intensity and pain unpleasantness experienced during 
each stimulation, with the emphasis that ratings should reflect what they actually felt during 
the stimulation, irrespective of what was suggested before or during the stimulation. 
Therefore, an intensity and unpleasantness rating following each suggestion for pain increase 
(increase-intensity\ |INT; increase-unpleasantness:l\\JN'P) and each suggestion for pain 
decrease {decrease-intensity.[INT; decrease-unpleasantnessjU N P), was recorded for every 
participant (pain score sheet presented in Appendix 6.2).
The distinction between pain intensity and pain unpleasantness was explained before each 
experiment, using separate visual analogue scales (VAS) (Price, McGrath, Rafii 8c 
Buckingham, 1983; Rainville et al., 1999). For the intensity scale ‘O’ was defined as ‘not at all 
intense’ and ‘100’ was designated as ‘the most intense pain sensation imaginable’. For the 
unpleasantness scale, ‘0’ was defined as ‘not at all unpleasant,’ and ‘100’ denoted ‘the most 
unpleasant pain imaginable’ (pain intensity and unpleasantness scales presented in 
Appendix 6.3). The descriptors ‘Burning’. ‘Scalding’, ‘Stinging’, ‘Cutting’ and ‘Tingling’ 
were added to the pain intensity VAS, to emphasise the sensory dimension of pain. Whilst, 
the descriptors ‘Troublesome’, ‘Bothersome’, ‘Annoying’, and ‘Irritating’ were added to the 
pain unpleasantness VAS, to clarify the affective dimension of pain (Hofbauer et al., 2001; 
Morin 8c Bushnell, 1998; Rainville et al., 1999). To avoid ceiling effects, participants were 
instructed that ratings could be below ‘0’ or above ‘100’ if lower or larger values were 
needed to describe sensations relative to previous ratings (Rainville et al., 1999). Participants 
were instructed to keep their eyes closed and visualise the scales when giving their numerical 
ratings for each stimulation (Rainville et al., 1999).
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6.2.5.2. Absorption, critical thought and relaxation
Absorption, critical thought and relaxation were assessed following SA, (non-hypnotic 
context) and SA2 (hypnotic context). Absorption scores were obtained by asking 
participants to mark on a VAS (0 = not at all absorbed; as distracted as I can be; 100 = 
completely absorbed; as focussed as I can be), how absorbed they were during the instructions 
for pain modulation. A high rating indicated that the participant was highly absorbed or 
focussed, whilst a low rating inferred that the participant found it difficult to become 
absorbed or focus their attention.
Critical thought scores were obtained by asking participants to mark on a VAS (0 = very few  
critical/analytical thoughts; 100 = lots o f critical/analytical thoughts), how many critical or 
analytical thoughts they had during the instructions for pain modulation. A high score 
indicated that the participant thought critically about the suggestions, whereas a low score 
inferred that the participant had little or no critical thoughts and did not critically analyse. 
Relaxation scores were also measured by asking participants to mark a VAS (0 = as un­
relaxed as I can be; 100 = as relaxed as I can be). (VASs for absorption, critical thought and 
relaxation are presented in Appendix 6.4.)
6.2.6. Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room, which had no link with hypnosis 
research. Upon arrival they were informed about the nature of the pain stimulus and were 
given an information sheet, which explained that the experiment was designed to investigate 
‘the influence of state and context on thought, behaviour and pain’. Any reference to 
hypnosis was strictly avoided. The information sheet emphasised that participants were free 
to withdraw from the study at any point, without having to give a reason. After written 
consent was given, the temperature of the water was adjusted individually in pre- 
experimental trials to gauge a suitable pain stimulus for each participant for the actual 
experiment (see section 6.2.3). Subsequently, participants were presented with the first
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assessment of suggestibility for pain modulation (SA^. After scoring SAj and the 
measurement of levels of absorption/critical thought/relaxation, a hypnotic context was 
explicitly established. Participants were informed that the remaining part of the study would 
be similar in content to the part they had completed, however the second part would follow 
the induction of hypnosis. At this point participants were not aware that hypnosis was 
relevant to the experiment and therefore were given an explicit opportunity to withdraw 
from the study. All participants were then given standard progressive relaxation 
instructions, plus additional instructions for either relaxation or absorption or reduced 
critical thought depending on which experimental condition that had been assigned to. The 
second assessment of suggestibility for pain modulation (SA2) was then presented and levels 
of absorption/critical thought/relaxation were measured for the second time. At the end of 
the session participants were asked to respond to a set of questions that asked what they 
thought the experiment was about: i) before they arrived at the testing session; ii) after the first 
set of suggestions for pain modulation; and iii) after the second set of suggestions for pain 
modulation (the post-experimental questionnaire comprised of these questions is presented 
in Appendix 6.5). Finally, participants were asked to mark on a VAS how typical of hypnosis 
they thought the induction they received was (0 = not at all typical of hypnosis; 100 = 
completely typical o f hypnosis); and how hypnotised they felt following the hypnotic 
induction (0 = not at all hypnotised; 100 = completely hypnotised)
6.2.7. Statistical analyses
SPSS for Mac OS X (version 11.0) was used for the analyses of data. The effects of Condition 
and Hypnotic Suggestibility on each pain measure (i.e.fINT;tUNP; jINT; jUNP) were 
tested using a 3 x 3 x 2 (condition x hypnotic suggestibility x context) between-within 
analyses of covariance (ANCOVA), taking pain modulation scores at SA! as the covariate. 
Comparison of the means were carried out by Fisher’s protected least significant difference 
(LSD) test, to determine differences between: (i) conditions and (ii) level of hypnotic 
suggestibility, with regard to each measure of pain. Paired-samples Student’s t-test were
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carried out to compare scores for responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions in a non­
hypnotic context (SA,) with scores in a hypnotic context (SA2), with respects to Condition 
and Hypnotic Suggestibility. As in Study 2, a rejection region with at least a value of p < 0.05 
was selected and used throughout (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
6.3. Results
Naivety concerning the experiment involving hypnosis and hypnotic procedures was 
maintained throughout the study for almost all participants. However, three participants 
from the Absorption condition (1 HHSp & 2 LHSp); one participant from the Relaxation 
condition (a HHSp); and one participant from the RCT condition (a LHSp) reported that 
the experiment might have been related to hypnosis after the first assessment of 
suggestibility for pain modulation (SA,). Means and correlations were calculated for both 
the full sample and sub-sample of participants who reported no awareness or suspicion that 
the study concerned hypnosis. The patterns of means and correlations were virtually 
identical for the two data sets, so analyses of the full sample are reported here.
Means and standard deviations of responses to suggestions for pain increase and pain 
decrease, in non-hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts, are presented in Table 6.1, 
Table 6.2, Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. As an important part of the analyses, quantification of 
the effect of condition on responsiveness to suggestions for pain modulation was calculated 
(see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The data was screened for univariate and multivariate outliers. The 
data was normally distributed, with no skewness and kurtosis values exceeding standardised 
scores of ± 3.29 (p < .001, two-tailed test). Mahalanobis distances (critical values, x2(8)= 
26.125, p < .001) were calculated and no cases were found to have Mahalanobis distances 
greater than the critical value, demonstrating the absence of multivariate outliers. The effect 
of side stimulated and any possible interactions were non-significant (ps > .10). This factor 
was dropped from analyses and data were averaged across hands.
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Table 6.1. Mean (standard deviation) responses to suggestions for pain  increase in both non-hypnotic
(SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts
Suggestions 
for Pain
RX ABS RCT
Increase & 
Hypnotic 
Suggestibility
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
Overall
TINT
HHSp 70.46
(9.34)
70.91
(10.68) 0.05
71.10
(11.08)
75.20
(10.15) 0.41
67.00
(11.11)
66.50
(10.29) -0.05
70.29
(9.75)
MHSp 56.70
(8.69)
62.20
(7.86) 0.70
54.86
(9.58)
66.21
(10.73) 1.16
56.54
(9.68)
55.77
(9.32) -0.08
58.84
(8.52)
LHSp 47.86
(9.94)
48.43
(11.76) 0.05
43.64
(10.27)
45.00
(8.37) 0.15
41.25
(9.32)
38.08
(10.02) -0.34
44.53
(9.32)
Overall 57.71
(13.67)
59.20
(13.70) 0.11
55.97
(14.69)
62.97
(14.94) 0.48
54.43
(14.13)
52.77
(15.04) -0.12
fUNP
HHSp 61.82
(10.31)
64.09
(10.91) 0.22
66.70
(10.00)
70.70
(9.51) 0.43
61.00
(1174)
60.00
(10.54) -0.09
64.02
(10.48)
MHSp 51.50
(9.73)
57.50
(8.90) 0.68
50.50
(9.74)
61.21
(11.98) 1.02
50.77
(9.97)
50.15
(10.34) -0.06
53.59
(9.10)
LHSp 40.00
(8.99)
37.93
(9.47) -0.23
38.64
(8.97)
42.09
(9.75) 0.39
42.50
(9.17)
41.17
(9.30) -0.15
40.31
(7.72)
Overall 50.14
(13.20)
51.74
(15.10) 0.11
51.40
(14.43)
57.91
(15.50) 0.44
50.86
(12.40)
49.89
(12.33) -0.08
Note.
|INT ratings are intensity ratings (0 = not at all intense; 100 = the most intense pain imaginable) for each 
suggestion for pain increase. |U N P  ratings are unpleasantness ratings (0 = not at all unpleasant; 100 = the 
most unpleasant pain imaginable) for each suggestion for pain increase
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Figure 6.1. Mean (standard error) intensity and unpleasantness ratings following suggestions for pain
increase, for the relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS) and reduced critical thought (RCT) conditions
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Table 6.2. Mean (standard deviation) responses to suggestions for pain  decrease in both non-hypnotic
(SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts
Suggestions 
for Pain
RX ABS RCT
Decrease & 
Hypnotic 
Suggestibility
SA, sa 2 Effect
Size
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
Overall
iINT
HHSp 25.09
(10.50)
23.18
(11.02) 0.19
21.20
(9.94)
17.50
(9.66) 0.40
21.20
(9.72)
21.50
(10.81) -0.03
21.69
(9.91)
MHSp 40.30
(8.55)
34.30
(8.19) 0.76
39.64
(10.65)
24.71
(11.17) 1.42
36.15
(10.83)
35.39
(9.23) 0.08
34.82
(8.99)
LHSp 33.50
(9.84)
36.43
(11.31) -0.29
34.27
(9.74)
37.00
(10.05) -0.29
34.17
(10.41)
35.83
(11.48) -0.16
35.18
(9.35)
Overall 32.80
(11.17)
31.66
(11.78) 0.10
33.54
(12.77)
25.66
(12.01) 0.64
31.20
(11.97)
31.57
(11.87) -0.03
JUNP
HHSp 26.46
(9.31)
23.91
(10.05) 0.28
30.10
(11.56)
25.30
(1129) 0.44
25.70
(10.08)
25.50
(11.41) 0.02
26.13
(9.82)
MHSp 42.00
(8.88)
34.50
(9.56) 0.86
40.71
(10.16)
26.50
(10.04) 1.46
38.92
(9.25)
38.77
(10.58) 0.02
36.70
(8.87)
LHSp 32.43
(9.09)
32.64
(8.99) -0.02
34.36
(9.24)
32.27
(9.04) 0.24
33.75
(9.32)
34.58
(10.76) -0.09
33.30
(8.58)
Overall 33.29
(10.76)
30.43
(10.27) 0.28
35.69
(10.96)
27.97
(10.26) 0.74
33.37
(10.69)
33.54
(11.89) -0.02
Note.
JINT ratings are intensity ratings (0 = not at all intense; 100 = the most intense pain imaginable) for each 
suggestion for pain decrease. JUNP ratings are unpleasantness ratings (0 = not at all unpleasant; 100 = the 
most unpleasant pain imaginable) for each suggestion for pain decrease. A decrease in pain ratings from 
SA, to SA2) following suggestions for pain decrease, is actually an increase in responsiveness to suggestion.
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Figure 6.2. Mean (standard error) intensity and unpleasantness ratings following suggestions for pain
decrease, for the relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS) and reduced critical thought (RCT) conditions
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6.3.1. Suggestions for pain increase: intensity ( f INT)
The ANCOVA for flN T ratings evidenced a main effect for Condition [F (2 95) = 11.779, p  < 
0.001] and Hypnotic Suggestibility [F (295) = 13.861, p  < 0.001]. The interaction between 
Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non-significant. The main effect for Condition 
revealed that change in |IN T  ratings from SA, to SA2 was significantly different between: (i) 
ABS and RX conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.05]; (ii) ABS and RCT conditions [LSD test, p  < 
0.001] and (iii) RX and RCT conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.025]. The main effect for Hypnotic 
Suggestibility revealed that the change in ] INT ratings was significantly different between:
(i) HHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p  < 0.001]; and (ii) MHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p  < 0.001]. 
The difference in flN T ratings change between HHSp and MHSp was not significant.
There were no significant differences in flN T ratings for Condition at SA,. Paired samples 
t-tests indicated that flN T ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly increased only for the ABS 
condition [t(34) = 4.385, p  < 0.001]. No significant differences in flN T from SA, to SA2were 
found for either the RX or RCT conditions. With respect to Hypnotic Suggestibility, there 
were significant differences in flN T ratings at SA,. Post-hoc comparisons of the means 
(LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that flN T ratings at SA, were significantly greater for 
HHSp compared to MHSp, which in turn were significantly greater than LHSp. Paired- 
samples t-tests indicated that |IN T  ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly increased only for 
MHSp [t{36) = 3.728, p  < 0.001]. No significant differences in flNT from SA, to SA2were 
found for either HHSp or LHSp.
6.3.2. Suggestions for pain increase: unpleasantness (fUNP)
The ANCOVA for fUNP ratings revealed a main effect for Condition [F (2 95) = 7.137, p  < 
0.001] and Hypnotic Suggestibility [F (295) = 10.334, p  < 0.001]. The interaction between 
Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non-significant. The main effect for Condition 
revealed that change in fUNP ratings from SA, to SA2 was significantly different between:
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(i) ABS and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.025]; and (ii) ABS and RCT conditions [LSD 
test,p < 0.001]. The difference in fUNP ratings change between the RX and RCT 
conditions was non-significant. The main effect for Hypnotic Suggestibility revealed that 
change in fUNP ratings was significantly different between: (i) HHSp and LHSp [LSD test, 
p < 0.001]; and (ii) MHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p < 0.001]. The difference in |U N P ratings 
change between HHSp and MHSp was not significant.
There were no significant differences in |U N P ratings for Condition at SA,. Paired samples 
t-tests indicated that fUNP ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly increased for the ABS 
condition [ t(34) = 3.972, p < 0.001]. No significant differences in |U N P from SA, to SA2 
were found for either the RCT or RX conditions. Concerning Hypnotic Suggestibility, there 
were significant differences in fUNP ratings at SA,. Post-hoc comparisons of the means 
(LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that fUNP ratings at SA, were significantly greater for 
HHSp compared to MHSp, which in turn were significantly greater than LHSp. Paired- 
samples t-tests indicated that f UNP ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly increased for 
MHSp [ t(36) = 3.125, p < 0.01] and approached significance for HHSp [ t (30) = 1.931, p = 
0.063]. No significant difference in fUNP from SA, to SA2 was found for LHSp.
6.3.3. Suggestions for pain decrease: intensity ( i  INT)
The ANCOVA for jIN T ratings revealed a main effect for Condition [F {2 95) = 9.124, p < 
0.001]; and Hypnotic Suggestibility [F (2 95) = 9.397, p < 0.001]. The interaction between 
Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non-significant. The main effect for Condition 
revealed that change in JINT ratings from SA, to SA2 was significantly different between: (i) 
ABS and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.01]; and (ii) ABS and RCT conditions [LSD test, p 
< 0.001]. The difference in jIN T ratings change between the RX and RCT conditions was 
not significant. The main effect for Hypnotic Suggestibility revealed that change in j INT 
ratings was significantly different between: (i) HHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p < 0.01]; and
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(ii) MHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p < 0.001]. The difference in JINT ratings change between 
HHSp and MHSp was not significant.
There were no significant differences in [INT ratings for Condition at SA,. Paired samples 
t-tests indicated that JINT ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly decreased for the ABS 
condition [ t(34) = -4.765, p < 0.001]. No significant differences in JINT ratings from SA, to 
SA2 were found for either RX or RCT conditions. In relation to Hypnotic Suggestibility, 
there were significant differences in JINT ratings at SA,. Post-hoc comparisons of the 
means (LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that JINT ratings at SA, were significantly lower 
for HHSp compared to MHSp and LHSp. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that JINT ratings 
from SA, to SA2 significantly decreased for MHSp [ t(36) = -4.349, p < 0.001] and HHSp [ t(30) 
= -2.088, p < 0.05]. No significant difference in JINT from SA, to SA2 was found for LHSp.
6.3.4. Suggestions for pain decrease: unpleasantness ( jUNP)
The ANCOVA for JUNP ratings revealed a main effect for Condition [F (295) = 7.374, p < 
0.001]; and Hypnotic Suggestibility [F (295) = 4.945, p < 0.01]. The interaction between 
Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non-significant. The main effect for Condition 
revealed that change in JUNP ratings from SA, to SA2 was significantly different between:
(i) ABS and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.05]; (ii) ABS and RCT conditions [LSD test, p < 
0.001]. The difference in JUNP ratings change between RX and RCT conditions was not 
significant. The main effect for Hypnotic Suggestibility revealed that change in JUNP 
ratings was significantly different between: (i) HHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p < 0.05]; and
(ii) MHSp and LHSp [LSD test, p < 0.01]. The difference in JUNP ratings change between 
HHSp and MHSp was not significant.
There were no significant differences in JUNP ratings for Condition at SA,. Paired samples 
t-tests indicated that JUNP ratings from SA, to SA2 significantly decreased for the ABS 
condition [ t(34) = -4.756, p < 0.001] and the RX [ t(34) = -2.473, p < 0.025]. No significant 
difference in JUNP was found for the RCT condition. Regarding Hypnotic Suggestibility,
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there were significant differences in JUNP ratings at SA,. Post-hoc comparisons of the 
means (LSD test, p < 0.05) indicated that jU N P ratings at SA, were significantly lower for 
HHSp compared to MHSp and LHSp. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that JUNP ratings 
from SA, to SA2 significantly decreased for MHSp [ t{36) = -4.065, p < 0.001] and HHSp [ t(30) 
= -2.112, p < 0.05]. No significant difference in JUNP from SA, to SA2 was found for LHSp.
6.3.5. Absorption, critical thought and relaxation
Means and standard deviations of self-reported relaxation, absorption and critical thought 
are presented in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3. All ratings were measured in relation to both non­
hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic contexts (SA2). Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
performed to measure whether self-ratings of absorption, critical thought and relaxation 
predicted flNT, fUNP, JINT and JUNP measures of hypnotic responsiveness to pain 
modulation suggestions (SA2). Hypnotic response ratings (SA2) were entered as the 
dependent variable. Non-hypnotic response ratings, Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility 
were used as covariates and entered in block 1. Change in absorption, critical thought and 
relaxation scores (i.e. change between non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts) were entered in 
block 2 in stepwise fashion. Stepwise regression was used, as the IVs used in these analyses 
could not be assigned theoretical importance with regard responsiveness to pain 
modulation suggestions.
Non-hypnotic flN T ratings, Hypnotic Suggestibility and self-reported Absorption all 
significantly predicted hypnotic t INT ratings, with variance associated with the other 
variables controlled (non-hypnotic responses: P = 0.574, p < 0.001; hypnotic suggestibility:
P = 0.261, p < 0.01; absorption: p = 0.218, p  < 0.001). Together these variables accounted 
for 69.4% of the variance in hypnotic responses, with absorption uniquely accounting for 
4.6% of the variance in hypnotic f INT ratings. Condition, relaxation ratings and critical 
thought ratings did not significantly predict change in flN T ratings.
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Table 6.3. Mean (standard deviations) ratings for relaxation, absorption and critical thought in non­
hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts
Rating
Condition
Relaxation Absorption Critical Thought
SA, sa2 SA, sa2 SA, sa2
RX 70.76
(15.72)
82.07
(16.59)
67.24
(17.56)
72.34
(19.16)
37.39
(23.48)
30.66
(22.70)
ABS 71.57
(13.86)
83.69
(14.74)
66.31
(14.48)
80.76
(12.47)
36.09
(21.25)
21.59
(17.21)
RCT 70.16
(19.44)
82.05
(17.05)
64.91
(15.66)
71.61
(16.37)
33.61
(23.54)
34.64
(27.05)
Note.
Relaxation, Absorption and Critical Thought ratings were rated out of 100.
A similar pattern of results was found for |U N P ratings, with non-hypnotic |U N P ratings, 
Hypnotic Suggestibility and self-reported Absorption all significantly predicted hypnotic 
fUNP ratings, with variance associated with the other variables controlled (non-hypnotic 
responses: (3 = 0.566, p  < 0.001; hypnotic suggestibility: (3 = 0.205, p  < 0.025; absorption: (3 = 
0.291, p  < 0.001). Together these variables accounted for 65.2% of the variance in hypnotic 
responses, with absorption uniquely accounting for 8.2% of the variance in hypnotic f UNP 
ratings. Again, neither Condition nor relaxation nor critical thought ratings significantly 
predict change in f UNP ratings.
Three variables were found to predict hypnotic |IN T  ratings, when variance of the other 
variables was controlled (non-hypnotic responses: |3 = 0.661 , p <  0 .001; absorption: |3 = 
0.271, p  < 0.01; critical thought: |3 = 0.181, p  < 0.05). Together these variables accounted for 
51.5% of the variance in hypnotic responses, with absorption uniquely accounting for 6.9% 
and critical thought uniquely accounting for 3.1% of the variance in hypnotic JINT ratings. 
Condition, hypnotic suggestibility, and relaxation ratings did not significantly predict 
change in JINT ratings.
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Figure 6.3. Mean (standard error) ratings for relaxation, absorption and critical thought, for the
relaxation (RX), absorption (ABS) and reduced critical thought (RCT) conditions
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In relation to jUNP ratings, non-hypnotic |U N P  ratings, Hypnotic Suggestibility and self- 
reported Absorption all significantly predicted hypnotic 1UNP ratings, with variance 
associated with the other variables controlled (non-hypnotic responses: |3 = 0.711, p  <  0.001; 
hypnotic suggestibility: p = 0.157, p  <  0.05; absorption: p = 0.232, p  <  0.01). Together these
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variables accounted for 56.0% of the variance in hypnotic responses, with absorption 
uniquely accounting for 4.7% of the variance in hypnotic jUNP ratings. Condition, 
relaxation ratings and critical thought ratings did not significantly predict change in |  UNP 
ratings.
6.3.6. Typicality of hypnosis and ‘feeling hypnotised’
A 3 x 3 (Condition vs. Hypnotic Suggestibility) ANCOVA for typicality of hypnosis scores 
revealed a main effect for Condition [F (2 95) = 9.023, p < 0.001]. Hypnotic Suggestibility and 
the interaction between Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non significant (ps > 
0.10). Post-hoc comparisons of the means (LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that typicality 
of hypnosis scores were significantly higher for the ABS condition (M = 69.56, SD = 16.26) 
in comparison with (i) the RX condition (M = 59.43, SD = 17.29); and (ii) the RCT 
condition (M = 53.59, SD = 16.88).
A 3 x 3 (Condition vs. Hypnotic Suggestibility) ANCOVA for ‘feeling hypnotised’ scores 
revealed a main effect for Condition [F (2 95) = 9.491, p < 0.001]. Hypnotic Suggestibility and 
the interaction between Condition and Hypnotic Suggestibility was non significant (ps > 
0.10). Similar to typicality of hypnosis scores, post-hoc comparisons of the means (LSD test, 
alpha = 0.05) indicated that ‘feeling hypnotised’ scores were significantly higher for the ABS 
condition (M = 60.53, SD = 16.93) in comparison with (i) the RX condition (M = 44.61, SD 
= 15.73); and (ii) the RCT condition (M = 45.96, SD = 16.76).
6.3.7. Manipulation check
3 x 3 x 2  (Condition vs. Hypnotic Suggestibility vs. Context) between-within ANCOVAs, 
controlling for baseline scores, were used to analyse whether the inductions used, actually 
produced the effects (i.e. increased absorption and reduced critical thought) that they were 
designed for.
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The ANCOVA for self-reported absorption revealed a main effect for Condition [F (2 95) = 
4.898, p <0.01]. Hypnotic Suggestibility and the interaction between Condition and 
Hypnotic Suggestibility was non significant (ps > 0.10). Post-hoc comparisons of the means 
(LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that change in self-reported absorption from SA, to SA2 
was significantly greater for the ABS condition in comparison to (i) the RX condition; and
(ii) the RCT condition. There were no significant differences in self-reported absorption for 
Condition at SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated that self-reported absorption scores 
significantly increased, from SA, to SA2, for all three conditions: ABS [t (34) = 6.934, p < 
0.001]; RX [ t(34) = 2.525, p < 0.025]; and RCT [ t(34) = 2.479, p < 0.025].
The ANCOVA for self-reported critical thought revealed a main effect for Condition [F (2>95) 
= 4.909, p <0.01]. Hypnotic Suggestibility and the interaction between Condition and 
Hypnotic Suggestibility was non significant (ps > 0.10). Post-hoc comparisons of the means 
(LSD test, alpha = 0.05) indicated that change in self-reported critical thought from SA, to 
SA2 was only significantly greater for the ABS condition when compared to the RCT 
condition. There were no significant differences in self-reported critical thought for 
Condition at SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated that self-reported critical thought scores 
significantly decreased (i.e. a reduction in critical thought), from SA, to SA2, only for the 
ABS condition [ t(34) = -5.934, p < 0.001]. No significant differences in self-reported critical 
thought scores were found for either the RX or RCT conditions.
The ANCOVA for self-reported relaxation revealed no significant effects for Condition, 
Hypnotic Suggestibility or the interaction between Condition and Hypnotic suggestibility 
(ps > 0.1). There were no significant differences in self-reported relaxation for Condition at 
SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated that self-reported relaxation scores significantly 
increased, from SA, to SA2, for all three conditions: ABS [t(34) = 4.625, p < 0.001]; RX [t(34) = 
4.574, p < 0.001]; and RCT [ t{34) = 3.737, p < 0.001].
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6.4. Discussion
6.4.1. Effect of condition on responses to pain modulation suggestions
This study set out to examine a wider range of potential relationships between absorption 
and reduced critical thought in relation to suggestibility, by assessing suggestions for pain 
modulation. In line with expectation, responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions for 
each pain rating (i.e.tIN T;tU N P;JIN T;|U N P) increased significantly (from SA! to SA2) 
following the inclusion of instructions for absorption (ABS condition). The mean effect 
sizes of adding instructions for absorption to a hypnotic induction on responsiveness to 
pain modulation suggestions were substantial, especially for suggestions for pain decrease, 
varying from 0.44 to 0.74. However, contrary to the findings of Study 2, responses to pain 
modulation suggestions, for each pain rating, did not significantly increase following the 
inclusion of instructions for reduced critical thought (RCT condition). With regard to the 
RX condition, only jU N P ratings were found to significantly decrease following 
instructions for just relaxation. Moreover, the results indicate that increases in 
responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions for each pain rating were significantly higher 
in the ABS condition compared to both the RX and RCT conditions. These findings, in part, 
support those previously reported in Study 2 and by Brown et al., (2001) and indicate that 
instructions for absorption facilitate suggested responding, over and above that produced by 
the hypnotic context alone.
6.4.2. Effect of hypnotic suggestibility on responses to pain modulation 
suggestions
Responses to pain modulation suggestions for each pain rating at SA, (non-hypnotic 
context) were significantly greater for high hypnotically suggestible participants (HHSp) in 
comparison to medium hypnotically suggestible participants (MHSp) and low hypnotically 
suggestible participants (LHSp). This is consistent with the plethora of data that indicates
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that HHSp are significantly more responsive to suggestions than LHSp (e.g. Hilgard, 1965; 
Hilgard & Hilgard, 1994; Montgomery et al., 2000). In addition, MHSp were significantly 
more responsive to pain increase suggestions than LHSp at SA,. Research regarding pain 
modulation suggestions in non-hypnotic contexts (i.e. not following a hypnotic induction 
or in a situation that is labeled hypnosis) is somewhat lacking, but these findings are 
consistent with the view that responding to suggestions, which have been typically 
associated with hypnosis, is a normal human propensity (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). HHSp 
appear to be more responsive than MHSp and LHSp, irrespective of whether hypnosis is 
induced or not. This is consistent with the notion that hypnotic suggestibility scales, such as 
the HGSHS:A (Shor & Orne, 1962), are at best only scales of suggestibility -  the capacity to 
respond to suggestions -  with the addition of a hypnotic induction (Kirsch, 1997; 
Weitzenhoffer, 2002).
Responses to suggestions for pain decrease ( jIN T & jUNP ratings) significantly increased 
(from SA, to SA2) for HHSp. However, increases in responses to pain modulation 
suggestions following the induction of hypnosis for MHSp, was more than comparable to 
that of HHSp. In fact, responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions for each pain rating, 
including suggestions for pain increase, significantly increased (from SA, to SA2) for MHSp. 
It was predicted that HHSp would show a greater increase in responses to pain modulation 
suggestions following a hypnotic induction, compared to LHSp and MHSp. Indeed, 
increases in responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions for each pain rating were 
significantly greater for HHSp compared to LHSp. Equally, increases in responses to pain 
modulation suggestions for MHSp were also found to be significantly greater than that of 
LHSp. There were no significant differences in increases in responses to suggested pain 
modulation between HHSp and MHSp. However, inspection of effect sizes indicates that 
the induction of hypnosis had a greater effect on suggested responding for MHSp (effect
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sizes15 ranging from: 0.68 to 1.46) in comparison to HHSp (effect sizes ranging from: 0.05 to 
0.44).
These findings indicate that HHSp individuals are very responsive to both non-hypnotic 
suggestions and hypnotic suggestions, and paradoxically are not affected much by hypnosis 
per se16. In contrast MHSp show relatively lower levels of responsiveness to non-hypnotic 
suggestions, and a significantly higher level of response to the same suggestions 
administered during hypnosis. In some ways, MHSp could be identified as the true ‘high 
hypnotisable’ individuals, at least with regard to pain modulation suggestions. MHSp 
appear to be the ones who show the largest gains from addition of a hypnotic induction. 
Nevertheless, MHSp are rarely included in experimental designs and relatively little is 
known about their characteristics in comparison to HHSp and LHSp (Braffman & Kirsch, 
1999). This emphasises the importance for future studies to include MHSp in their designs, 
as well as assessing changes in suggested responding as a function of inducing hypnosis. This 
may prove essential in identifying individuals that would benefit from hypnotic procedures 
and individuals that would be better, or at least equally, served by suggestions in a non­
hypnotic context.
6.4.3. Self-reported absorption, critical thought and relaxation
The current study addressed some of the recommendations made in the previous chapter, 
and in contrast to Study 2, absorption and critical thought were measured in both non­
hypnotic and hypnotic contexts, allowing a more systematic examination of these factors. 
Consistent with the results reported in Study 2, the current findings indicate that self- 
reported absorption was associated with changes in responsiveness to pain modulation 
suggestions. Changes in absorption scores (i.e. scores at SA2 -  scores at SA,) were found to
15 Excluding participants in the Reduced Critical Thought condition
16 A highly hypnotizable person is traditionally conceptualised as one who shows little responsiveness to 
non-hypnotic suggestion and a high level of response to the same suggestions administered during 
hypnosis
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significantly predict f INT, t UNP, j INT; and jU N P ratings following a hypnotic induction, 
accounting for 4.6% - 8.2% of the variance of hypnotic behaviour. However, changes in 
critical thought scores were only predictive of j  INT ratings, and changes in relaxation 
scores were not predictive of any measures of responses to suggested pain modulation. As 
touched upon in Chapter 5, the finding that self-reported critical thought was not predictive 
of hypnotic behaviour, and that responses to pain modulation suggestions did not increase 
significantly following instructions for reduced critical thought, may be due to the actual 
instructions used. The instructions used, instructed participants to ‘avoid thinking 
critically’, and not to ‘question’ or ‘analyse’, which may have produced a counter- 
intentional effect similar to the one found in suppression experiments (e.g. Wegner et al., 
1987; Wenzlaff et al., 1991), and consequently increased critical thought instead of reducing 
it.
6.4.4. Have state changes occurred?
The findings of the present investigation are supportive, in part, of those reported in Study 
2, and are consistent with the possibility that an altered psychological state characterised by 
being ‘absorbed’ plays a role in increasing suggestibility. However, for this interpretation to 
have any validity, there needs to be evidence that the instructions for absorption did bring 
about state changes that they were designed for. In Study 2, there were no differences with 
regard levels of absorption, critical thought and relaxation between the three experimental 
conditions. Possible reasons for the homogeneity of self-reported ratings across conditions 
in Study 2, included: (i) no non-hypnotic context measurement; (ii) the use of forced- 
choice scales; (iii) the use of a problematic scale to measure critical thought; (iv) reliance on 
long-term memory to give ratings for each suggestion (also see Chapter 5, section 5.4.3). 
The current study addressed these shortcomings (see Introduction, section 6.1.4).
Self-reported absorption was found to significantly increase, from SAj to SA2, for all three 
conditions. However, these increases were significantly greater for the ABS condition in
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comparison to both the RX and RCT conditions. This may account for the difference in 
suggestibility between the conditions. In addition, critical thought scores only significantly 
decreased (i.e. a reduction in critical thought) for the ABS condition. Indeed, absorption 
and reduced critical thought may be viewed as working synergistically and it is conceivable 
that they reflect different aspects of the same cognitive processes (i.e. increased absorption 
may subsequendy lead to less critical thought), which may explain why critical thought 
reduced significantly for the absorption condition. Taken together, changes in levels of self- 
reported absorption and critical thought and that self-reported absorption significantly 
predicted suggestibility change, provides support for the notion that a state of absorption 
may facilitate suggested responding.
6.4.5. The effects of expectation
Supportive of the ‘generic non-state’ view is the explanation that instructions for absorption 
increased responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions via changes in expectancy. 
Hypnotic inductions including these instructions may have been more consistent with the 
lay view of what constitutes an appropriate hypnotic induction. Instructions for absorption 
may therefore have enhanced the credibility of the definition of the situation as hypnotic, 
and thus increased expectation and consequently suggestibility. Consistent with this 
explanation, are the findings that participants in the ABS condition rated the hypnotic 
induction they received as significantly more typical of hypnosis than those participants in 
the RX or RCT conditions. In addition, participants in the ABS condition felt significantly 
more ‘hypnotised’ than participants in either of the other two conditions.
However, although responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions increased significantly 
following instructions for absorption, instructions for relaxation alone and reduced critical 
thought were insufficient to produce a significant mean increase in responses to pain 
modulation suggestions, despite the presence of an explicit hypnotic context. This result 
although found in Study 2, is contrary to previous research, as simply labelling the situation
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as ‘hypnosis’ should significantly increase suggestibility (e.g. Barber & Calverley, 1965; 
Kroger & Schneider, 1959) and indicates that the plausibility of the labelling is a crucial 
additional factor.
6.4.6. Conclusions
This study provides evidence that instructions for absorption increase responses to 
suggestions for pain modulation, over and above that produced by the hypnotic context 
alone. In contrast to Study 2, instructions for reduced critical thought were not found to 
facilitate suggestibility. This may indicate that although such instructions facilitate 
responding to suggestions found in hypnotic suggestibility scales, they may not be useful for 
the more clinically oriented suggestions for the control of pain. Therefore, the findings of 
the present study, which examined a wider range of potential relationships between 
absorption and reduced critical thought to suggestibility, are partly consistent with those 
reported in Chapter 2. Increased suggestibility may be related to a state of absorption or 
with participants’ expectations. Neuroimaging is a potential avenue that future research 
may explore to definitively establish what underlies changes in suggestibility as a function of 
hypnosis. Imaging of responses to suggestions in a non-hypnotic context is an area that has 
been neglected. The current study is also consistent with the view that responding to 
‘hypnotic’ suggestions may be a normal human propensity independent of hypnosis, as 
HHSp are more responsive to suggestions than MHSp and LHSp regardless of whether 
hypnosis is induced or not. More importantly, although responses for HHSp generally 
increase following a hypnotic induction, the current study found that MHSp are the ones 
who show the largest gains from addition of a hypnotic induction. This has important 
implications for the control and management of pain, as these findings indicate that a large 
percentage of people could significantly benefit from a hypnotic intervention, rather than 
only HHSp. Indeed knowledge about the individuals that would benefit from hypnotic 
procedures and factors that influence pain control, such as instructions for absorption, 
could in future be more directly and optimally utilised by both patients and heath care
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providers, which in turn may provide an impetus to the development of improved 
therapeutic techniques.
This study also raised once more the possibility that one of the functions of hypnotic 
inductions is to provide a plausible labelling of them as ‘hypnosis’, and to thereby raise 
expectations of an increase in response to suggestions. The next study takes up this theme.
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Chapter 7
Study 4: Is Hypnosis More Than a Label?"
Chapter overview
Hypnotic induction procedures are presumed by many to induce ‘hypnosis’ and are often 
reported to enhance suggestibility. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, knowledge about the 
mechanisms as well as the necessity of hypnotic inductions in changing suggestibility 
remains poor. This empirical chapter examines the effect of labelling induction procedures 
as ‘hypnosis’ on responsiveness to suggestion and aims to systematically determine the 
extent to which hypnotic suggestibility is affected by: (a) the induction technique itself; and 
(b) the recognition or perception that a hypnotic procedure is being carried out. This has 
important implications for the use of hypnosis and suggestion clinically as well as practically 
as a cognitive tool and may indicate that the ability to respond to suggestions may be a 
normal characteristic, independent of hypnotic induction procedures.
7.1 Introduction
Interest in hypnosis is currently experiencing a revival, with discussions turning to the 
effects of the clinical efficacy of hypnosis as an adjunct to psychological and 
pharmacological therapies (e.g. Kirsch et al., 1995; Patterson & Jensen, 2003), its cost-saving 
role in health care (e.g. Lang et al., 2000; Lang & Rosen, 2002) and its potential as a tool to 
study cognitive phenomena (e.g. Oakley et al., 2003; Rainville et al., 1997; Szechtman et al., 
1998). With the increasing use of hypnosis in clinical practice and the harnessing of 
hypnosis by cognitive neuroscientists as a means of illuminating mental processes, a central 
issue that arises for the practical application of hypnosis concerns the use of hypnotic
* This study has been published in a paper by Gandhi and Oakley (2005) under the title ‘Does ‘hypnosis’ 
by any other name smell as sweet? The efficacy o f‘hypnotic’ inductions depends on the label ‘hypnosis”
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induction procedures and their efficacy. Hypnotic inductions are communications used 
with the intention of facilitating the elicitation of hypnotic phenomena by means of 
suggestion (Edmonston, 1991). However, as discussed earlier, research has yet to establish 
the role of induction procedures in achieving these suggested effects or the mechanisms by 
which they might exert their influence (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch & Braffman, 2001)
7.1.1. The label ‘hypnosis’
One of the key elements in formal hypnotic induction procedures is the hypnotic label. 
There is enormous variation, however, in what constitutes a hypnotic induction. They may 
involve, for example, instructions to engage in visual imagery, to sit quietly, or to exercise 
vigorously, to remain alert or to become relaxed, as well as embedded instructions and 
suggestions (e.g. to become drowsy or enter a dream-like state). Nevertheless, all these 
hypnotic inductions are normally explicitly labelled ‘hypnosis’ - participants’ perceptions of 
inductions and consequently their hypnotic responding is influenced by their lay beliefs, 
expectations and motivations concerning hypnosis and its effects on behaviour and 
experience. Woody, Bowers and Oakman (1992) note ‘while an explicit hypnotic induction 
may be quite unnecessary for the elicitation of hypnotic phenomena, the perception of the 
situation as a hypnotic context may be crucial.’ (p. 25). Supportive of this view, Barber and 
Calverley (1964, 1965) showed that the hypnotic label is capable of increasing 
responsiveness to suggestion, even in the absence of any formal induction procedures.
More recently, Lynn, Vanderhoff, Shindler & Stafford (2002) compared 132 participants’ 
responses to the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos et 
al., 1983) following either: (i) a standard hypnotic induction; (ii) a standard induction, with 
all references to ‘cooperation’ removed; (iii) a standard induction which instructed 
individuals that an ‘altered state of consciousness’ or ‘trance’ was needed to experience 
hypnosis; or (iv) no induction, with the session being defined as hypnosis. There were no 
significant statistical differences between the ‘no-induction’ group and any of the other
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three groups in terms of behavioural and subjective responding and Lynn et al., (2002) 
concluded that ‘hypnotic inductions are no more effective than suggestions alone elicited in 
a hypnotic context’ (p. 239)
7.1.2. Hypnotic inductions as ‘non-deceptive’ placebos
Kirsch (2000b) has described hypnotic inductions as ‘non-deceptive placebos’. He writes 
‘when the effect of administering a drug is found to be independent of its specific 
ingredients, the drug is deemed to be a placebo. Similarly, hypnotic inductions must be 
expectancy manipulations, akin to placebos, because their effects on suggestibility are 
independent of any specific component or ingredient’ (p. 237). Support for the notion that 
the effects of hypnotic inductions on suggestibility are independent of any specific 
component has been provided by studies that have demonstrated that virtually anything 
labelled as hypnosis can produce so-called ‘hypnotic’ effects. Glass and Barber (1961) used a 
placebo ‘hypnotic drug’ to induce hypnosis. Glass and Barber (1961) established a medical 
context by introducing participants to a physician who undertook a variety of 
measurements (blood pressure, reflex patterns, pupillary changes) and explained that the 
‘powerful hypnotic drug’ would increase suggestibility quickly by acting upon ‘neurological 
centres’. Within this context, participants were given a tablet and a half of sodium 
bicarbonate, and subsequently received 8 standardised test suggestions. The results 
indicated that the ‘hypnotic drug’ was as effective in enhancing suggestibility as a formal 20- 
minute trance induction; with mean behavioural responses of 5.8 and 6.3 respectively not 
differing significantly. Baker and Kirsch (1993) similarly used a ‘hypnotic drug’ placebo in a 
study investigating hypnotic analgesia. They initially reported that a traditional trance 
induction produced more pain relief in response to suggestions than a pain-reducing 
analgesic placebo. However, when the placebo was described as a ‘hypnotic drug’ that 
increased suggestibility, the effects of hypnotic and placebo (‘hypnotic drug’) pain reduction 
were equivalent.
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Kroger and Schneider (1959) reported on tests designed to induce hypnosis by ‘subliminal 
and photic stimulation of the brain waves’ (p. 93). Kroger and Schneider used an apparatus 
called the ‘brain-wave synchroniser’ which they claimed would increase efficiency in the 
induction of hypnosis and asserted that when stroboscopic flash light frequency was set at or 
close to participants’ ‘dominant alpha rhythm’, photic driving would occur and induce 
hypnosis. However, as later demonstrated by Hammer and Arkins (1964), the ‘brain-wave 
synchroniser’ was nothing more than a ‘placebo’ procedure. The synchroniser on its own 
had no effect on hypnotic suggestibility, and only affected hypnotic suggestibility when 
participants were informed that it would induce hypnosis. Although unintentional, Kroger 
and Schneider’s study was an early demonstration of the use of an expectancy modification 
procedure as a hypnotic induction.
In a conceptually similar study, Council, Kirsch, Vickery and Carlson (1983) used the 
setting of a psychophysiological laboratory to lend credibility to a placebo induction 
involving ‘bio-feedback’. Participants were informed that hypnosis could be induced 
through amplification of particular brainwaves. They then viewed their ‘brainwaves’ on an 
oscilloscope, whilst receiving false feedback. This expectancy modification procedure was 
equivalent to traditional trance induction procedures on most measures of responsiveness 
to suggestion.
There is a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that the expectations, perceptions 
and pre-conceptions individuals have about hypnosis are important determinants of 
hypnotic behaviour (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1, for a fuller account). A notable example of 
this was reported by Orne (1959), who showed, that by varying participants’ expectations 
about what will happen during hypnosis, different out comes would subsequently occur. In 
Orne’s study, half of the participants were informed that a key characteristic of hypnosis was 
arm catalepsy; the other half was not given any specific expectancy altering information. 
Orne found that significantly more of the former group displayed arm catalepsy compared 
to the latter. Similarly, Lynn, Snodgrass, Rhue and Hardaway (1987) found participants’
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subjective experience and involuntariness ratings to be significantly correlated with their 
pre-hypnotic beliefs about hypnosis.
There is strong evidence to suggest that non-hypnotic or ‘neutral’ procedures labelled as 
‘hypnosis’ are as effective as a formal hypnotic induction in increasing suggestibility. 
However, a question that has yet to be addressed is whether hypnotic inductions themselves 
continue to be as effective when not labelled ‘hypnosis’. To the author’s knowledge, the 
effect of a standardised hypnotic induction, independent of the label ‘hypnosis’ has not been 
previously examined. Given that hypnotic inductions seem likely to be increasingly used 
clinically and experimentally, it is essential to determine the degree to which the effect of 
hypnotic inductions is a function of the technique itself or due to the label ‘hypnosis’.
7.1.3. Study objectives
The current study aimed to systematically investigate the effect that a hypnotic induction 
has on responsiveness to suggestion and to determine the extent to which the magnitude of 
this effect is altered by labelling the procedure ‘hypnosis’. As in Study 2, participants were 
initially presented with a suggestibility measure in the absence of any formal instructions or 
mention of hypnosis. They were then presented with the suggestibility measure for a second 
time following either a hypnotic induction which was explicitly labelled as relaxation (RX 
condition); a hypnotic induction which was explicitly labelled as hypnosis (HYP condition); 
or, as a control condition, an extract from a psychology text book (CON condition). 
Behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion were obtained. Naivety concerning hypnosis was maintained throughout the 
study for participants in all three groups with the sole exception that the word ‘hypnosis’ 
was used when introducing the induction procedures to those in the HYP condition. 
Importantly, the set of expectations for those participants involved in the ‘hypnotic’ 
procedure labelled hypnosis (HYP condition) were different to those involved in the 
‘hypnotic’ procedure labelled relaxation (RX condition).
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7.2 Method
7.2.1. Design
For the reasons outlined in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1.), a 3 x 2 (condition x context) between- 
within design was employed, with induction condition as the three level independent 
variable (CON vs. HYP vs. RX). Changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced 
involuntariness suggestibility scores from the first suggestibility assessment (SAJ to the 
second (SA2) were the principle dependent variables. It is important to note that the results 
from Study 2, as well as the findings of previous studies (Barber 8c Glass, 1962; Braffman & 
Kirsch, 1999; Hilgard 8c Tart, 1966; Weitzenhoffer 8c Sjoberg, 1961) provide no evidence for: 
(1) a disproportionate number of high, medium and low hypnotically suggestible 
individuals in experimental and control groups, and (2) ceiling effects for very responsive 
individuals.
7.2.2. Measures
7.2.2.1. Suggestibility scale
Suggestibility was measured on the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Form C: (WSGC; Bowers 1993, 1998; Kirsch, Milling 8c Burgess, 1998). The 
WSGC is a group adaptation of the individually administered Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer 8c Hilgard, 1962). The WSGC consists 
of twelve test suggestions, however, four test suggestions were deemed unsuitable for 
repeated presentation (age regression; negative visual hallucination; posthypnotic 
suggestion; amnesia), and consequently were not used in this study. The adapted WSGC 
consisted of eight suggestions in total and included two ideomotor suggestions (hand 
lowering; moving hands together), two challenge suggestions (arm rigidity; arm 
immobilization), and four cognitive suggestions (dream, mosquito hallucination; music 
hallucination; taste hallucination).
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Two versions of the scale were created, with the same items in different testing orders, which 
were counterbalanced and presented across the conditions. However, the relative order of 
ideomotor, challenge and cognitive suggestions was always maintained across the two tests. 
The scale was used to measure suggestibility before the induction manipulation (SA,) and 
after the induction manipulation (SA2).
The scoring of suggestibility items was adapted from the WSGC, assessing both behavioural 
(Bowers, 1998) and subjective measures (Kirsch et al., 1998). Internal reliability of the 
behavioural and subjective scales has been reported as 0.81 and 0.89 respectively, indicating 
high internal consistency (Bowers, 1993; Kirsch et al., 1998). Self-reported behavioural 
scores on the WSGC are obtained by having participants complete a questionnaire on which 
they indicate whether they had made the behavioural response called for by the suggestion 
(0 = no; 1= yes). Behavioural responses to suggestions were assessed as the sum of these 
ratings (range 0-8). Subjective scores on the WSGC are obtained by having participants rate 
the degree to which they felt the subjective effects called for by each suggestion (e.g. arm 
lowering, arm rigidity) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 5 = to a great degree). 
Subjective experience responsiveness to suggestion were assessed as the sum of these ratings 
(range 8-40)
Existing scales, with the exception of one (the Carleton University Responsiveness to 
Suggestion Scale: CURSS: Spanos et al., 1983) do not measure whether responses to 
suggestions are experienced as involuntary or not, i.e. the ‘classic suggestion effect’ 
(Weitzenhoffer, 1953). Consequently, in addition to the behavioural and subjective scores 
of the WSGC, self-reported experienced involuntariness was assessed. The scoring of 
experienced involuntariness was adapted from the CURSS. Experienced involuntariness 
scores were obtained by having participants rate the degree to which their response to each 
suggestion was experienced as being involuntary (0 = not at all; 4 = great degree). In line 
with the CURSS, participants were only scored as experiencing involuntariness, for each 
suggestion, if the classic combination of behavioural occurrence and non-volitional
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experiencing occurred. Therefore, a score of 1 was given, if the behavioural indicator 
occurred and involuntariness was either rated moderate or rated high. Otherwise a score of 
0 was given. Overall, experienced involuntariness of responding to suggestion was assessed 
as the sum of these ratings (range 0-8).
7.2.3. ‘Hypnotic’ inductions
The hypnotic induction procedure administered was adapted from the one accompanying 
the WSGC, with the 20 mentions of ‘hypnosis’ and ‘hypnotised’ being changed to the words 
‘absorption’ or ‘absorbed’ (adapted induction procedure presented in Appendix 7.1). This 
was done to maintain naivety concerning the nature of the experiment, as well as to retain 
the authenticity and nature of the induction, without using the words hypnosis. The words 
‘absorption/absorbed’ were used on the strength of Studies 2 and 3, and as the construct of 
absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) is often cited as an important feature of hypnosis, 
and is widespread within the field. At one time it represented probably the most significant 
point of convergence between theories of hypnosis (Spanos & Barber, 1974). Participants in 
the HYP condition and RX condition received identical hypnotic inductions, with the only 
difference being that the hypnotic induction was either labelled ‘hypnosis’ or ‘relaxation’.
For participants in the HYP condition, the re-worded ‘hypnotic’ induction was preceded by 
the following instructions, adapted from the instructions used by Braffman & Kirsch (1999):
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions, only this time we will ask you to experience them whilst in hypnosis. So in 
this version, the suggestions will be preceded by a hypnotic induction to help you become 
hypnotised.’
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For participants in the RX condition, the same ‘hypnotic’ induction was preceded by the 
following instructions:
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions, only this time we will ask you to experience them whilst being relaxed. So in 
this version, the suggestions will be preceded by relaxation instructions to help you 
become relaxed.’
Participants in the CON condition did not receive a ‘hypnotic’ induction. Instead, they 
received an extract on the capacities of the newborn infant from ‘Hilgard’s Introduction to 
Psychology’ (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bern, Nolen-Hocksema, 2000, p. 73-76). The book 
extract was preceded by the following instructions:
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions. Before the second part of the study begins, we would like you to concentrate 
and listen to the words of an extract from a book.’
7.2.4. Participants
In all 105 participants (58 males & 47 females) took part in this study. All participants were 
undergraduate university students, with the majority being recruited from University 
College London. The age of participants ranged from 18-37 years, with a mean age of 22.41 
years (SD = 3.82). All signed up for an experiment entitled, ‘the influence of state and 
context on behaviour’, and participated in one of the following three conditions: CON 
(N=35, 21 male, 14 female); HYP (N=35, 19 male, 16 female) or RX (N=32, 18 male, 17 
female). Participants were randomly allocated to conditions on the day of assessment, and 
were tested in small groups of 2-5 participants. Psychology students were excluded from this 
study due to their experience with hypnotic procedures during their course and familiarity 
with the investigators. The joint UCL/UCLH Committee on the Ethics of Human Research 
approved this study; informed consent was obtained from all participants.
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7.2.5. Procedure
After reading the study information sheet and providing consent, all participants were 
presented with SAj. Participants were informed that it was a measure of imagination (see 
Barber, 1965; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). After scoring SA,, participants received a hypnotic 
induction that was either labelled as ‘hypnosis’ (HYP) or ‘relaxation’ (RX) or no hypnotic 
induction at all (CON), depending on which experimental condition they had been assigned 
to. SA2 was then presented and behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness 
measures of responsiveness to suggestion were scored. Finally, when all measures had been 
completed, participants were asked to respond to a set of questions that asked what they 
thought the experiment was about: i) before they arrived at the testing session; ii) after the first 
set of suggestions; and iii) after the second set o f suggestions. These questions were asked to 
assess participants’ awareness of hypnosis or hypnotic-like procedures. All assessments and 
instructions were recorded on audiotape for maximum experimental control.
7.2.6. Statistical analyses
SPSS for Mac OS X (version 10.1) was used for the analyses of data. The effect of condition 
on suggestibility (behavioural, subjective, involuntariness) was tested using a 3 x 2 
(condition x context) between-within analyses of covariance (ANCOVA), taking 
suggestibility scores at SA, as the covariate. Comparison of the means were carried out by 
Fisher’s protected least significant difference (LSD) test (Carmer & Swanson, 1973; Howell, 
1997). Paired-samples Student’s t-tests were carried out to compare suggestibility scores for 
the first suggestibility assessment (SA,) with suggestibility scores for the second 
suggestibility assessment (SA2). A rejection region with at least a value of p < 0.05 was 
selected and used throughout (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001)
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7.3. Results
No participants from any of the three experimental conditions reported that the experiment 
may have been or was related to hypnosis after the first set of suggestions had been 
administered (SA,). Naivety concerning the experiment involving ‘hypnosis’ and ‘hypnotic 
procedures’ was maintained throughout the study for the majority of participants in the RX 
and CON groups. Five participants from the RX group and three participants from the 
CON group reported that the experiment might have involved hypnosis after the second set 
of suggestions had been administered (SA2). Means and correlations were calculated for 
both the full sample and sub-sample of participants who reported no awareness or suspicion 
that the study concerned hypnosis. The patterns of means and correlations were virtually 
identical for the two data sets, so only analyses of the full sample are reported here.
Means and standard deviations of responses to suggestion, for each condition, are presented 
in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. As an important part of the analyses, quantification of the effect 
of condition on responsiveness to suggestions was calculated (see Table 7.1). The data were 
screened for univariate and multivariate outliers. No cases were found to have standardised 
scores in excess of ± 3.29 (p< 0.001, two-tailed test). The data were normally distributed, 
with no skewness and kurtosis values exceeding standardised scores of ± 3.29 (p< 0.001, 
two-tailed test). Mahalanobis distances (critical values, x 2{6) = 22.458, p <0.001) were 
calculated. No cases were found to have Mahalanobis distances greater that the critical value 
demonstrating the absence of multivariate outliers.
Correlations between responses to suggestions for the first suggestibility assessment (SA,) 
and the second suggestibility assessment (SA2) were significant for all measures in each 
condition: behavioural (CON: r = 0.686, p  < 0.001; HYP: r = 0.470, p  < 0.01; RX: r = 0.577, 
p  < 0.001); subjective (CON: r = 0.767, p  < 0.001; HYP: r = 0.497, p  < 0.01; RX: r = 0.663, p  
< 0.001); experienced involuntariness (CON: r = 0.811, p  < 0.001; HYP: r = 0.717, p  <
0.001; RX: r = 0.722, p < 0.001). Condition was found not to moderate the association
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between SA, and SA2 scores (Fisher’s transformation, 1921). The r between SA, and SA2 
scores for each measure of suggestibility (behavioural, subjective, involuntariness) did not 
significantly differ between: (i) CON and HYP conditions; (ii) CON and RX conditions; and 
(iii) RX and HYP conditions.
Concerning behavioural responses, 13 participants (37%) in the CON condition passed 
fewer suggestions following an extract from a psychology textbook; 10 (29%) showed no 
change at all, and 12 (34%) exhibited greater suggestibility. Nine participants (26%) in the 
HYP condition showed a decrease in behavioural scores, with 5 participants (14%) showing 
no change, and 21 (60%) showing greater behavioural responses following a hypnotic 
induction that was explicitly labelled as hypnosis. Thirteen participants (37%) in the RX 
condition reported reduced behavioural responses, whilst 9 (26%) reported no change, and 
13 (37%) reported greater behavioural responses following a hypnotic induction that was 
explicitly labelled as relaxation. The frequency distributions of changes in behavioural, 
subjective and involuntariness measures of responsiveness to suggestion for each condition 
are displayed in Table 7.2.
The ANCOVA for behavioural scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F 
(2,ioi) = 3.944, p <0.025]. This effect revealed that change in behavioural suggestibility scores 
in the HYP condition was significantly different to that observed in the CON condition 
[LSD test, p < 0.01]. The difference between: (i) the RX and CON conditions and (ii) the 
HYP and RX conditions, on behavioural suggestibility change were non-significant. There 
were no significant differences in behavioural scores at SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated 
that behavioural scores significantly increased from SA, to SA2, for only the HYP condition 
[ t{34) = 2.894, p < 0.01]. No significant differences in behavioural scores from SA, to SA2, 
were found for either the RX or CON conditions.
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Table 7.1. Mean (standard deviation) responses to suggestions for the first suggestibility assessment (SA,)
and the second suggestibility assessment (SA2).
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
SA, sa2 Effect 
Size (oQ
SA, sa2 Effect 
Size (d)
SA, sa2 Effect 
Size (d)
CON 3.17 3.09 -0.05 19.34 18.94 -0.08 2.20 2.11 -0.06
(1.40) (1.76) (4.82) (4.94) (1.41) (1.47)
HYP 3.14 4.06 0.51 19.46 25.80 1.18 2.11 3.71 0.97
(1.93) (1.68) (4.47) (6.16) (1.43) (1.84)
RX 3.69 4.00 0.16 21.11 22.66 0.28 2.77 3.17 0.22
(1.83) (1.93) (5.48) (5.77) (1.66) (1.99)
Note.
Behavioural scores are ratings of behavioural responses to suggestions & are defined as the number of 
suggestions passed out of eight. Subjective scores are ratings of degree to which participants felt the 
subjective effects called in each suggestion & were rated out of forty (i.e. measured on a scale of 1-5 for 
each of the eight suggestions). Involuntariness scores are ratings of experienced involuntariness of 
suggestions & defined as the number of suggestions passed out of eight
Table 7.2. Frequency distribution (percentages) of changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced 
involuntariness measures of suggestibility as a function of an extract from a textbook (CON), a hypnotic 
induction labelled as ‘hypnosis’ (HYP) and a hypnotic induction labelled as ‘relaxation’ (RX)
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase
CON 13 10 12 13 8 14 10 17 8
(37%) (29%) (34%) (37%) (23%) (40%) (29%) (48%) (23%)
HYP 9 5 21 7 0 28 1 7 27
(26%) (14%) (60%) (20%) (0%) (80%) (3%) (20%) (77%)
RX 13 9 13 13 0 22 10 7 18
(37%) (26%) (37%) (37%) (0%) (63%) (29%) (20%) (51%)
Note.
A decrease was when participants’ responses to suggestion were lower at SA2 (after an induction) when 
compared to their responses at SA, (prior to an induction). Same refers to when participants’ responses to 
suggestions were the same at both SA, and SA2. An increase was when participants’ responses to 
suggestion were higher at SA2 when compared to their responses at SA,
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Figure 7.1. Mean (standard error) behavioural, subjective and involuntariness scores for the control
(CON), ‘hypnosis’ (HYP) and ‘relaxation’ (RX) conditions
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□  SA2
3 5
3 0  -
2 5  -
20 i
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C o n d i t io n
As with behavioural scores, the ANCOVA for subjective scores indicated a significant main 
effect for Condition [F (2>101) = 21.306, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in 
subjective suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the HYP and CON 
conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; (ii) the HYP and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; and
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(iii) the RX and CON conditions [LSD test, p < 0.025]. There were no significant differences 
in subjective scores at SA,. Paired-samples Student’s t-test indicated, again as with 
behavioural scores, revealed a significant increase in subjective scores from SA, to SA2, for 
only the HYP condition [t (34) = 6.785, p < 0.001]. No significant differences in subjective 
scores from SA, to SA2, were found for either the RX or CON conditions.
The ANCOVA for experienced involuntariness scores indicated a significant main effect for 
Condition [F (2,01) = 17.561, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in experienced 
involuntariness suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the HYP and 
CON conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001] and (ii) the HYP and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 
0.001]. The difference between the RX and CON conditions on change in experienced 
involuntariness scores was non-significant. There were no significant differences in 
experienced involuntariness scores at SA,. Paired samples t-tests indicated a significant 
increase in experienced involuntariness scores from SA, to SA2, for the HYP condition [t (34) 
= 7.349, p < 0.001]. No significant difference in experienced involuntariness scores from 
SA,to SA2, were found for either the RX or CON conditions.
7.4. D iscussion
The purpose of this study was to assess the effect a hypnotic induction has on 
responsiveness to suggestion and determine the extent to which ‘hypnotic’ responsiveness to 
suggestions is affected by the induction procedure itself and the effect of labelling the 
procedure ‘hypnosis’. As in previous studies (Barber & Glass, 1962; Braffman & Kirsch,
1999; Brown et al., 2001; Hilgard &Tart, 1966; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961), 
the results of this investigation appear to indicate that a hypnotic induction increases 
suggestibility by a relatively small amount. However, this effect was moderated by whether 
the induction was labelled ‘hypnosis’ or ‘relaxation’. Neither behavioural, subjective, nor 
involuntariness measures of responsiveness to suggestion significantly increased following 
the use of a hypnotic induction that was labelled as ‘relaxation’ (RX condition); on average
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50% of participants in this condition experienced a decrease or no change in suggestibility. 
In contrast behavioural, subjective and involuntariness measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion, increased significantly following the use of the same hypnotic induction that was 
labelled as ‘hypnosis’ (HYP condition); on average 72% of participants in this condition 
exhibited greater responses to suggestions. Moreover, the significant increases in subjective 
and experienced involuntariness measures of suggestibility following a hypnotic induction 
labelled ‘hypnosis’ were over and above that produced by the same hypnotic procedure 
labelled ‘relaxation’. These results indicate that the significant effect hypnotic inductions 
have on suggestibility is dependent on the label ‘hypnosis’.
The current findings challenge the traditional view of hypnotic responsiveness as primarily 
an altered state of consciousness, which is often presumed to be determined by the 
administration of a hypnotic induction. The findings indicate that whilst the technique of a 
hypnotic induction itself has little effect on responsiveness to suggestion, the recognition or 
perception that a hypnotic induction is being carried out appears to be the significant factor. 
This is supportive of the ‘generic non-state’ view, which defines hypnosis as a social context 
established by a set of culturally defined procedures termed as hypnotic inductions or 
procedures, and that ‘hypnotic’ phenomena can be explained by expectancy, motivation 
and beliefs (Barber, 1969; Kihlstrom, 1985; Kirsch, 2000a; Sarbin & Coe 1972). It is worth 
noting here the possibility that these non-state factors may themselves generate a 
correspondingly distinctive mental state. However, this is of course a different proposition 
from the ‘generic altered state’ view in its ‘strong’17 version (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.1, for 
accounts of the ‘generic non-state’ and ‘generic altered state’ conceptions of hypnosis)
17 The ‘strong’ interpretation of the state is the traditional understanding of hypnosis, as a special or 
distinct state of consciousness characterised by cognitive, behavioural, phenomenological, and 
physiological processes that all hypnotised individuals enter. In contrast the ‘weak’ interpretation views 
the hypnotic state as a descriptive label representing a domain of characteristic phenomena, including 
suggested behaviours and self-reports of experience. The ‘weak’ interpretation construes the ‘state’ as a 
shorthand for this description, with no causal properties or defining features associated with it (Hilgard, 
1969; Kihlstrom, 1985).
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The generalisability of interpreting results from studies involving hypnotic induction 
procedures is not without question. Although most studies use a so-called ‘traditional’ 
hetero-induction, which involves mental and physical relaxation, there is enormous 
variation in procedures that are termed ‘hypnotic inductions’. For example, a hypnotic 
induction, may involve suggested visual imagery, various ideomotor suggestions (e.g. non- 
volitional eye closure), instructions to remain alert, instructions to relive experiences and 
embedded suggestions. The findings of the present study in addition to those of studies 2 
and 3 indicate that the following components are instrumental: (i) the definition of the 
situation as ‘hypnosis’; (ii) instructions to become mentally involved or to focus on internal 
experiences (absorption); and (iii) instructions to avoid thinking critically producing a 
reduction in monitoring, judging and interpreting (reduced critical thought). However, it 
remains unclear which other components of hypnotic inductions procedures are necessary 
and which are redundant. Future research will need to address this issue through several 
well-designed studies, using different hypnotic induction procedures. As noted by Oakley 
and Halligan (2005), this also raises a practical concern for studies involving hypnotic 
induction procedures, as it becomes essential to describe these procedures in detail, which is 
not consistently done in experimental or clinical studies.
7.4.1. The effect of the label ‘hypnosis’
As discussed in Chapter 3, although previous research characterises the increase in 
suggestibility produced by hypnotic inductions as being small, but significant, this is not a 
true reflection of the efficacy of hypnotic inductions, as the size of the experimental effect 
has not been considered. Effect sizes allow us to calculate the relative magnitude of an 
experimental treatment (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). The mean effect sizes of labelling a 
hypnotic induction ‘hypnosis’ on suggestibility varied from 0.51 (behavioural) to 1.18 
(experienced involuntariness). If we consider that the mean effect size for psychological 
treatments in general is 0.47 and the mean effect size of medical outcomes (other than 
mortality) ranges from 0.24 to 0.80 (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993), the effect of adding an
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induction that is perceived to be hypnosis (i.e. labelled hypnosis) is substantial and on some 
measures very substantial indeed.
These results are supportive of the substantial data on the clinical efficacy of hypnosis as an 
adjunct to psychological and pharmacological therapies, which has been shown for many 
different conditions, including those which can be functional or psychosomatic in origin, or 
at least exacerbated by anxiety, stress or psychological factors (see Kirsch et al., 1995).
7.4.2. Conclusions
It is evident that hypnotic induction procedures in themselves are not rituals by which 
suggested hypnotic phenomena are established. The hypnotic induction as a technique 
produced a modest increase in responses to suggestions. However, the increase was only 
significant if the induction procedure was labelled ‘hypnosis’. This constitutes a challenge to 
the ‘generic altered state’ view as well as the ‘strong’ version of the altered state hypothesis 
and indicates that the production of suggested hypnotic phenomena is not dependent on a 
hypnotic technique per se. The significant element of such procedures appears to be the 
label ‘hypnosis’ or the suggestion of ‘hypnosis’. In a sense the label ‘hypnosis’ can be 
interpreted as a ‘meta-suggestion’ that subsequent suggestions will be responded to more 
strongly. The results may reassure both clinicians and researchers that they do not need to 
rely on elaborate inductions to produce suggested experiences (e.g. hallucinations, amnesia, 
analgesia). Nevertheless, the mean effect size of the label ‘hypnosis’ on suggestibility 
indicates that if the label can be reasonably and plausibly applied to an appropriate clinical 
or experimental procedure, then it should be used. Between 60-80% of participants in the 
present study experienced an increase in suggestibility following an induction labelled as 
‘hypnosis’18 -  ‘the effect is there ...and it would seem sensible to utilise the idea when 
defining hypnosis’ (Wagstaff, 1998a, pg. 160). The label hypnosis is important because it 
maximises the occurrence of suggested changes, experiences and behaviour. These data
18 Presumably, the minority of participants that showed no difference or a reduction in suggestibility may 
benefit from more ‘suggestive’ approaches without the use o f a hypnotic induction.
again highlight the important issue of suggestion and hypnosis. As has been discussed, it is 
important that hypnosis and suggestion are treated separately, until the cognitive and 
neuropsychological mechanisms of both have been definitively established, as it is still 
unknown whether suggested effects that occur outside hypnosis are represented differently 
in the brain than those occur following a hypnotic induction. The findings indicate that 
responding to suggestions, which have been typically associated with hypnosis, is a normal 
human propensity and therefore may shed considerable light on the mundane building 
blocks of everyday psychoneurological processes, dysfunctional experience and behaviour, 
as well as consciousness and self-awareness (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001; Oakley & Halligan, 
2005).
Labelling a ‘hypnotic’ procedure ‘hypnosis’ thus seems to be an effective way of increasing 
subsequent responses to suggestion and this labelling is a common, albeit often 
unintentional, pre-induction strategy. Another component of pre-induction routines is the 
elicitation of compliance with a number of requests (e.g. to sit in a particular way; to look at 
a particular object). Some indirect hypnotic procedures explicitly develop an expectancy of 
positive responding to instructions and ideas (the so-called ‘yes set’; Erickson, Rossi & Rossi, 
1976) as a facilitator of hypnotic responsiveness. The next chapter investigates this strategy, 
hitherto neglected experimentally, as a potential variable in increasing responsiveness to 
‘hypnotic’ suggestions.
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Chapter 8
Study 5: When Responses to Requests Affect Responses to 
Suggestion
Chapter overview
Suggestions are rarely given in an isolated form and are often administered accompanied by 
several instructions or requests (e.g. requests to use imagery or carry out certain 
procedures). Hypnotic techniques used by researchers and clinicians to alter experiences, 
thoughts and behaviours are often therefore complex communications comprised of 
suggestions and requests. The basic difference between requests and suggestions is that a 
request implies that the response should be performed intentionally, whereas a suggestion 
implies that the response will happen by itself. Some ‘indirect’ approaches to hypnosis have 
employed repeated instructions and questions that promote affirmative responses to create 
a compliant state of mind (the ‘yes set’, Erickson et al., 1976) to facilitate responses to 
suggestion. Given the common practice of making requests before and during the 
administering of suggestions, this chapter examines systematically, how behaviour 
performed in response to requests influences responses to suggestion.
8.1. Introduction
Typically, hypnotic induction procedures begin by requesting certain activities (e.g. closing 
your eyes and relaxation) and then progressively shift to suggest the same responses (e.g. 
‘your body is very relaxed’). Making requests before and in the midst of administering 
suggestions is common. For example, participants are usually requested to prepare or 
position themselves in a certain way prior to a suggestion (e.g. position their hands in a 
certain way or adopt a certain scenario) and are often requested to terminate a suggestion
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and anticipate the next suggestion (Gorassini, 2002). Experimental situations themselves are 
also strongly associated with requests; individuals are frequently requested to participate, to 
give consent and for personal information (Haley, 1958). Although there is a large body of 
social psychological literature that indicates that compliance to a request on one occasion 
enhances compliance on subsequent occasions (e.g. ‘foot-in-the-door’ tactic19: Dejong,
1979; Freedman & Fraser, 1966; ‘door-in-the face’ tactic20: Cialdini, 2001; Cialidini, Vincent, 
Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler 8c Darby, 1975), knowledge regarding the influence of compliance 
with a prior request on responsiveness to a suggestion is an area that has received little 
explicit recognition.
8.1.1. Suggestions vs. requests
The difference between requests and suggestions lies in their representation of behavioural 
causation (Gorassini, 1997, 2002; Hilgard, 1965; Spanos 8c Gorassini, 1984; Weitzenhoffer, 
1974; 2000). A request implies that the response should be performed intentionally and 
defines the self as the cause of the response (e.g. ‘lower you arm’). In contrast, a suggestion 
implies that the response will happen by itself and attributes the cause to a source external 
to the self (e.g. ‘your arm is getting heavier and heavier and beginning to lower’). A request 
calls for a voluntary act; a suggestion for an involuntary response.
Gorassini (1997, 2002, 2004) identifies another key difference between requests and 
suggestions, in what he calls ‘reversibility: the property that allows a message to be construed 
in two qualitatively difference ways, in this case with respect to the actions required of the 
participant’ (Gorassini, 2002, p. 172). According to Gorassini, requests are usually 
interpreted only in one way, in that the recipient of a request will almost always be expected 
to make the requested response (e.g. raising a hand in response to the request ‘raise your
19 Request technique to gain compliance, in which the focal request is preceded by a smaller request that is 
bound to be accepted
20 Request technique to gain compliance, in which the focal request is preceded by a larger request that is 
bound to be refused
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hand’). Suggestions, on the other hand, are open to two contrasting interpretations. One 
construal is that the recipient of a suggestion refrains from making the suggested response 
and waits for the suggested response to occur by other means. The other interpretation is 
that the recipient of a suggestion makes the suggested response in a more general attempt to 
experience the suggestion. For example, making an arm go down whilst experiencing the 
suggested notion that it is getting heavier and happening by itself.
Consistent with these conceptualisations are studies that indicate that requests of a 
reasonable nature elicit unanimous voluntary responses, whereas suggestions of a 
reasonable nature bring about involuntary responses in a relatively small proportion of 
individuals (e.g. Gorassini, 2002; Spanos & Barber, 1972; Spanos & Gorassini, 1984; 
Weitzenhoffer, 1974). For example, in a study by Spanos and Gorassini (1984), participants 
were administered three suggestions and three requests in a counterbalanced order. The 
requests instructed participants to make a series of motor responses while the suggestions 
implied that the same responses occurred involuntarily. Results indicated that participants 
displayed a greater behavioural response to requests but rated their responses to suggestions 
as more involuntary than responses to requests. Similarly, Spanos and Barber (1972) and 
Weitzenhoffer (1974) found that responses to suggestions tended to be rated as more 
involuntary than those made to a request.
8.1.2. Is a request always a request?
Although requests are usually voluntary responses, there is evidence indicating that some 
participants may rate their responses to requests as occurring at least moderately 
involuntarily, in both hypnotic (Weitzenhoffer, 1974; Spanos & Barber, 1972) and non­
hypnotic contexts (Spanos & Gorassini, 1984). A possible explanation for this phenomenon 
may lie in the structure of experimental situations, which may create ambiguity for 
participants regarding their classification of their responses to requests (Spanos & Gorassini, 
1984). The requests in these experiments ask for participants to make a series of somewhat
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‘arbitrary’ motor responses with no meaningful goal-directed sequence. This is in stark 
contrast to behaviours in everyday situations, which are carried out to achieve a particular 
purpose. Nevertheless, the relative frequency of such responding following hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic procedures (e.g. task-motivation instructions) remains to be determined. 
Researchers and clinicians often assume that an intended suggestion acts as suggestion and a 
request acts as a request. However these findings, although found in only a minority of 
participants, raise an important issue that intended requests may indeed be interpreted and 
function as suggestions, which may in-turn confound results and have unforeseen 
consequences therapeutically (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 2000)
8.1.3. Planned behaviours
The recipient of a suggestion may engage either to refrain from making the suggested 
response or to make the suggested response (Gorassini, 1997, 2004). Gorassini (1988-1989, 
1997) proposed four different strategies, each leading to a different response pattern, which 
could reasonably be formulated in response to a suggestion. He postulated that two 
strategies would result in responses contrary to a suggestion. As suggestions imply that a 
response will happen by itself, caused by a source external to the self, participants 
accordingly may plan to: (i) wait for an involuntary response to occur -  wait strategy, (ii) 
use imagery which is often requested by suggestions (e.g. ‘regard your arm as heavier than 
lead’), but refrain from making the suggested response -  imagine strategy.
On the other hand participants may directly produce the suggested response, which may 
take one of two strategy forms with participants planning to: (iii) comply with the 
suggestion and attempt to behave in accordance with the suggestion and appear to be 
experiencing an involuntary response -  cold acting strategy, (iv) make the suggested response 
in an attempt to generate suggested experiences, sensations, emotions and associated 
involuntariness -  hot acting strategy.
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Several studies have investigated the relationship between plans and hypnotic responding 
(Gorassini, 1988-1989, 1997; Katsanis, Barnard 8c Spanos, 1988-1989; Silva 8c Kirsch, 1992; 
Spanos, Burnley 8c Cross, 1993). The pattern of findings in most of these investigations is 
similar, and taken together the results from these studies reveal that approximately 75% of 
participants indicate planning to wait for suggested responses to occur by themselves. Of 
these 75%, half planned to solely wait for a response to occur (wait strategy) and half 
planned to use imagery in conjunction with waiting (imagine strategy). 10% of participants 
revealed that they planned to only comply with the suggestions (cold act strategy), whilst the 
remaining 15% reported planning to make the suggested responses in addition to 
attempting to produce the suggested experiences (hot acting strategy). Hypnotic responding 
has been consistently reported as correlating negatively with waiting, not at all with cold 
acting and positively with hot acting (Gorassini, 1988-1989, 1997; Katsanis et al., 1988-1989; 
Silva 8c Kirsch, 1992, Spanos et al., 1993). The correlation between hypnotic responding and 
wait plans with imagery has been shown to be positive in some studies (Gorassini, 1997;
Silva 8c Kirsch, 1992; Spanos et al., 1993), or absence in others (Gorassini, 1988-1989; 
Katsanis et al., 1988-1989). Both Gorassini (1997) and Silva and Kirsch (1992) argue that 
the positive correlation between imagining and hypnotic performance is the result of a 
misclassification of the hot act strategy, due to a failure to recognise the source of volition 
and a high awareness of instructions to concentrate on imaginings. This research is 
supportive of the notion that hypnotic responding does not purely involve involuntary 
control and signifies that planned behaviours achieved through self-deception (hot acting), 
may play an important role in responding to hypnotic suggestions (Gorassini, 1997, 2004)
8.1.4. Request-to-suggestion carryover
Although researchers have given considerable attention to delineating the nature and 
differences between responding to suggestions and requests, they have not examined in a 
systematic way the influence of compliance with a prior request on responses to suggestion. 
As far as the author is aware only one study has examined how behaviour performed in
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response to requests influences responsiveness to suggestion. In a unique study by Gorassini 
(2002), 20 participants were initially requested to raise an outstretched arm (move 
condition) or to hold an outstretched arm still but imagine it rising (hold still condition).
All participants were found to comply with the particular request given. Subsequently, all 
participants were administered suggestions, in a non-hypnotic context, for arm rising 
movements. The results indicated that eight out of the ten participants in the move 
condition (i.e. were earlier requested to move) produced the suggested movements, whilst 
suggested responses failed to occur in all ten participants in the hold still condition. The 
study provides evidence supporting a request-to-suggestion carryover effect, with 
participants failing to exhibit movements if initially requested to hold still, but exhibiting 
suggested movements if initially requested to move.
One possible explanation for this effect is that compliance with the request influenced task 
strategies for responding to the suggestion (Haley, 1958). In other words, participants who 
produced an arm movement in response to the request to move believed that a similar 
movement was required in response to the suggestion to move. In contrast, participants who 
kept their arms motionless in response to the hold still request believed that a similar lack of 
movement was required in response to the suggestion to move (Gorassini, 2002; Haley, 
1958). Another possible explanation for the request-to-suggestion carryover effect m aybe 
attributed to a response set (e.g. Kirsch, 2000a). Participants may have learned to act in a 
certain way, to move or hold still, in response to initial requests, which could have resulted 
in the formation of a response set linking communications regarding arm movements to 
responses. Subsequent suggestions to move may have automatically elicited the learned 
response to either move or hold still (Gorassini, 2002; Kirsch 2000a).
Although the study provides evidence of robust request-to-suggestion carryover, caution 
needs to be taken when interpreting these findings. The principal shortcoming of 
Gorassini’s (2002) study was that it only measured behavioural responses and failed to 
measure whether participants experienced suggested scenarios as subjectively real and
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involuntary -  both of which are hallmarks of a true response to a suggestion (e.g. Lynn et 
al., 1990; Weitzenhoffer, 1953). In the absence of measured involuntariness and subjective 
experience, the behavioural responses to suggestions could have simply been due to 
compliance. There was also no way of determining whether participants were actually 
responding to requests voluntarily. A second fundamental limitation of Gorassini’s (2002) 
study was its lack of assessment of processes potentially responsible for the carryover 
phenomenon. Finally, the request-to-suggestion carryover was demonstrated using only a 
very small sample (N = 20) and one ideomotor suggestion for arm movement. It remains to 
be seen whether request-to-suggestion carryover would still occur with a larger sample of 
participants and with a greater variety of ideomotor, cognitive and challenge suggestions.
8.1.5. Study objectives
Given that the practice of making requests is inextricably linked to the administering of 
suggestions and hypnotic induction procedures in general, it is important to know the 
conditions under which compliance with requests influences responsiveness to suggestions. 
The findings of Gorassini (2002) indicate that compliance with a request can have a major 
impact on responsiveness to an ideomotor suggestion in a non-hypnotic context. However, 
therapeutic and experimental suggestions are usually administered in a hypnotic context. 
The influence of compliance to requests on responsiveness to a variety of suggestions in a 
hypnotic context has yet to be systematically investigated. The first aim of the current study 
was to examine the influence of compliance to requests in a hypnotic context on 
suggestibility. The second aim of the study was to address the role of strategy selection in 
responses to suggestion in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts. The current 
investigation also addressed the principal shortcomings of the Gorassini (2002) study by 
including measures of subjective experience and involuntariness for both suggestions and 
requests.
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A similar method to that used in Study 2 and Study 4 was employed. Participants were 
initially presented with a suggestibility measure in the absence of any formal instructions or 
mention of hypnosis. A hypnotic context was then established and participants were 
presented with the suggestibility measure for a second time following either: (i) standard 
relaxation instructions (RX condition); (ii) requests to actively produce movements plus 
relaxation instructions (MOVE condition); or (iii) requests to imagine movements plus 
relaxation (IMAG condition). Behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness 
measures of responsiveness to suggestion were obtained. Strategies used by participants to 
respond to suggestions were also measured. It was hypothesised that suggestibility would 
significantly increase following requests to: (i) make movements (MOVE condition) and (ii) 
imagine movements (IMAG condition), with suggestibility change in these two groups 
being significantly greater than relaxation instructions alone (RX condition). The data 
reviewed above allowed for the possibility that requests to make movements may have a 
considerable influence on behavioural responses. Previous research indicates that response 
control in a hypnotic context is similar to response control outside of a hypnotic context. It 
was thus expected that responding to suggestion would be negatively correlated with wait 
plans and positively correlated with hot acting in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts.
8.2 Method
8.2.1. Design
For the reasons outlined in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1.), the influence of compliance to 
requests on responsiveness to suggestion was tested in a 3 x 2 (condition x context) 
between-within design, with induction condition as the three level independent variable 
(RX vs. MOVE vs. IMAG). Participants in each of the three experimental conditions 
received suggestions in both non-hypnotic (SA,: first suggestibility assessment) and 
hypnotic contexts (SA2: first suggestibility assessment). In line with the methodology used in 
the previous three studies and the recommendations by Braffman and Kirsch (1999), the
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order of non-hypnotic and hypnotic assessments of suggestibility were not counterbalanced. 
Changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness suggestibility scores 
from SA, to SA2 were the principle dependent variables.
8.2.2. Measures
8.2.2.1 Suggestibility scale
As in Study 4, suggestibility was measured on the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility Form C: (WSGC; Bowers, 1993, 1998; Kirsch et al., 1998). The 
WSGC is a group adaptation of the individually administered Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), and consists of 
twelve test suggestions. The same adapted WSGC used in Study 4 was used in this study (see 
Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.1). Four test suggestions were deemed unsuitable for repeated 
presentation (age regression; negative visual hallucination; posthypnotic suggestion; 
amnesia), and consequently the adapted WSGC consisted of eight suggestions in total and 
included two ideomotor suggestions (hand lowering; moving hands together), two 
challenge suggestions (arm rigidity; arm immobilisation), and four cognitive suggestions 
(dream; mosquito hallucination; music hallucination; taste hallucination). Two versions of 
the scale were created, with the same items in different testing orders, which were 
counterbalanced and presented across the conditions. However, the relative order of 
ideomotor, challenge and cognitive suggestion was always maintained across the two tests. 
The scale was used to measure suggestibility before the induction manipulation (SA,) and 
after the induction manipulation (SA2).
The scoring of the suggestibility items was adapted from the WSGC (behavioural: Bowers, 
1998; subjective: Kirsch et al., 1998) and the CURSS (involuntariness: Spanos et al., 1983) and 
is described in detail in Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.1. However, for convenience, the 
behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness scoring of the suggestibility items 
will also be briefly described here. Self-reported behavioural responses to suggestions were
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obtained by having participants indicate whether the behavioural response called for by the 
suggestion occurred or not (0 = no; 1= yes). Total behavioural scores were the sum of these 
ratings (range 0-8). Subjective responses to suggestions were obtained by having 
participants rate on a 5-point Likert scale, the degree to which they felt the subjective effects 
called for by each suggestion (1 = not at all; 5 = to a great degree). Subjective experience of 
responsiveness to suggestion was assessed as the sum of these ratings (range 8-40). Finally, 
experienced involuntariness scores were obtained by having participants rate the degree to 
which their response to each suggestion was experienced as involuntary (0 = not at all; 3 = 
great degree). Participants were scored as experiencing involuntariness for each suggestion, if 
the classic combination of behavioural occurrence and non-volitional experiencing 
occurred. Therefore, a score of 1 was given, if the behavioural criterion had been passed and 
involuntariness was either rated moderate or rated high (see section 7.2.2.). Otherwise a 
failing score of 0 was given. Experienced involuntariness of responding to suggestion was 
assessed as the sum of these ratings (range 0-8).
8.2.2.2. Strategy choice
Strategies used by participants to respond to suggestions were assessed following SAt (non­
hypnotic context) and SA2 (hypnotic context). Strategy selection was measured using a 
planning questionnaire (Gorassini 1988-1989, 1997; planning questionnaire presented in 
Appendix 8.1), which describes four actions strategies -  wait, imagine, cold act, and hot act 
-  per suggestion. Participants selected the one alternative that best characterised their 
planning. For example, for the arm rigidity suggestion, which suggested that an outstretched 
arm was becoming stiff and unable to bend, the alternatives were:
(i) Did you plan simply to wait7. When you heard this suggestion, you may have
thought something like the following: ‘The suggestion is predicting that the arm 
will stiffen automatically’. Thus, you chose to refrain from stiffening the arm 
deliberately, and to observe if it became stiffer on its own.
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(ii) Did you plan to produce imaginings? When you heard this suggestion, you may have 
thought something like the following: ‘I am expected to imagine-along with the 
suggestion, and this will lead automatically to the arm getting stiff. Thus you chose 
to imagine-along with the suggestion, but you refrained from making the arm go 
stiff deliberately.
(iii) Did you plan to produce the response deliberately7. When you heard this suggestion 
you may have thought something like the following: ‘I am expected simply to stiffen 
the arm deliberately’. Thus you chose to stiffen the arm deliberately.
(iv) Did you plan to create a realistic experience in yourself. When you heard this 
suggestion, you may have thought something like the following: ‘The suggestion 
would like me to make the arm feel realistically as if it can not bend’. Thus, you 
made the arm stiff and simultaneously tried to make the arm feel as if it could not be 
bent.
For each item, planning with respect to the item’s principal response was assessed. Four 
planning scores -  wait, imagine, cold act, and hot act -  were obtained. They reflected the 
frequency over the eight suggestions that each of the plans was endorsed, in both non­
hypnotic (SAt) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts. In line with Gorassini (1997), a count score per 
suggestion was also calculated to assess internal consistency of the planning questionnaire. 
The count score indicated the number of responses beyond waiting that was planned. The 
wait strategy was scored 0; the imagine and cold act strategies were scored 1; and the hot act 
strategy was scored 2. Response count scores ranged from 0-2 per suggestion and internal 
consistency coefficients for non-hypnotic and hypnotic planning were 0.81 and 0.79, 
respectively, indicating high reliability.
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8.2.3. Hypnotic context and inductions
A hypnotic context was explicitly established by making reference to hypnosis after SA,, 
using the following instructions adapted from Braffrnan & Kirsch (1999):
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions, only this time we will ask you to experience them whilst in hypnosis. So in 
this version, the suggestions will be preceded by a hypnotic induction to help you 
become hypnotised.’
Three induction conditions were created each consisting of either: initial relaxation 
instructions, plus additional relaxation instructions (RX condition); requests to actively 
produce movements, plus relaxation instructions (MOVE condition); or requests to 
imagine movements, plus relaxation instructions (IMAG condition; instructions for 
relaxation and requests to produce and imagine movements presented in full in Appendix 
8.2). The relaxation instructions common to all induction conditions were adapted from the 
CURSS (Spanos et al., 1983) and were included in order to provide a realistic hypnotic 
context and to maximise responsiveness to suggestions in all conditions. These instructions 
served as a standard relaxation procedure (adapted relaxation instructions presented in 
Appendix 5.5). All instructions and suggestions were recorded onto audio compact disc to 
increase experimental control.
8.2.4. Requests
Prior to SA2, participants in the MOVE and IMAG conditions received three requests for: (i) 
a head movement consisting of the head falling forward till it touched the chest; (ii) an arm 
movement consisting of an arm-out-front to arm-pointing-straight-up motion; and (iii) a 
hand clasp movement consisting of clasping both hands together tightly with the fingers 
interlaced. Participants in the MOVE condition were requested to make each one of these 
movements. In contrast, participants in the IMAG condition were requested only to imagine
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each one of these movements (see Appendix 8.2). To determine the nature of responses to 
these requests (e.g. were they carried out; were they experienced as voluntary) behavioural 
and experienced involuntariness scores were obtained for each request (full questionnaire 
assessing responses to requests presented in Appendix 8.3). Participants were required to 
rate on a dichotomous scale (0 = no; 1= yes) whether they responded to each request. 
Behavioural responses to requests were assessed as the sum of these ratings (range 0-3). 
Experienced involuntariness for responses to requests were assessed using a 4-point Likert 
scale on which participants rated their response to each request as being involuntary (0 = 
not at all; 3 = great degree). Involuntariness responses to requests were assessed as the sum of 
these ratings (range 0-12).
In contrast to those in the MOVE and IMAG conditions, participants in the RX condition 
did not receive explicit movement related requests prior to SA2. Instead, they received 
relaxation instructions that emphasised feeling pleasantly comfortable and relaxed (see 
Appendix 8.2).
8.2.5. Participants
In all 105 participants (55 males 8c 50 females) took part in this study. All participants were 
undergraduate and graduate university students, with the majority being recruited from 
University College London. The age of participants ranged from 18-34 years, with a mean 
age of 20.53 years (SD = 2.52). All signed up for an experiment entitled, ‘the influence of 
state and context on behaviour’, and participated in one of the following three conditions: 
RX (N = 35, 17 male, 18 female); MOVE (N = 35, 18 male, 17 female) or IMAG (N = 35, 20 
male, 15 female). Participants were randomly allocated to conditions on the day of 
assessment, and were tested in small groups of 2-5 participants. Psychology students were 
excluded from this study due to their experience with hypnotic procedures during their 
course and familiarity with the investigators. The joint UCL/UCLH Committee on the
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Ethics of Human Research approved this study; informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.
8.2.6. Procedure
Participants were tested in small groups (2-5 participants) in a quiet room. After reading the 
study information sheet and providing consent, all participants were presented with SA,. 
Participants were informed that is was a measure of their ability to involve themselves in 
various experiences. After scoring SA, and strategy selection responses, a hypnotic context 
was explicitly established and participants were given an explicit opportunity to withdraw 
from the study. Participants were then given either: relaxation instructions (RX condition); 
requests to actively produce movements, plus relaxation instructions (MOVE condition); or 
requests to imagine movements, plus relaxation instructions (IMAG condition), depending 
on which experimental condition they had been assigned to. SA2 was then presented and 
behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion were scored and strategy selection responses obtained for the second time. In 
addition, responses to requests were assessed for participants in the MOVE and IMAG 
conditions. At the end of the session participants were asked to respond to a set of questions 
that asked what they thought the experiment was about: i) before they arrived at the testing 
session; ii) after the first set o f suggestions; and iii) after the second set o f suggestions.
8.2.7. Statistical analyses
SPSS for Mac OS X (version 11) was used for the analyses of data. The effects of Condition 
on (i) suggestibility (behavioural, subjective, involuntariness) and (ii) strategy dimensions, 
were tested using a 3 x 2 (condition vs. context) between-within analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVA). Suggestibility/strategy scores at SA,were taken as covariates. Comparison of 
the means were carried out by Fisher’s protected least significant difference (LSD) test 
(Carmer & Swanson, 1973; Howell, 1997). For each suggestibility and strategy dimension 
measure, a paired-samples Student’s t-test was performed comparing suggestibility/strategy
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scores for the first suggestibility assessment (SA,), with suggestibility/strategy scores for the 
second suggestibility assessment (SA2). A rejection region of at least value p < 0.05 was 
selected and used throughout (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
8.3. Results
Naivety concerning the experiment involving hypnosis and hypnotic procedures was 
maintained throughout the study for almost all participants. However five participants from 
the RX condition; one participant from the MOVE condition; and three participants from 
the IMAG condition reported that the experiment might have been related to hypnosis after 
the first assessment of suggestibility (SA,). Means and correlation were calculated for both 
the full sample and sub-sample of participants who reported no awareness or suspicion that 
the study concerned hypnosis. The patterns of means and correlations were virtually 
identical for the two data sets, so analyses of the full sample are reported here.
Means and standard deviations of responses to suggestion in both non-hypnotic (SA,) and 
hypnotic (SA2) contexts are presented in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1. As an important part of 
the analyses, quantification of the effect of condition on responsiveness to suggestion was 
calculated (see Table 8.1). The data were screened for univariate and multivariate outliers. 
No cases were found to have standardised scores in excess of ± 3.29 (p < 0.001, two-tailed 
test). The data were normally distributed, with no skewness and kurtosis values exceeding 
standardised scores of ± 3.29 (p < 0.001, two-tailed test). Mahalanobis distances (critical 
values, x2(6> = 22.458, p < 0.001) were calculated. No cases were found to have Mahalanobis 
distances greater that the critical value demonstrating the absence of multivariate outliers.
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Table 8.1. Mean (standard deviation) responses to suggestions for the relaxation (RX), requests to
produce movements (MOVE) and requests to imagine movements (IMAG) conditions, in both non­
hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic (SA2) contexts.
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
SA, sa2 Effect
Size
SA, SA2 Effect
Size
SA, SA2 Effect
Size
RX 3.31 3.71 0.21 20.03 21.20 0.20 2.46 2.34 -0.07
(1.86) (2.04) (5.52) (6.26) (1.74) (1.63)
MOVE 3.09 4.77 1.16 19.77 20.74 0.19 2.37 2.26 -0.07
(1.56) (1.37) (5.30) (5.16) (1.68) (158)
IMAG 2.91 4.03 0.69 18.00 22.06 0.75 2.26 3.34 0.63
(1.46) (1.81) (5.14) (5.87) (1.65) (1.81)
Note.
Behavioural scores are ratings of behavioural responses to suggestions & are defined as the number of 
suggestions passed out of eight. Subjective scores are ratings of degree to which participants felt the 
subjective effects called in each suggestion & were rated out of forty (i.e. measured on a scale of 1-5 for 
each of the eight suggestions). Involuntariness scores are ratings of experienced involuntariness of 
suggestions & defined as the number of suggestions passed out of eight
Table 8.2. Frequency distribution (percentages) of changes in behavioural, subjective and experienced 
involuntariness measures of suggestibility as function of instructions for relaxation (RX), requests to 
produce movements (MOVE) and requests to imagine movements (IMAG)
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase Decrease Same Increase
RX 6 15 14 13 5 17 12 15 8
(17%) (43%) (40%) (37%) (14%) (49%) (34%) (43%) (23%)
MOVE 0 2 33 9 3 23 6 25 4
(0%) (6%) (94%) (26%) (8%) (66%) (17%) (71%) (12%)
IMAG 4 5 26 4 1 30 5 4 26
(12%) (14%) (74%) (12%) (3%) (85%) (14%) (12%) (74%)
Note.
A decrease was when participants’ responses to suggestion were lower at SA2 (after an induction) when 
compared to their responses at SA, (prior to an induction). Same refers to when participants’ responses to 
suggestions were the same at both SA, and SA2 An increase was when participants’ responses to suggestion 
were higher at SA2 when compared to their responses at SA,
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Figure 8.1. Mean (standard error) behavioural, subjective and involuntariness suggestibility scores for the
relaxation (RX), requests to produce movements (MOVE) and requests to imagine movements (IMAG)
conditions
□  SA1 □  SA1
M OVE IMAG
C o n d i t i o n
MOVE IMAG
C o n d i t io n
MOVE
C o n d i t io n
IMAG
Correlations between non-hypnotic suggestibility (SA,)and hypnotic suggestibility (SA2) 
were significant for all measures in each condition: behavioural (RX: r = 0.777, p < 0.001; 
MOVE: r = 0.696, p <  0.001; IMAG: r = 0.702, p < 0.001); subjective (RX: r = 0.778, p < 
0.001; MOVE: r = 0.872, p < 0.001; IMAG: r = 0.778, p < 0.001); experienced
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involuntariness (RX: r = 0.755, p  < 0.001; MOVE: r = 0.916, p  < 0.001; IMAG: r = 0.775, p  < 
0.001). Concerning behavioural responses, 6 participants (17%) in the RX condition passed 
fewer suggestions following instructions for relaxation only, 15 (43%) showed no change at 
all, and 14 (40%) exhibited greater suggestibility. No participants in the MOVE condition 
showed a decrease in behavioural scores, with 2 participants (6%) showing no change, and 
33 (94%) showing a greater behavioural response following requests to make movements. 
Four participants (12%) in the IMAG condition reported reduced behavioural responses, 
whilst 5 (14%) reported no change, and 26 (74%) reported greater behavioural responses 
following requests to imagine movements. The frequency distributions of changes in 
behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness measures of responsiveness to 
suggestion for each condition are displayed in Table 8.2.
8.3.1. Effect of condition on suggestibility
The ANCOVA for behavioural scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F
(2.ioi) = 9.053, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in behavioural suggestibility scores 
was significantly different between: (i) the IMAG and RX conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.05];
(ii) the MOVE and IMAG conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.05]; and (iii) the MOVE and RX 
conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.001]. There were no significant differences in behavioural 
suggestibility scores for Condition at SA,. Behavioural scores significantly increased, from 
SA,to SA2, for both the MOVE [ t(34) = 8.617, p  < 0.001] and IMAG conditions [ t(34) = 5.067, 
p  < 0.001]. No significant difference in behavioural scores, from SA,to SA2, was found for 
the RX condition.
As with behavioural scores, the ANCOVA for subjective scores indicated a significant main 
effect for Condition [F(2101) = 7.185, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in 
subjective suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the IMAG and RX 
conditions [LSD test, p  < 0.01]; and (ii) the IMAG and MOVE conditions [LSD test, p  < 
0.001]. The difference between the MOVE and RX conditions on change in subjective
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suggestibility scores was non-significant. There were no significant differences in subjective 
suggestibility scores for Condition at SA,. Paired-samples t-tests revealed a significant 
increase in subjective scores from SA,to SA2> for both the MOVE [ t{34) = 2.168, p < 0.05] 
and IMAG conditions [ t (34) = 6.429, p  < 0.001]. No significant difference in subjective scores 
from SA,to SA2, was found for the RX condition.
The ANCOVA for experienced involuntariness scores indicated a significant main effect for 
Condition [F(2101) = 16.319, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in experienced 
involuntariness suggestibility scores was significantly different between: (i) the IMAG and 
RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; and (ii) the IMAG and MOVE conditions [LSD test, p 
< 0.001]. The difference between the MOVE and RX conditions on change involuntariness 
suggestibility scores was non-significant. As with both behavioural and subjective scores, 
there were no significant differences in experienced involuntariness suggestibility scores for 
Condition at SA,. Experienced involuntariness scores were only found to significantly 
increase, from SA,to SA2, for the IMAG condition [ t (34) = 5.478, p < 0.001]. No significant 
differences in experienced involuntariness scores, from SA,to SA2, were found for either the 
MOVE or RX conditions.
8.3.2. Effect of condition on strategy dimensions
Means and standard deviations for strategy scores in each condition are presented in Table 
8.3 and Figure 8.2. Correlations between strategy and suggestibility dimensions are 
presented in Table 8.4.
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Table 8.3. Mean (standard deviation) strategy scores reported in non-hypnotic (SA,) and hypnotic (SA2)
contexts.
W ait Imagine Cold Act Hot Act
SA, sa 2 SA, sa2 SA, sa2 SA, sa2
RX 3.71 3.20 1.86 2.31 1.09 0.80 1.34 1.71
(167) (1.37) (1-48) (1.62) (0.98) (0.80) (0.91) (1.34)
MOVE 3.74 2.26 2.23 1.37 0.77 3.91 1.26 0.49
(2.63) (1.79) (2.39) (1.63) (1.70) (2.03) (1.79) (0.78)
IMAG 3.86 1.80 1.91 3.17 0.94 0.77 1.29 2.23
(2.07) (1.51) (1.90) (1.64) (1.11) (0.94) (1.58) (1.66)
Note.
Planning scores -  wait, imagine, cold act, and hot act -  reflect the frequency over 
that each of the plans were endorsed
the eight suggestions
Table 8.4. Correlations between strategy and suggestibility scores in both non 
hypnotic (SA2) contexts
-hypnotic (SA,) and
Non-hypnotic context (SA,) Hypnotic context (SA2)
Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness Behavioural Subjective Involuntariness
RX
W ait -0.35* -0.32 -0.30 -0.49** -0.41* -0.48**
Imagine 0.04 0.05 0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.03
Cold Act 0.23 0.09 -0.02 0.31 0.21 0.03
Hot Act 0.34* 0.41* 0.35* 0.38* 0.38* 0.42*
MOVE
W ait -0.35* -0.29 -0.36* -0.48** -0.35* -0.27
Imagine 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.28 -0.25 -0.06
Cold Act -0.04 -0.07 0.11 0.50* 0.34* 0.17
Hot Act 0.39* 0.44** 0.36* 0.35* 0.39* 0.30*
IMAG
W ait -0.27 -0.33 -0.38* -0.66*** -0.64** -0.65***
Imagine -0.11 0.07 0.09 0.35* 0.50** 0.47**
Cold Act -0.01 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 -0.27 -0.21
Hot Act 0.38* 0.36* 0.40* 0.56** 0.40* 0.40*
Note.
*p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Figure 8.2. Mean (standard error) wait, imagine, cold act and hot act strategy scores for the relaxation
(RX), requests to produce movements (MOVE) and requests to imagine movements (IMAG) conditions
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The ANCOVA for wait strategy scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F
(2,ioi) “  6.232, p < 0.01]. This effect revealed that change in wait strategy scores was 
significantly different between: (i) the IMAG and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; and
(ii) the MOVE and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.025]. The difference between the IMAG
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and MOVE conditions on change in wait strategy scores was non-significant. There were no 
significant differences in wait strategy scores for Condition at SA,. Wait strategy scores 
significantly decreased, from SA,to SA2, for both the MOVE [ t(34) = -2.926, p < 0.01] and 
IMAG conditions [ t(34) = -5.958, p < 0.001]. No significant difference in wait strategy scores, 
from SA,to SA2, was found for the RX condition.
The ANCOVA for imagine strategy scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition 
(F (2,ioi) = 9.847, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in imagine strategy scores was 
significantly different between: (i) the IMAG and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.05]; (ii) the 
MOVE and IMAG conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; and (iii) the MOVE and RX conditions 
[LSD test, p < 0.025]. There were no significant differences in imagine strategy scores for 
Condition at SA,. Imagine strategy scores significantly increased, from SA,to SA2, only for 
the IMAG condition [ t (34) = 3.016, p < 0.01]. No significant differences in imagine strategy 
scores from SA,to SA2 were found for either the RX or MOVE conditions.
The ANCOVA for cold act strategy scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition 
[F (2,ioi) = 61.441, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in cold act strategy scores was 
significantly different between: (i) the MOVE and RX conditions [LSD test,p < 0.001]; (ii) 
the MOVE and IMAG conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]. The difference between the IMAG 
and RX conditions on change in cold act strategy scores was non-significant. There were no 
significant differences in cold act strategy scores for Condition at SA,. Cold act strategy 
scores significantly increased, from SA,to SA2, only for the MOVE condition [ t (34) = 7.338, p 
< 0.001]. No-significant differences in cold act strategy scores, from SA,to SA2, were found 
for either the IMAG or RX conditions.
The ANCOVA for hot act strategy scores indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F
(2,ioi) = 17.474, p < 0.001]. This effect revealed that change in hot act strategy scores was 
significantly different between: (i) the MOVE and RX conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]; (ii) 
the MOVE and IMAG conditions [LSD test, p < 0.001]. The difference between the IMAG 
and RX conditions on change in hot act strategy scores was non-significant. There were no
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significant differences in hot act strategy scores for Condition at SA,. Hot act strategy scores 
significantly increased, from SA,to SA2, for the IMAG condition [ t(34) = 2.657, p  < 0.025]. In 
contrast, hot act strategy scores significantly decreased, from SAjto SA2, for the MOVE 
condition [ t(34) = -3.271, p < 0.01]. No significant difference in hot act strategy scores from 
SA,to SA2 was found for the RX condition.
8.3.3. Manipulation check
Independent samples t-tests were used to analyse the behavioural and involuntariness 
responses to requests for participants in the MOVE (requests to make movements) and 
IMAG (requests to imagine movements) conditions. These analyses were used to determine 
whether the inductions used, actually produced the effects they were designed for (i.e. to 
elicit responses to requests). The mean behavioural score for responses to requests was 2.77 
(SD = 0.60) for the MOVE condition and 1.03 (SD = 0.98) for the IMAG condition. 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that behavioural responses to requests were 
significantly higher for the MOVE condition in comparison with the IMAG condition [t (68)
= 8.948, p < 0.001]. The mean experienced involuntariness score for responses to requests 
was 3.26 (SD = 2.75) for the MOVE condition and 3.20 (SD = 2.44) for the IMAG 
condition. Independent sample t-tests indicated no significant differences between the 
MOVE and IMAG conditions with respect to experienced involuntariness scores for 
responses to requests.
8.4 Discussion
8.4.1. Effect of condition on responses to suggestion
This study set out to examine the influence of compliance to requests, in a hypnotic context, 
on suggestibility. In line with expectation, behavioural and subjective measures of 
responsiveness to suggestion increased significantly (from SA,to SA2), following requests to 
actively produce movements (MOVE condition). Indeed the mean effect size of requesting
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participants to actively produce movements on behavioural responses to suggestion was 
large. The inclusion of requests to imagine movements (IMAG condition) not only resulted 
in significant increases in behavioural and subjective suggestibility, but also in experienced 
involuntariness of responses to suggestion. The mean effect sizes of requesting participants 
to imagine movements on all measures of suggestibility were substantial, varying from 0.63 
to 0.75 (see Chapter 3). Neither behavioural, subjective nor involuntariness measures of 
suggestibility significantly increased following instructions for relaxation in a hypnotic 
context (RX condition). Moreover, increases in behavioural responses to suggestion were 
significantly higher for the MOVE condition compared to the IMAG and RX conditions. 
Whereas, increases in subjective and involuntariness responses to suggestions were 
significantly higher in the IMAG condition compared to both the MOVE and RX 
conditions. As predicted, these findings are supportive of the request-to-suggestion 
carryover effect reported by Gorassini (2002), indicating that compliance to requests has a 
major impact on responsiveness to suggestion. Specifically, requests to make movements 
have a significant impact on behavioural responses to suggestion, whilst requests to imagine 
movements appear to effect subjective and involuntariness aspects of responding to 
suggestion in addition to the behavioural component.
8.4.2. Effect of condition on strategy dimensions
Another key aim of the study was to address the role of strategy selection in responses to 
suggestion in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts, allowing an assessment of the 
potential processes responsible for the carryover phenomenon. In the non-hypnotic context 
(which was identical for each condition), on average, 47% of participants, in all conditions, 
indicated that they solely planned to wait for suggested responses to occur (wait strategy). 
25% of participants indicated that they planned to use imagery, which is often requested by 
the suggestions (imagine strategy). 12% planned to comply with the suggestions attempting 
to behave in accordance with the suggestions (cold act strategy). The remaining 16% of 
participants planned to respond by attempting to generate suggested experiences, sensations
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and emotions (hot act strategy). These results are consistent with the findings on planning 
in a hypnotic context (e.g. Gorassini, 1988-1989; 1997; Katsanis et al., 1988-1989; Spanos et 
al., 1993). In addition, the current study found wait plans to significantly correlate 
negatively with responses to suggestions, whilst hot act plans were found to significantly 
correlate positively. Similar results were also reported by studies that investigated the 
relationship between planning and hypnotic responding (e.g. Gorassini, 1988-1989; 1997; 
Katsanis et al., 1988-1989; Spanos et al., 1993).
These findings may indicate that the hypnotic context per se does not determine planning 
behaviour, but it is the suggestions themselves that are responsible for them. Indeed as 
predicted, suggested responding was found to be negatively correlated with wait plans, and 
positively correlated with hot acting in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts for all 
conditions. Further support for this notion comes from the planning behaviour of 
participants in the RX condition (who received relaxation instructions in a hypnotic 
context), which on the whole did not change. There were no significant changes in any of 
the four planning dimensions, from a non-hypnotic context (SA,) to a hypnotic context 
(SA2). The correlations between planning dimensions and responses to suggestions in the 
hypnotic context were also similar to the ones in the non-hypnotic context.
In contrast with the RX condition, planning behaviour for participants in both the MOVE 
and IMAG conditions significantly changed from SA, to SA2. For participants in the MOVE 
condition, both wait and hot act strategy scores significantly decreased, whilst cold act 
strategy scores significantly increased. Indeed, the increase in cold-act strategy scores for the 
MOVE condition was significantly higher when compared to changes in these scores for 
both the IMAG and RX conditions. Participants in the IMAG condition, however, revealed 
a significant increase in imagine and hot act strategy scores. Moreover, these increases were 
significantly higher compared to imagine and hot act strategy score changes for both the 
MOVE and RX conditions. A similar significant decrease in wait strategy scores was found 
for the IMAG and MOVE conditions.
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These results indicate that requests to make movements facilitate behaviour to comply and 
behave in accordance with suggestions, but not to generate the suggested subjective 
experiences. This may help to explain the large increase in behavioural suggestibility and the 
lack of increase in experienced involuntariness found for participants in the MOVE 
condition. Participants who made movements in response to requests may have believed 
that similar behavioural movements were merely required in responding to subsequent 
suggestions. Supportive of this is the finding that cold act strategy was significantly 
positively correlated with responding to suggestion following requests to make movements. 
Nevertheless, subjective responses to suggestions increased following responses to requests 
for movement, which indicates that participants in the MOVE condition did not only 
produce objective responses, but also experienced some of what was being suggested. This 
may have been as a consequence of requests to produce movements, the hypnotic context, 
or a combination of both. Evidence from participants from the RX condition, suggests that 
the hypnotic context alone would not have been responsible. An important next step would 
be to investigate the effect of responding to requests on a range of suggestions in a non­
hypnotic context.
On the other hand, requests to imagine movements enhances: (i) plans to wait for suggested 
responses to occur, whilst planning to use imagery; and (ii) plans to self-deceive by behaving 
in accordance with suggestions and intending to produce the experiences that go with the 
suggestions. A possible explanation for the significant increases in behavioural, subjective 
and involuntariness measures of suggestibility for participants in the IMAG condition, may 
lie in the significant increases in imagine and hot act strategies. Both planning dimensions 
correlated significantly with suggested responding following requests to imagine 
movements. Although hot acting has consistently been found to correlate positively with 
suggested responding (e.g. Gorassini, 1988-1989; 1997; Katsanis et al., 1988-1989; Spanos et 
al., 1993), a positive correlation has only been observed in some studies (e.g. Gorassini,
1997; Silva & Kirsch, 1992). Silva and Kirsch (1992) argue that the positive relationship 
between imagining and hypnotic responding is a misclassification of the hot acting strategy,
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due to a low awareness of information pointing to volition, and high awareness of 
instructions to concentrate on imaginings and use imagery (Gorassini, 1997). Consequently, 
participants may report using a imagine strategy, when in-fact a hot acting strategy was 
used.
This highlights a potential weakness of the current study with respect to imprecision in 
strategy measurement. As with previous studies, the current study relies on self-report 
methodology to reveal the strategies chosen and the link between strategy selection and 
suggested responses, which is open to potential distortion. According to Gorassini (1997), a 
random reporting error would result in a failure to report the actual strategy used in 
addition to reporting a strategy from a set of equally incorrect alternatives. However, if 
strategy reporting were generally accurate, but with some random error, then strategy 
response parallelism would be evident. The trend in research in this area, including this 
study generally supports strategy-performance parallelism indicating that strategy reporting 
on the whole is accurate. Although post-hoc reports of strategy selection may increase the 
likelihood of bias, Katsanis et al., (1988-1989) showed that obtaining plan results before or 
after administering suggestions had no effect on strategy reporting or responsiveness to 
suggestions (cf. Gorassini, 1997).
8.4.3. Interpretation of requests
The wording of requests (e.g. ‘I want you to make/imagine a movement’) clearly defines the 
participant as the source of response. Therefore, compared to suggestions, instructions 
should be explicitly interpreted as self-generated actions (Gorassini, 2004). Consequently, 
requests of a reasonable nature should almost always bring unanimous compliance. Indeed, 
participants that were requested to make movements produced almost unanimous 
behavioural responses. A minority of participants produced behavioural responses when 
requested to imagine movements. Requests should, if interpreted correctly, result in 
uniformly voluntary responses (e.g. Spanos & Gorassini, 1984), with experienced
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involuntariness scores for requests being zero or very close to zero. The mean experienced 
involuntariness scores for requests for participants in the MOVE and IMAG conditions was 
low. However, they were not zero or as close to zero as one might expect, which implies that 
some participants may have responded to requests as they would suggestions. This 
phenomenon was also found in a minority of participants by Weitzenhoffer (1974) and 
Spanos and Gorassini (1984) and reiterates the importance of being aware of the type of 
communications (e.g. suggestions or instructions) being used, so as to counter potential 
unforeseen consequences.
8.4.4. Conclusions
In conclusion, it is evident that people do not only plan to wait passively for suggested 
responses to occur, in either non-hypnotic or hypnotic contexts. Planning to refrain from 
making responses was found to correspond to an absence of responding and therefore was 
consistently found to correlate negatively with suggested responding. Planning to self- 
deceive through hot acting was correlated positively and most reliably with suggested 
responding, as it results in the occurrence of suggested responses with accompanying non- 
volitional experience. Compliance to requests was found to have a major impact on 
responsiveness to suggestion. The present research carries important implications for the 
use of suggestion in psychotherapy, providing a potential means of increasing 
responsiveness to suggestion by shifting people’s strategies from waiting to doing (Haley, 
1958). Requests to make movements could be incorporated into clinical and experimental 
procedures to maximise behavioural responses to suggestion, whilst requests to imagine 
movements/scenarios could be used to enhance subjective reality and non-volition.
Although the causal link between planned behaviour and responses to suggestions has yet to 
be established, this study indicates that suggested responding may be in part, conceptualised 
as planned actions.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
Chapter overview
The results of each of the empirical studies have been examined, analysed and discussed 
within the context of the scope of the thesis at the end of each chapter. This final chapter 
integrates the findings of the empirical work and proposes directions for the future 
development of research on suggestion and hypnosis.
9.1. Background and aims o f the thesis
The thesis made a clear distinction from the outset between the hypothetical ‘hypnotic state’ 
and the phenomena produced by suggestions, proposing that suggestion is separable from 
hypnosis, despite the common practice of making no distinction between the two.
In Chapter 1 a review of the wider literature on suggestion and suggestibility revealed that 
although there is a no accepted classification for these phenomena, there is a general 
agreement concerning their multidimensional nature. The findings with respect to non­
hypnotic suggestibility21 are at best inconclusive, beset with conceptual difficulties as a result 
of a variety of factors including: vague classification based on differences that are not always 
meaningful; a lack of test standardisation; and a general paucity of research in this area. The 
chapter also reviewed research pertaining to suggestion and suggestibility within the 
‘domain of hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973), which has been heavily influenced by the ‘primary / 
secondary’ suggestibility distinction first conceptualised by Eysenck and Furneaux (1945). 
The former is claimed to involve behavioural and experiential involuntary responses to
21 Distinct from the type of suggestibility assessed by hypnotisability scales and suggestions that are 
typically included within the ‘domain of hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973)
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direct verbal suggestion, whilst the latter relates to tendencies such as, gullibility, conformity 
and compliance. Despite the popular and longstanding belief that hypnosis is only related to 
‘primary’ suggestibility, as championed by Hilgard (1973, 1991), Eysenck and Fumeaux 
(1945) and Evans (1967, 1989), it was argued that the evidence with respects to the 
independence of hypnosis from other types of suggestibility is far from conclusive, as 
illustrated by studies on social influence, the placebo response and interrogative 
suggestibility. In addition it was posited that the relationship between hypnosis and 
suggestibility was further complicated by the methods used to assess ‘hypnotisability’, which 
were deemed not to assess the state of hypnosis or the capacity to develop it, but at best to 
assess some form of suggestibility (Weitzenhoffer, 2000).
Chapter 2 focussed on examining hypnosis and the principle characteristics of the ‘hypnotic 
state’, and although existing theories could account for certain aspects of hypnosis, no single 
theory could account for the entire range of findings concerning the phenomenon. Indeed 
the review of the literature revealed no evidence for a unique state of hypnosis. Nevertheless 
it was argued that different theorists are looking at diverse aspects of the same phenomenon 
(e.g. social, cognitive, phenomenological, physiological) and consequently the search for a 
unitary marker of hypnosis is naive and misguided (Gruzelier, 2000; Woody & McConkey,
2003). In line with Woody and McConkey (2003) and the work of Gruzelier and Crawford 
(e.g. Gruzelier, 1998; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992), it was suggested that the dynamic- 
systems approach (Tart, 1983), which investigates the diversity of states that occur in 
hypnosis and their patterns across time, rather than a unique signature, would potentially be 
a useful framework for future research in this area.
In Chapter 3 it was argued that about the only thing one can say about hypnosis-inducing 
procedures is that in some cases, they appear to cause suggestibility to become enhanced.
The data that exists are based on studies in which the same suggestions were given with and 
without prior induction of hypnosis (e.g. Hull & Huse, 1930; Williams, 1930; Caster &
Baker, 1932; Jenness, 1933; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961; Barber & Glass, 1962; Hilgard &
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Tart, 1966; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). These studies typically found that although 
participants are capable of responding to suggestions in the absence of any formal hypnotic 
induction, their responsiveness to suggestions may be increased by a small but significant 
amount by the induction of hypnosis. However, it was further argued that this moderate 
enhancement in suggestibility as characterised by these studies, is not a true reflection of the 
efficacy of hypnotic inductions, as the size of the experimental effect has not been 
considered (Kirsch, 1997). A review and re-analyses of previous work revealed that the effect 
of the induction of hypnosis on suggestibility was substantial, comparable to psychological 
treatments in general and medical outcomes. This thesis aimed to delineate the variables 
subsumed under the label ‘hypnotic inductions’ that are instrumental to this substantial 
enhancement in responsiveness to suggestion.
9.2. Key findings
A series of experiments were conducted to establish the relationship between hypnosis and 
responsiveness to suggestion. More specifically, these studies aimed to investigate which of 
the independent variables subsumed under the label ‘hypnotic induction’ were instrumental 
and which were extraneous. The following elements were identified as characteristic of a 
typical hypnotic induction:
1. Instructions to become mentally involved or to focus on internal experiences 
(absorption)
2. Instructions to avoid thinking critically producing a reduction in monitoring, 
judging and interpreting (reduced critical thought)
3. The explicit labelling of a procedure as ‘hypnosis’
4. The initial explicit requests for certain activities and then a subsequent shift to 
suggesting the same responses
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In Chapter 4, as preparation for exploring these elements, a study using a large sample of 
participants to explore lateral asymmetry in bodily response to suggestions was described. 
The question of lateralisation of response to suggestion and the notion that one side of the 
body may be more responsive to suggestion, had important implications for how non­
hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility were measured in this thesis. Given that a third of 
items on standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales (e.g. SHSS:C, Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 
1962) involve suggestions with directions for responses on a specific side of the body, it was 
critical to investigate whether suggestibility as measured by these scales could be a function 
of whether the suggestion is lateralised. Participants received either an involuntary 
movement or a motor inhibition suggestion. No significant lateral bias was found for either 
of the two suggestions regardless of whether the response was defined behaviourally, 
subjectively or by experienced involuntariness. The findings provided support for those 
previously reported by Otto-Salaj et al., (1992) and confirmed that there is no lateral 
asymmetry in bodily response to suggestion. Consequently, lateralised test items contained 
in standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales continued to be used in subsequent studies, to 
measure responsiveness to suggestions in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic contexts. The 
implications of these results for the parallels that have been drawn between symptoms of 
conversion disorder and phenomena produced in response to suggestions were also 
discussed (e.g. Babinski & Froment, 1918; Hilgard, 1977; Janet 1907/1929; Kihlstrom, 1992; 
Oakley, 1999b, 2001).
Having examined the relationship between lateral asymmetry and bodily response to 
suggestion, the studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 turned to the nature and role of 
hypnotic induction itself and explored the notion that absorption and reduced critical 
thought are instrumental in how inductions exert their influence. In chapter 5 the 
prediction that the inclusion of instructions for (i) absorption and (ii) reduced critical 
thought will increase suggestibility independent of any effect produced by the hypnotic 
context was investigated in a 3 x 2 (condition x context) between-within design study.
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The findings reported in Chapter 5 were in line with expectation, with responsiveness to 
suggestion increasing significantly following the inclusion of instructions for absorption and 
reduced critical thought. Moreover, instructions for absorption and reduced critical thought 
increased suggestibility over and above that produced by the hypnotic context alone. The 
results may be supportive of the idea that states of absorption and reduced critical thought 
facilitate suggested responding, however, analyses concerning the self-report measures were 
unable to provide strong evidence that participants’ levels of absorption and critical thought 
were affected by the instructions. Consideration was given to the possibility that the 
increased suggestibility may have been due to factors unrelated to state changes such as 
strategy use, expectation and motivation. Nevertheless, self-reported levels of absorption 
were found to predict behavioural, subjective and experienced involuntariness measures of 
hypnotic suggestibility regardless of condition.
Chapter 6 examined a wider range of potential relationships between absorption and 
reduced critical thought in relation to suggestibility, by assessing suggestions for pain 
modulation. In addition, the association between pain modulation and hypnotic 
suggestibility was investigated. Based on the results in Chapter 5, it was predicted that 
changes in responses to suggestions for pain modulation would be significantly greater 
when instructions for absorption or reduced critical thought were given, compared with 
instructions for relaxation alone. From the research reviewed in Chapter 6, it was also 
expected that high hypnotically suggestible participants (HHSp) would show a greater 
increase in responses to pain modulation suggestion following a hypnotic induction, 
compared to low hypnotically suggestible participants (LHSp) and medium hypnotically 
suggestible participants (MHSp).
The findings reported in Chapter 6 are partially consistent with the predictions made. In 
support of the hypotheses, responsiveness to pain modulation suggestions increased 
significandy following the inclusion of instruction for absorption, with the increases being 
over and above that produced by the hypnotic context alone. However, contrary to what
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was predicted, responses to pain modulation suggestions did not significantly increase 
following the inclusion of instructions for reduced critical thought. It was proposed that 
although such instructions facilitate responding to suggestions found in hypnotic 
suggestibility scales, they may not be useful for the more clinically oriented suggestions for 
the control of pain. Consistent with the results reported in Chapter 5, self-reported 
absorption was significantly associated with changes in responsiveness to pain modulation 
suggestions. Analyses concerning the self-reported measures and ‘typicality’ ratings indicate 
that the increased suggestibility reported may be related to a state of absorption and/or with 
participants’ expectations.
With respect to the effect of hypnotic suggestibility on pain modulation, it was found that 
responses to pain modulation suggestion in a non-hypnotic context were significantly 
greater for HHSp in comparison to MHSp, who in turn were significantly more responsive 
that LHSp. In fact HHSp were more responsive to suggestions than MHSp and LHSp 
regardless of whether hypnosis was induced or not, which is consistent with the view that 
responding to ‘hypnotic’ suggestions is a normal propensity independent of hypnosis per se. 
It was predicted that HHSp would display the greater increases in responsiveness to pain 
modulation suggestions, and although responses for HHSp generally did increase following 
a hypnotic induction, it was found that MHSp were the ones who showed the largest gains 
from the addition of a hypnotic induction. That is HHSp were very responsive to both non­
hypnotic and hypnotic suggestions and their responsiveness was not affected much by the 
hypnotic induction procedure. In contrast MHSp showed relatively lower levels of 
responsiveness to non-hypnotic suggestion, and significantly higher levels of response to the 
same suggestions administered during hypnosis. As discussed in Chapter 6, this emphasises 
the importance for future studies to include MHSp in their designs, but more importantly 
may imply that a large percentage of people could benefit from the control and 
management of pain via hypnotic intervention.
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Chapter 7 aimed to systematically investigate the effect that a hypnotic induction has on 
responsiveness to suggestion and to determine the extent to which the magnitude of this 
effect is altered by labelling the procedure ‘hypnosis’. The results indicated that the hypnotic 
induction itself produces a moderate increase in responses to suggestions. However, the 
effect was moderated by whether the induction was labelled ‘hypnosis’ or ‘relaxation’. There 
were no significant increases in responsiveness to suggestion following the use of a hypnotic 
induction that was labelled as ‘relaxation’. In contrast responsiveness to suggestion 
increased significantly following the use of the same hypnotic induction that was labelled as 
‘hypnosis’. These data imply that the extent to which suggestion affects conscious 
experience appears to depend more on the individual’s perception that the context can be 
identified as ‘hypnosis’, and on the beliefs and expectations that this raises, then it does on 
the intrinsic properties of the induction procedure itself.
Chapter 8 focussed on the complex communications, which comprise of suggestions and 
requests that are often used in a hypnotic context to alter experiences, thoughts and 
behaviour. Given the common practice of making requests before and during the 
administering of suggestions, the study reported in this chapter aimed to examine the 
influence of compliance to requests in a hypnotic context on suggestibility and address the 
role of strategy selection in responses to suggestion in both non-hypnotic and hypnotic 
contexts. It was hypothesised that suggestibility would significantly increase, over and above 
any effect produced by the hypnotic context alone, following compliance to requests to (i) 
make movements; and (ii) imagine movements. In addition, based on previous research, it 
was expected that suggested responding would be negatively correlated with planning to 
wait for a response to occur (wait strategy) and positively correlated with planning to make 
the suggested response in an attempt to generate the suggested experiences (hot acting 
strategy).
It was found that compliance to requests had a major effect on responsiveness to suggestion. 
Requests to make movements had a significant impact on behavioural responses to
237
suggestion, whilst requests to imagine movements appeared to affect subjective and 
involuntariness aspects of responding in addition to the behavioural component. It was also 
found, in line with expectation that planning to refrain from making responses 
corresponded to an absence in responding, whereas planning to self-deceive through hot 
acting was associated with suggested responses.
9.3. General discussion
9.3.1. Putting the findings into context
Examination of a model of brain processing that originated from neuropsychological 
studies investigating associative learning and memory in animals (Oakley, 1985) and which 
has been subsequently developed to account for aspects of consciousness and self awareness, 
(Halligan & Oakley, 2000; Oakley & Eames, 1985), suggestibility (Brown & Oakley, 2004) 
and phenomena associated with hypnosis and hysteria (Oakley 1999a, 1999b, 2001), help to 
place the results presented here into context (also see Chapter 5). The essential features of 
this model as it relates to the present results are shown in Figure 9.1. Following a 
preattentive stage of processing, a centralised executive structure (the Primary Attentional 
System - PAS), samples the resultant processing hypotheses and selects the best-fitting ones 
in the light of previous experience to create primary representations that can form the basis 
for action. In routine situations the selected primary representations automatically activate 
related cognition and action schemata and lead to behaviours that are executed rapidly, 
efficiently and without volitional effort.
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Figure 9.1. A heuristic model of information processing showing the relationship between underlying 
processes (level 2) and subjective experience (level 1). See text for further explanation (modified from 
Brown & Oakley, 2004; Oakley, 1999a, 1999b, 2001)
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These PAS control processes correspond to contention scheduling in the model proposed by 
Norman and Shallice (1986). Where the existing knowledge base is inadequate to specify 
appropriate action schemata, in novel situations for example, a higher level secondary 
attentional system (SAS), similar to the supervisory attentional system of Norman &
Shallice (1986), exercises planning and goal setting capacities to create secondary
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representations from the representations (hypotheses) provided by the PAS. Secondary 
representations can then achieve behavioural output via their influence on the PAS.
In this model those primary and secondary representations that are selected through the 
action of the SAS, as being relevant at any one time to the primary goal of the individual, 
form the content of subjective experience. The term ‘Level T is used to refer to the 
subjective accompaniments of processing and ‘Level 2’ refers to the brain processes that 
underlie them.
The model assumes that the mechanisms of suggestion in hypnosis and outside it are 
fundamentally the same. The results presented in this thesis support this view, 
demonstrating consistently high correlations between responses to non-hypnotic and 
hypnotic suggestions and strong evidence that many individuals can produce ‘hypnotic’ 
phenomena in response to suggestion without an induction. Suggestions are seen as external 
influences that serve to raise the likelihood of a particular hypothesis being selected by the 
PAS as the basis for the generation of primary representations. Once selected by the PAS 
the suggested hypothesis (or ‘rogue representation’) is capable of evoking a brain state 
comparable to that of the suggested effect. In the perceptual domain this could result in a 
non-veridical sensory experience or the loss of awareness of a sensation that is physically 
present. Appropriate suggestions may also result in the direct elicitation of a motor 
response, such as arm levitation, which is experienced as involuntary. Alternatively the 
rogue representation may invoke the inhibition of an intended motor output, such as limb 
paralysis.
The model posits that suggestions may have their effect directly at the level of the PAS 
(‘concentrative’ responding) or indirectly via the SAS (‘constructive’ responding)22. Within 
this framework, (a) the inclusion of instructions to become absorbed and reduce critical
22 As Brown and Oakley (2004) point out, although a distinction in styles of responding is made, it is likely 
that these styles overlap in practice, with some individuals adopting one style under some circumstances 
and another in a different situation.
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thought23; (b) compliance to requests; and (c) the label ‘hypnosis’ may enhance 
suggestibility by increasing the likelihood of a suggestion being acted upon (i.e. of a rogue 
representation being selected by PAS). A state of absorption and reduced critical thought 
may maximise the representation activation produced by the words of the suggestions, and 
consequently be a key component of the concentrative response style (Brown & Oakley,
2004). However, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, absorption and a reduction in critical 
thought may facilitate responsiveness to suggestion by increasing the use of strategies, and 
consequently may also facilitate constructive responding. Compliance to requests may 
enhance the use of SAS strategies such as engaging in goal-directed imaging, which would 
influence PAS activity and therefore suggested responding. Indeed the findings in Chapter 8 
encompass the notion of constructive responding, revealing that planning to make the 
suggested responses in addition to attempting to produce the suggested experience (hot 
acting strategy) were correlated positively and most reliably with suggested responding. In 
this model the label ’hypnosis’ can be seen as a suggestion that activates existing preattentive 
representations about hypnosis, leading to the selection by the PAS of hypotheses that 
influence an individuals experience in the ‘hypnotic’ situation both directly and via 
subsequent representation in SAS. Important among these may be beliefs about the 
involuntariness of responding. In particular the label ‘hypnosis’ may serve as a meta­
suggestion that the effects of suggestion are enhanced following ‘hypnotic’ induction 
procedures.
The results reported in this thesis are consistent with this model, which provides a 
framework that accommodates both ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ perspectives of hypnosis, with 
both hypnotic procedures and suggestion operating at the level of the executive control 
systems. From the ‘generic state’ position, a ‘real’ subjective state-change is felt at Level 1, as
23 Although instructions for a reduction in critical thought had no effect on responsiveness to pain 
modulation suggestions, and was unable to predict changes in responsiveness to suggestion, it is 
important to note that absorption and reduced critical thought may be viewed synergistically and its 
conceivable that they reflect different aspects of the same cognitive processes (i.e. increased absorption 
may subsequently lead to less critical thought).
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reflected by what the individuals concerned report of their experience. From the ‘generic 
non-state’ stance, the phenomena and the accompanying subjective experiences are the 
products of social influence and implicit perceptions of the role requirements during 
hypnosis as they are enacted at Level 2.
9.3.2. So what of suggestion and hypnosis?
9.3.2.1 The effect of hypnosis on responses to suggestion -  anything new?
Hypnotic inductions are procedures intended to elicit hypnotic phenomena that precede 
clinical interventions and test suggestions contained in standardised hypnotic suggestibility 
scales (Edmonston, 1991). However, data on the nature and role of hypnotic induction 
procedures is surprisingly lacking, and as argued throughout the thesis probably the only 
thing one can say about them with any conviction is that they enhance suggestibility in 
some cases. The present body of work approached the relationship between hypnosis and 
suggestion from an objective standpoint, by measuring and comparing responses to 
suggestion without a hypnotic induction with responses to the same suggestions following a 
hypnotic induction.
The considerations raised in this thesis indicate that multiple factors within the psychosocial 
context and within the experience of subjects influence the alterations of cognition and 
sensation brought about by suggestion. The effect of individual factors on responses to 
various types of ‘hypnotic’ suggestion has received little explicit recognition in the general 
literature. However, the investigations reported here help identify the relative influence of 
elements of hypnosis, or more correctly existing hypnosis-inducing procedures, have on 
responses to suggestion. Taken together, the findings reveal that the essential elements of 
induction procedures are the definition of the situation as hypnotic which in turn enhances 
the expectation of benefits; the focussing of attention and the reduction of critical thought; 
and the facilitation of engaging in goal-directed behaviours through compliance to requests.
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Although the results presented here are consistent with the notion that hypnotic 
phenomena can be suggested successfully without a prior induction procedure, the fact 
remains that hypnotic induction procedures do increase suggestibility substantially.
Between 60 -  94% of participants that received (a) instructions to become absorbed or 
reduce their critical thought or (b) requests to make or imagine movements, experienced an 
increase in responsiveness to suggestion. These increases in responses to suggestion were 
significantly greater than those participants that received relaxation instructions in a 
hypnotic context, of which between only 23-40% experienced an increase in suggestibility. 
Similarly between 60-80% of participants that received an induction labelled ‘hypnosis’ 
experienced an increase in suggestibility, in comparison to only 23-40% of participants that 
received the same induction but labelled ‘relaxation’. Consequently, if these elements can be 
reasonably and plausibly applied to an appropriate clinical or experimental procedure that 
employs suggestion to achieve its effects, then they should be used. Identification and 
knowledge of these factors can be more directly and optimally utilised by both patients and 
health care providers, thus providing an impetus to the development of improved 
therapeutic techniques.
Another key contribution of the body of work reported here was the quantification of the 
effect of hypnotic inductions and the elements that characterise them. Previous research has 
typically described the increase in suggestibility produced by hypnotic inductions as being 
small but significant (e.g. Barber & Glass, 1962; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Hilgard & Tart, 
1966; Weitzenhoffer & Sjoberg, 1961). It was argued that the examination of mean 
differences was not a true reflection of the efficacy of hypnotic inductions, as the size of the 
experimental effect had not been examined and that effect sizes would be a more accurate 
way of determining the relative magnitude of the effect of hypnotic inductions (Kirsch, 
1997). On examination of effect sizes, the ‘true’ effect of hypnotic inductions and the 
essential elements that they are comprised of (as identified above) on responses to 
suggestion was found to be very substantial indeed.
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The measurement of experienced involuntariness is a distinguishing feature of the research 
presented here and one of its major strengths. The experience of involuntariness is often 
cited as one of the hallmarks of a response to a suggestion (Lynn et al., 1990; Weitzenhoffer, 
1953, 2000). Weitzenhoffer claims a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a 
communication to be termed a suggestion is that the suggested behaviours and experiences 
are accompanied by a feeling of involuntariness (i.e. the ‘classic suggestion effect’). 
Unfortunately, the measurement of experienced involuntariness has frequently been 
ignored, resulting in individuals being credited for responses to suggestion, which they did 
not actually demonstrate (Weitzenhoffer, 2002). This is one of the most significant 
weaknesses of previous studies, that has been remedied in those reported in this thesis.
Hypnotic inductions increase responsiveness to suggestions. This was already known, but 
what was not known was which variables subsumed under the label ‘hypnotic induction’ 
were instrumental to this increase and just how great this increase was. That is the foremost 
contribution of this thesis.
9.3.2.2. Suggestion and hypnosis -  one and the same?
A key underlying premise of this thesis is that hypnosis and suggestion are not one and the 
same and that suggestibility is not hypnotisability. Unfortunately many researchers do not 
differentiate between suggested effects and those specific to the hypnotic state. For example, 
in the recent special issue of the International Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Hypnosis on brain imaging and hypnosis, Killeen and Nash (2003) include the following 
definition of a hypnotic procedure that was put together by those attending the University 
of Tennessee Brain Conference:
‘A hypnotic procedure is a protocol used to establish a hypnotic situation and evaluate 
responses to it. In such situations one person (the subject) is guided by another (the 
hypnotist) to respond to suggestions for alterations in perception, thought, and action. 
If the constellation of responses to standardized suggestions satisfy a criterion, we
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infer that the procedure induced a hypnotic state. Hypnotic responses are those 
responses and experiences characteristic of the hypnotic state’ (p. 208).
There are two fundamental flaws with this definition. Firstly, the definition relies on circular 
reasoning. If the presence of a ‘hypnotic state’ is to be inferred from a ‘constellation of 
responses to standardised suggestions’ the ‘hypnotic state’ cannot in turn be used to explain 
responsiveness to suggestion. Secondly, responsiveness to suggestion as an index cannot tell 
us for certain whether an individual is hypnotised or not. This definition highlights the two 
main components of hypnosis -  ‘trance’ and ‘suggestion’ (Heap and Aravind, 2002). 
Unqualified suggestibility has traditionally been considered a sign of hypnosis. However, no 
matter how many other so-called signs of hypnosis are observed (e.g. dilation of the pupil; 
spontaneous amnesia; trance logic, fixity of gaze; alteration of the sense of time -  see 
Weitzenhoffer 2000, for a comprehensive list of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ signs that have 
been associated with hypnosis), if suggestibility is absent, none of the typical phenomena of 
hypnosis (e.g. amnesia, hallucinations, analgesia) are produced.
As has been continually repeated throughout this thesis, there is no evidence as of yet for a 
‘discrete state’ or ‘discrete states’ of hypnosis, involving unique patterns of psychological 
structures. Although a ‘trance’ state without suggestibility is possible, given that this would 
have little effect without specific suggestions for altered perception, could this ‘trance’ state 
be called hypnosis? -  perhaps not, but that would be a matter for debate if such a trance 
‘state’ were eventually to be identified. However, as the review of suggestion in Chapter 1 
revealed, suggestibility is not unique to hypnosis, and therefore it seems equally plausible 
that no matter how central suggestion is to the production of so-called hypnotic 
phenomena, hypnosis may not be unique to suggestibility. Nevertheless, suggestibility has 
been the only feature that has been intimately associated with hypnosis that can be 
objectively and more or less numerically assessed. Assessment of hypnosis and the capacity 
to develop it beyond suggestibility remains practically non-existent, with the exception of 
the Field Inventory (Field, 1965) and the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI;
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Pekala, 1991b), which measure the depth of hypnosis but do not make direct use of 
suggestibility. However, the validity of such scales is usually established on how well their 
measures correlate with measures of suggestibility obtained from the Stanford scales and as 
Weitzenhoffer (2002) points out there are no good reasons for believing that the assessment 
of the hypnotic state should necessarily also measure suggestibility. The ‘hypnotic state’ may 
perhaps only be clearly detected with ultra responsive individuals, so-called ‘virtuosos’, and 
it is these individuals that may be able to provide the basis of a specific index of hypnosis 
beyond suggestibility. The experiential approach developed by Price and Barrell (1980), 
which utilises the first-person and third person perspectives to discover the common 
dimensions and interrelationships within specific types of experiences, provides a 
potentially useful paradigm to develop such an index.
The thesis also raises the question of whether there is a distinction between non-hypnotic 
and hypnotic suggestibility. The current work adopted Kirsch’s distinction between 
suggestibility, hypnotic suggestibility and hypnotisability. Suggestibility and hypnotic 
suggestibility are defined as responsiveness to suggestion in non-hypnotic and hypnotic 
contexts respectively. Hypnotisability, on the other hand, is defined as the change in 
suggestibility following a hypnotic induction procedure. The distinction between non­
hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility typically rests on the use of a procedure called 
hypnosis. Both Kirsch (1997) and Wagstaff (1998a) have raised the possibility of eliminating 
this distinction. According to Kirsch (1997) ‘hypnosis could be defined as responding to 
suggestions used in hypnotisability scales, regardless of whether an induction has been 
used’, (p. 221). Wagstaff (1998a) on the other hand proposes that ‘we consider ‘hypnosis’ 
not as something in a separate category from suggestion, but rather as a suggestion in itself 
... [a] suggestion that one is entering a special state or condition called hypnosis’ (p. 160).
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9.3.3. Future directions
Increasingly, discussion is turning to the effects of the clinical efficacy of hypnosis as an 
adjunct to psychological and pharmacological therapies, as well as its cost-saving role in 
healthcare. Future work needs to identify, which individuals will benefit from the addition 
of hypnosis to a clinical protocol and which individuals would be served better by 
therapeutic suggestions in a non-hypnotic context. The finding that medium hypnotically 
suggestible individuals appear to significantly benefit from a hypnotic induction, whilst high 
and low hypnotically suggestible individuals seem to be as responsive to hypnotic 
suggestions as they are to non-hypnotic suggestions may provide a useful starting point. 
However, previous research indicates that hypnotic suggestibility is not always a very good 
predictor of treatment outcome and even when a relationship is found, as with pain 
modulation, it is usually relatively modest (e.g. Bates, 1993; Hilgard & Hilgard, 1994; Kirsch, 
1999; Patterson & Jenson, 2003).
Suggestibility has been measured in this thesis, with the exception of one study, using 
standardised hypnotic suggestibility scales. A possible avenue for future exploration would 
be to use other types of suggested effects within the ‘domain o f hypnosis’ (Hilgard, 1973) 
that are not reflected in these scales but play an important part in applied clinical and 
medical settings. The study reported in Chapter 6 used suggestions for pain modulation, 
which is a good example of a practical use of hypnosis (i.e. pain management) that is not 
reflected in the test items used in standardised scales. Other examples include, specific 
suggestions to modulate attention, intentionality and awareness of control and suggestions 
for behaviours that mimic more closely the symptoms of conversion and dissociative 
disorders, such as paralysis and blindness. Research of this sort would help elucidate the 
relationships between induction procedures and suggestibility that are of clinical relevance 
and can increase the efficacy of hypnosis as a clinical and experimental tool.
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Unfortunately, over the last 300 years hypnosis has been associated with limitless bizarre 
and extraordinary ideas and practices such as occultism, magic, and pseudo-science, which 
are responsible for many of the negative attitudes people have towards it. As a consequence 
of this, any treatment associated with hypnosis may be refused by funders of health care or 
by the proposed client. However, as Kirsch (1999) points out, hypnosis is an adjunct to 
therapy rather than a treatment, and the findings reported here indicate that the addition of 
a hypnotic induction procedure could improve treatment outcome. This will be particularly 
true for suggestive and imagery-based therapies for many different conditions that have 
psychological, functional or psychosomatic components, such as chronic and acute pain, 
eating disorders, anxiety disorders and dissociative disorders. Equally, elements such as 
instructions to become absorbed, focus on internal experiences and avoid thinking critically 
could easily be incorporated into cognitive behavioural therapies, without the hypnosis 
label. Future research could investigate whether the instrumental elements identified in this 
thesis to characterise hypnotic induction procedures, are able to increase responsiveness to 
suggestion when used in a non-hypnotic context. This may lead to knowledge about, and 
identification of, the factors that optimally influence responses to non-hypnotic suggestions, 
thus improving therapeutic techniques for both patients and health care providers.
Finally it is important to reiterate the proposal that future work should, in the first instance 
at least, treat suggestion and hypnosis separately. We need to determine if there is more to 
hypnosis than suggestion. The physiological and neurological evidence that could be 
provided by neuroimaging could potentially answer this question. With the upsurge in 
interest in the use of hypnosis as a tool to study cognitive phenomena, it becomes 
increasingly more important to establish whether: (i) there are ‘discrete states’ of hypnosis 
involving patterns of psychological structures; and (ii) the experiences produced in hypnosis 
(i.e. after a hypnotic induction) by suggestion, are dependent on this hypothetical ‘trance’ 
state. Only two neuroimaging studies (Rainville et al., 1999; Rainville et al., 2002) have 
directly addressed the status of hypnotic states, without confounding the effects of 
‘hypnosis’ with the effects of specific suggestions. Both these studies identified and
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characterised hypnosis as involving changes in brain activity within regions involved in the 
control of consciousness states, such as the brainstem, the thalamus and the anterior 
cingulate cortex, as well areas such as the ventrolateral frontal and right posterior parietal 
cortices which have been shown to regulate attentional processes through the mechanisms 
of executive attention. At present, although there is emerging evidence that hypnosis can be 
understood in terms of known attentional processes and brain systems, we still do not know 
about its necessity or if suggested effects that occur prior to a hypnotic induction are 
represented differently in the brain compared to suggested effects following a hypnotic 
induction. Based on the strong correlation between suggestibility in the two contexts, it 
seems likely that hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestions are governed by the same causal 
mechanisms. In fact, Hull wrote over 70 years ago that there is ‘no phenomenon [that] can 
be produced in hypnosis that cannot be produced to lesser degrees by suggestions given in 
the normal waking condition’ (Hull, 1933, p. 391). Neuroimaging data on the effects of 
suggestion without hypnosis could help definitively establish the cognitive and 
neuropsychological mechanisms that underlie hypnosis and suggestion, which is important 
if research on hypnosis and suggestion is to contribute meaningfully to the growth of the 
cognitive neurosciences and psychology in general.
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Appendix 4.1
Instructions and Suggestions for Involuntary Movement 
and Motor Inhibition
Instructions A and suggestions for arm lightness/raising
‘Good, just sitting comfortably, with your eyes closed and your hands resting easily on your 
legs begin to relax as much as you can and breathe easily and regularly. In a moment or two 
you will hear some suggestions relating to the feelings you have in your hands and arms. I 
would like you to concentrate on these suggestions and to think along with them. Absorb 
yourself in them. Do not try and analyse your thoughts or feelings... the more you are able 
to just let yourself go along with the instructions the easier it will be to experience what is 
being suggested. Nothing that you will be asked to experience or do will be embarrassing or 
harmful in any way. In fact most people simply find this a very relaxing and interesting 
experience. Just breathing easily and regularly and continuing to listen to the tape.’
‘Continue to relax -  breathing easily and gently. In a moment I will ask you to focus on your 
hands and to pay attention to particular feelings in one of them ... feelings of lightness and a 
feeling that that hand wants to move upwards all by itself, easily and without effort.’
‘Please be aware of the sensations in your two hands and notice perhaps that one them is 
feeling slightly different. A small tingle maybe or a feeling of pressure, a twitch of a muscle 
or some other feeling which tells you that particular hand is becoming lighter and lighter 
and is wanting to move upwards all by itself. Just beginning to want to move... move 
upwards as it feels lighter... and lighter... Your hand moving upwards... The whole arm 
becoming lighter and wanting to move upwards... Up and up... Moving up a little at first 
and then higher and higher as it gets lighter and lighter... just moving up and up... higher
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and higher... easier and easier without any effort all by itself. Up and up. Up and up. That 
hand and arm just feeling lighter and lighter right up to your shoulder, and rising 
upwards... bit by b it... up and up... all by itself. Just moving up and up, lighter and lighter, 
higher and higher. And once you feel that hand beginning to move, just allow the 
movement to continue... up and up easily and comfortably, all by itself. The hand and arm 
moving up and up, higher and higher. More and more. Just moving upwards, lighter and 
lighter, up and up until it reaches a comfortable position as high as it can go just at the 
moment... up and up ...up  and up...higher and higher...and just allowing your hand to 
remain in that position easily and comfortably for a moment or two longer’.
[Experimenter completes the observer’s scale on the basis of what has happened up to this 
point and where the hand is now]
‘Good and now that hand and arm beginning to feel normal again... just like the other one 
back to its normal weight and moving back from wherever it now is to rest comfortably 
back on your leg. Just returning to normal feeling and returning to its resting position. 
When both hands are resting comfortably on your legs again wiggle the fingers in both 
hands if you wish... to make sure they feel exactly the same... and then when you are ready 
just open your eyes... still feeling relaxed and comfortable and completely back to normal 
wide awake feelings.’
Instructions B and suggestions for arm heaviness/immobility
‘Good, just sitting comfortably, with your eyes closed and your hands resting easily on your 
legs begin to relax as much as you can and breathe easily and regularly. In a moment or two 
you will hear some suggestions relating to the feelings you have in your hands and arms. I 
would like you to concentrate on these suggestions and to think along with them. Absorb 
yourself in them. Do not try and analyse your thoughts or feelings... the more you are able 
to just let yourself go along with the instructions the easier it will be to experience what is 
being suggested. Nothing that you will be asked to experience or do will be embarrassing or
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harmful in any way. In fact most people simply find this a very relaxing and interesting 
experience. Just breathing easily and regularly and continuing to listen to the tape.’
‘Continue to relax -  breathing easily and gently. In a moment I will ask you to focus on your 
hands and to pay attention to particular feelings in one of them, feelings of heaviness and a 
feeling that that hand could not move upwards without a great deal of difficulty and effort.’
‘Please be aware of the sensations in your two hands and notice perhaps that one of them is 
feeling slightly different. A small tingle maybe or a feeling of pressure, a twitch of a muscle 
or some other feeling which tells you that particular hand is becoming heavier and heavier 
and is wanting to remain exactly where it is. Just becoming less and less able to move as it 
feels heavier... and heavier... Your hand becoming more and more unwilling to move... 
the whole arm becoming heavier and losing its ability to move... Sinking down heavier and 
heavier... Like a lead weight, as it rests against your leg... as it gets heavier and heavier... 
just too heavy to move... feeling like it could not be moved up no matter how hard you 
tried... just lying loose and heavy. That hand and arm just feeling heavier and heavier right 
up to you shoulder and resting heavily... little by little... more and more difficult to 
move... even if you tried. A feeling that the harder you tried the heavier and heavier the 
hand and arm would be... and less and less able to move... heavy... immobile. And once 
you feel that hand becoming unable to move just feel it ignoring any attempt to move it 
upward. Just try to life that heavy, immobile hand now and just feel how difficult it would 
be to move it more than a small am ount... and maybe it will not even move at all. Keep 
trying now until that hand has moved as much as it can just at the moment or until you 
want to stop trying altogether... heavier and heavier... more and more immobile... just 
allowing your hand to remain in that position easily and comfortably for a moment or two 
longer’.
[Experimenter completes the observer’s scale on the basis of what has happened up to this 
point and where the hand is now]
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‘Good and now that hand and arm beginning to feel normal again... just like the other one 
back to its normal weight and moving back down from wherever it now is to rest 
comfortably back on your leg. Just returning to normal feelings and returning to its resting 
position. When both hands are resting comfortably on your legs again wiggle the fingers in 
both hands if you wish... to make sure they feel exactly the same... and then when you are 
ready just open your eyes... still feeling relaxed and comfortable and completely back to 
normal wide awake feelings.’
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Appendix 4.2
Scoring for Arm Levitation and Arm Immobility 
Suggestions
Arm levitation sample
**Behavioural response to  b e  rec o rd ed  by th e  E xp erim en ter**
1. In r e s p o n se  t o  th e  s u g g e s t io n  o f  arm  lig h tn e ss /u p w a rd  m o v e m e n t:
W h ich  h an d  m o v e d  4  in c h e s  or m o re ?
Left R ight B oth  N eith er  (circle o n e )
**Subjective and experienced involuntariness responses t o  b e  reco rd ed  by th e  P articip ant**
2 . W h e n  it w a s  s u g g e s te d  th a t  o n e  o f  y o u r  h a n d s  w o u ld  b e g in  to  feel lighter and feel like it was beginning to 
move upwards w h ic h  h an d  d id  y o u  g e t  th a t  fe e lin g  in?
Left R ight B oth  N e ith er  (circle o n e )
3 . D uring th is  s u g g e s t io n , h o w  vo lu n tary  d id  th e  m o v e m e n t  fe e l?  (circle a n u m b er)
C o m p le te ly  vo lu n tary  1 2  3  4  5 C o m p le te ly  invo luntary
I m o v e d  it m y se lf Felt like it m o v e d  by itse lf
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Arm immobility sample
**Behavioural response to  b e  rec o r d e d  by th e  E xp erim en ter**
1. In r e s p o n se  to  th e  r e q u e st  t o  try to move the 'heavy' hand/arm a fter  th e  s u g g e s t io n  o f  h e a v in e ss /n o  
m o v e m e n t:
W h ich  h a n d  m o v e d  a n d  by n o  m o r e  th a n  1 inch?
Left R ight B oth  N eith er  (circle o n e )
**Subjective and experienced involuntariness responses to  b e  reco rd ed  by th e  P articip ant**
2 . W h en  it w a s  s u g g e s te d  th a t  o n e  o f  you r  h a n d s  w o u ld  b e g in  to  feel heavier and feel unable to move w h ich  
h a n d  d id  y o u  g e t  th a t  fe e lin g  in?
Left R ight B oth  N eith er  (circle o n e )
3 . D uring th is  s u g g e s t io n , h o w  vo lu n tary  d id n o t  m o v in g  or m o v in g  w ith  d ifficu lty  fe e l?  (circle a n u m b er)
C o m p le te ly  vo lu n tary  1 2  3  4  5  C o m p le te ly  invo luntary
I c o u ld  h a v e  m o v e d  it Felt like I c o u ld  n o t  m o v e
easily  if h ad  tried it easily  e v e n  if I tried
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Appendix 4.3
Handedness Questionnaire (Coren, 1992)
Simply read each of the questions below. Decide which hand you use for each activity and 
then put a check mark next to the answer that describes you the best. If you are unsure of 
any answer, try to act it out to see which hand you are using.
Ind icate  h a n d  p re fere n ce : LEFT H and RIGHT H and EITHER H and
1. W ith  w h ic h  h a n d  d o  y o u  norm ally  w r ite?
2 . W ith  w h ich  h a n d  d o  y o u  d raw ?
3 . W h ich  h an d  w o u ld  y o u  u s e  to  th r o w  a  ball to  h it a 
ta rg e t?
4 . In w h ic h  h a n d  d o  y o u  h o ld  a  te n n is  rack et?
5 . W ith  w h ic h  h an d  d o  y o u  u s e  you r  to o th b r u sh ?
6 . W h ich  h a n d  h o ld s  a  kn ife  w h e n  y o u  are c u ttin g  
th in g s?
7 . W h ich  h a n d  h o ld s  a h a m m e r  w h e n  y o u  nail th in g s?
8 . In w h ic h  h a n d  w o u ld  y o u  h o ld  a  m a tch  to  strike it?
9 . In w h ic h  h an d  w o u ld  u se  an  eraser  o n  p ap er?
10 . W h ich  h a n d  rem o v es  th e  to p  card w h e n  y o u  are  
d e a lin g  from  a d eck ?
11 . W h ich  h an d  h o ld s  th e  th rea d  w h e n  y o u  are  
th rea d in g  a n e e d le ?
12 . In w h ich  h an d  w o u ld  y o u  h o ld  a fly sw a tte r?
C o u n t th e  n u m b er  o f  'le ft', 'right' an d  'e ith er' r e s p o n se s . Y our sco re  is th e  n u m b er  o f  r igh ts m u ltip lied  by 3 , 
plu s th e  n u m b er  o f  e ith ers  m u ltip lied  by 2 p lus th e  n u m b er  o f  le fts . For c o n v e n ie n c e  fill in th e  fo llo w in g :
N u m b er o f  RIGHT r e sp o n se s  x 3  =
N u m b er o f  EITHER r esp o n se s  x 2  =
N u m b er o f  LEFT r e sp o n se s  =
Total =
3 3  to  3 6  =  S tron gly  R igh t-H an d ed
2 9  to  3 2  =  M o d erately  R igh t-H an d ed  (m ixed  r ig h t-h a n d ed )
2 5  to  2 8  =  W eak ly  R igh t-H an d ed  (m ixed  r ig h t-h a n d ed )
2 4  =  A m b id ex tro u s
2 0  to  2 3  =  W eak ly  L eft-H an ded  (m ixed  le ft-h a n d e d )
16 to  19  =  M o d era te ly  L eft-H an d ed  (m ixed  le ft-h a n d ed )
12 to  15  =  S tron gly  L eft-H an d ed
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Appendix 5.1
Suggestibility Scale Constructed by Brown et al., (2001)
This scale can be administered with and without a hypnotic induction procedure. It consists 
of eight test-suggestions taken from the Barber Suggestibility Scale (BSS: Barber, 1965), the 
Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS: Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, 
Stam & Bertrand, 1983), the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, form C (SHSS:C: 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS: Barber 8c Wilson, 
1979).
Participants were initially presented with this suggestibility measure in the absence of any 
formal instructions or mention of hypnosis. They then received the same suggestions in a 
hypnotic context.
In the non-hypnotic context the suggestions were preceded by the following instructions, 
adapted from the instructions used by Braffman and Kirsch (1999):
‘In this part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience various things that will 
be described to you on this audiotape/cd. Your ability to experience them depends largely 
on your willingness to be receptive to ideas and to allow these ideas to act upon you without 
interference. So all you need to do it close your eyes and try to experience what will be 
described to you.’
In the hypnotic context the suggestions were preceded by the following instructions:
‘In this second part of the study, we want to assess your ability to experience the same 
suggestions, only this time we will ask you to experience them whilst in hypnosis. So in this 
version, the suggestions be preceded by a hypnotic induction to help you become 
hypnotised’.
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The hypnotic context was terminated by the following instructions, adapted from the 
CURSS:
‘You’re going to come out of hypnosis in a few minutes... when you do... you’ll feel 
refreshed... wide awake... and in a good m ood... I will count from five to one... and with 
each count you will be more fully awake... five... starting to wake... four... more and more 
awake... three still more and more awake... two... becoming more and more awake... 
one... more awake... open your eyes... wide awake.’
Test-suggestions
1. Arm levitation (BSS)
‘Please hold your left arm straight out in front of you at shoulder height, with the palm of 
you hand facing down. Your left arm straight out in front of you, the palm down. 
Concentrate on your arm and listen to me. Imagine that the arm is becoming lighter and 
lighter... that it’s moving up and up ... It feels as if it doesn’t have any weight at all... and 
it’s moving up and up... more and m ore... It’s as light as a feather... it’s weightless and 
rising in the air... It’s lighter and lighter... rising and lifting... more and m ore... It’s lighter 
and lighter... and moving up and up... It doesn’t have any weight at all... and it’s moving 
up and up... more and more. It’s lighter and lighter... moving up and up... more and 
more... higher and higher.’ (Allow 10 seconds)
‘You can relax your arm now.’
2. Hand lock (BSS)
‘Please keep your eyes closed and clasp your hands together tightly and interlace the fingers. 
Press your hands together, with palms touching. Put them in your lap. Concentrate on your 
hands and hold them together as tightly as you can. Imagine that your hands are two pieces
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of steel that are welded together so that it’s impossible to get them apart. They’re stuck... 
they’re welded... they’re clamped... When I ask you to pull your hands apart they’ll be 
stuck and they won’t come apart no matter how hard you try... They’re stuck together... 
they’re two pieces of steel welded together... You feel as if your fingers were clamped in a 
vise... Your hands are hard... solid... and rigid! The harder you try to pull them apart the 
more they will stick together! It is impossible to pull your hands apart! The more you try the 
more difficult it will become. Try... you can’t.’ (Allow 5 seconds)
‘Try harder... you can’t.’ (Allow 10 seconds)
‘You can unclasp your hands now.’
3. Thirst ‘hallucination’ (BSS)
‘Imagine that you’ve just finished a long, long walk in the hot sun... You’ve been in the hot 
sun for hours... and for all that time you haven’t had a drink of water... You’ve never been 
so thirsty in your life... You feel thirstier and thirstier... Your mouth is parched... your lips 
are dry... your throat is dry... You have to jeep swallowing and swallowing... You need to 
moisten your lips.’ (Allow 3 seconds)
‘You feel thirstier and thirstier... drier and drier... Thirstier and thirstier... dry and 
thirsty... You’re very, very thirsty! Dry and thirsty! Dry and thirsty!’ (Allow 10 seconds)
‘Now imagine drinking a cool, refreshing glass of water.’ (Allow 5 seconds)
4. Arm rigidity (CURSS)
‘Please hold your left arm straight out in front of you at shoulder height... Notice that your 
arm feels slightly numb and that it is beginning to feel tight. Your arm feels tighter and 
tighter... It is becoming stiff and tight... stiff and rigid... Imagine that your arm is in a 
splint so that the elbow will not bend... A tightly splinted arm cannon bend... Your arm
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feels stiff and rigid... solid and rigid... it feels stiff... rigid... and unable to bend... In fact, 
your arm feels so stiff and so rigid that it won’t bend... Test how stiff and rigid it is. Try to 
bend your arm.’ (Allow 10 seconds)
‘Ok, that’s fine, your arm no longer feels stiff or rigid. You can once again bend it easily. Just 
let it relax and replace it in your lap.’
5. Hand repulsion (CURSS)
‘Now please extend both of your arms straight out in front of you at shoulder height with 
palms facing one another... and with the finger tips of one hand touching the finger tips of 
the other... Pay close attention to your hands... Notice the sensations that you feel in your 
hands... warmth... tingly feelings... and a little heaviness... Notice also that your hands are 
beginning to separate and move apart... Your hands are moving further and further apart... 
further and further apart... Your hands feel like two magnets repelling each other... they 
feel as though they are being forced apart... further and further apart... wider apart... 
moving further and further apart.’ (Allow 10 seconds)
‘Ok, that’s fine... just put your arms back in your lap and let them relax.’
6. Music ‘hallucination’ (CIS)
‘Please keep your eyes closed. Now think back to a time when you heard some wonderful, 
vibrant music... it could have been anywhere ... and by thinking back you can hear it even 
more exquisitely in your own m ind... You make it yourself... and you can experience it as 
intensely as real music... The music can be absolutely strong... exquisite... vibrating 
though every pore of your body... going deep into every pore... penetrating though every 
fibre of your being... The most beautiful, complete, exquisite, overwhelming music you 
ever heard... Listen to it now as you create it in your own mind.’ (Allow 15 seconds)
‘You may stop thinking of the music now.’
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7. Arm immobilisation (CURSS)
‘Please place your right forearm on the table in front of you with the palm of your hand 
facing down. Concentrate on your hand and arm. Notice that they are beginning to feel 
heavy... very... very heavy... Imagine that very heavy weights have been placed on your 
hand and arm ... the weights are very heavy... and they pin you hand and arm to the table in 
front of you... The weights are very heavy... and they make your hand and arm feel very 
heavy... very... very heavy... In fact, your hand and arm feel so heavy and so weighted 
down that you won’t be able to lift them from the table... Your hand and arm feel heavy... 
very... very heavy... much too heavy to lift from the table... too heavy even to move... Test 
how heavy your hand and arm are... Try to lift your hand and arm from the table.’ (Allow 
10 seconds)
‘Ok, that’s fine... your hand and arm no longer feel very heavy... and you can now lift them 
without difficulty... Let your hand and arm relax and replace them in your lap.’
8. Taste ‘hallucination’ (SHSS:C)
‘I want you to think of something sweet in your mouth. Imagine that you have something 
sweet tasting in your mouth, like a little sugar... And, as you think about this sweet taste, 
you can actually begin to experience the sweet taste... It may at first be faint, but it will 
grow... and grow... Now, you begin to notice a sweet taste in your m outh... The sweet taste 
is increasing... sweeter... and sweeter... It will get stronger. It often takes a few moments 
for such a taste to reach its full strength... It is now getting stronger... stronger.’ (Allow 10 
seconds)
‘All right. Now notice that something is happening to that taste. It is changing. You are not 
beginning to notice a sour taste in your m oth... an aid taste, as if you had some lemon in 
your mouth, or a little vinegar... The taste in your mouth is getting more and more sour... 
more acid... more and more sour.’ (Allow 10 seconds)
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‘All right. Now, the sour taste is going away, and your moth feels just as it did before I 
mentioned any taste at all. Your mouth is normal now. There, it’s quite normal now, and 
you just continue to relax... more and more relaxed.’
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Appendix 5.2
Scoring Booklet for Brown et al.’s (2001) Suggestibility Scale
This assessment form is to be completed by the experimenter. Behavioural scores were 
measured in a dichotomous fashion for each suggestion. Subjective scores were taken for all 
suggestions. Experienced involuntariness scores were taken for each item for which the 
participant obtained a score on the behavioural assessment (including the half-point on the 
hand-lock item), with the exception of the thirst, taste and music hallucinations for which 
involuntariness scores were taken irrespective of a behavioural response score.
C on d ition :  
S u b ject nu m b er: 
A ae:
A s s e s s m e n t  Form
C o n s e n t form  c o m p le te d ?  Y /  N 
Sex: M /  F
T est 1: B eh avioural
1. A rm  L evitation sc o r e  rise >  4  in c h es 0  /
2 . H and C lasp h a lf if h a n d s  to g e th e r  a fter  5  s e c  0  
o n e  if h a n d s  to g e th e r  a t e n d
/ ’/ , /
3 . Thirst H allu cin ation s c o r e  c lea r  m o u th  m o v e m e n ts ,  
s w a llo w in g  e t c . . .
0  /
4 .  Arm Riqiditv sc o r e  is p p t. d o e s  n o t  b e n d  arm 0  /
5 . H and ReDulsion s c o r e  if h a n d s  m o re  th a n  4  in c h es  apart 0  /
6 . M usic  H allucination sc o r e  c lear  h ea d  n o d d in g 0  /
7 . Arm  Im m obilisa tion s c o r e  if p p t. d o e s  n o t  lift arm  
m o r e  th a n  3  in ch es
0  /
8 . T aste  H allu cin ation sco r e  c lear  in d ication  o f  s w e e t  ta s te
(e .g .  sm ile , licking lips) or so u r  ta s te  (e .g . gr im ace)
0  /
TOTAL BEHAVIOURAL SCORE: /  8
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**  For th o s e  ite m s th a t p artic ip an ts  sc o r e  e ith e r  h a lf or  o n e ,  ask  for  in vo lu n tarin ess  sco res . Take  
in vo lu n tar in ess sco r e s  for  item s 3 , 6  a n d  8  r eg a r d le s s* *
T est 1: (i) Involun tariness; (ii) S u b jec tiv e
1. Arm L evitation
A t first y o u  w e r e  to ld  th a t you r  arm  w a s  g e t t in g  ligh ter  a n d  rising in th e  air. Y our arm  did rise.
W o u ld  y o u  say  th a t you r  arm  fe lt  a s th o u g h  it w a s  rising by itse lf or d id y o u  raise it o n
p u rp o se?  (sco re  involuntary) 0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , to  w h a t  e x te n t  d id yo u r  arm  fe e l  a s  th o u g h  its w a s  ligh t?  /  10
2. Hand Clasp
Y ou  w e r e  th en  to ld  th a t y o u  c o u ld n 't  ta k e  y o u r  h a n d s  ap art b e c a u s e  th e y  w e r e  w e ld e d
to g e th e r . Y ou  d id n 't ta k e  you r  h a n d s  apart. Did y o u  fe e l a s  th o u g h  y o u  couldn't ta k e  th e m
a p art or  w o u ld  y o u  sa y  y o u  k e p t th e m  to g e th e r  to  g o  a lo n g  w ith  th e  te s t?  (sco re  co u ld n 't)  0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , to  w h a t  e x te n t  d id  you r  h a n d s  fe e l  a s  th o u g h  th e y  w e r e  stu ck  to g e th e r ?  /  10
3 . Thirst H allu cin ation
Y ou  w e r e  th en  to ld  th a t y o u  w e r e  very th irsty  b e c a u s e  y o u 'd  b e e n  o n  a lo n g , h o t  w a lk  in th e
Sun. W o u ld  y o u  sa y  y o u  fe lt  th irstier d u rin g  th e  s u g g e s t io n  th a n  b e fo r e ?  (sco re  affirm ative) 0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , h o w  th irsty  d id  y o u  fe e l?  /  10
4 .  Arm  Riaiditv
Y ou  w e r e  th e n  to ld  th a t y o u  c o u ld n 't  b e n d  you r  arm  b e c a u s e  it w a s  in a sp lint. Y ou  d id n 't
b e n d  yo u r  arm . Did y o u  fe e l a s  th o u g h  y o u  couldn't b e n d  it or w o u ld  y o u  say  y o u  d id n 't
b e n d  it to  g o  a lo n g  w ith  th e  te s t?  (sco re  co u ld n 't)  0  /  1
O n a  sca le  o f  1 to 1 0 ,  to  w h a t  e x te n t  d id y o u  fe e l a s  th o u g h  y o u  c o u ld n 't  b e n d  you r  arm ? /  1 0
5. H and  R epulsion
Y ou  w e r e  th e n  to ld  th a t your h a n d s  w e r e  m o v in g  ap art b e c a u s e  th ey  w e r e  rep ellin g  o n e
a n o th e r . W o u ld  y o u  say  th a t yo u r  h a n d s  fe lt  a s  th o u g h  th e y  w e r e  m o v in g  by th e m se lv e s  or
did y o u  m o v e  th e m  o n  p u rp o se?  (sco re  invo luntary) 0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , to  w h a t  e x te n t  d id you r  h a n d s  fe e l  a s  th o u g h  th ey  w e r e  rep ellin g  o n e
a n o th e r?  /  10
6 . M usic  H allucination
Y ou  w e r e  th en  a sk ed  to  im a g in e  a p ie c e  o f  m u sic . Y ou  n o d d e d  you r h e a d  to  s h o w  th a t you
co u ld  h ear  th e  m u sic . Did y o u  h a v e  to  cre a te  th e  m u sic  o n  p u rp o se  or d id it play by itse lf o n c e
it w a s  started ?  (sco re  latter) 0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , to  w h a t  e x te n t  d id y o u  fe e l a s  th o u g h  y o u  w e r e  lis ten in g  to  real m u sic?  /  10
7. Arm  Im m obilisa tion
Y ou w e r e  th e n  to ld  th a t y o u  c o u ld n 't  lift you r  arm  b e c a u s e  it w a s  s o  heavy . Y ou  d id n 't lift your
arm . Did y o u  fe e l a s th o u g h  y o u  couldn't lift It or w o u ld  y o u  say  you  d id n 't lift it to  g o  a lo n g
w ith  th e  te s t?  0  /  1
O n a sca le  o f  1 to  10 , h o w  h ea v y  d id you r arm  fe e l?  /  10
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